Archive for the ‘Philosophy of Science’ Category
Call for Participants: Int. Workshop on Theory (Re-)Construction in the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (TRC2020), Sat & Sun, 7-8 NOV 2020
Int. Workshop on Theory (Re-)Construction in the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (TRC2020)
Sat & Sun, 7-8 NOV 2020 (online, using ZOOM)
Boğaziçi University, Dpt. of Philosophy & Cognitive Science Program, 34342 Bebek/Istanbul, Turkey
CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS
It has been repeatedly observed that the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (ESBS) lack well-developed theoretical superstructures, structures that researchers could apply to generate (point-)predictive empirical hypotheses. The MTR project treats this lacuna as an important reason to explain, and to treat, the ongoing replicability crisis in the ESBS.
To join this meeting as a discussant, please register on or before 1 NOV 2020.
Participation is on-site or online (using zoom). There are no fees.
SPEAKERS
| Amit Pundik (University of Oxford, United Kingdom; Tel Aviv University, Israel) – Predictive Evidence and Unpredictable Freedom Edouard Machery (Keynote) (University of Pittsburgh, United States) – Are perverse incentives responsible for the replication crisis? Erich Witte (University of Hamburg, Germany) – What is a well-supported empirical theory and research program in psychology and how to measure it? Holger Andreas (The University of British Columbia, Canada) – Carnapian Structuralism Johanna Sarisoy (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom) – Methodological Realism in Psychometrics Klaus Fiedler (Keynote) (Heidelberg University, Germany) – Nothing more practical than a good theory… Majid Beni (Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan) – Fleshing out the social aspect of Cognitive Structural Realism Maximilian Maier, Noah van Dongen and Denny Borsboom (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) – Comparing Theories with the Ising Model of Explanatory Coherence Roberto Fumagalli (King’s College London, United Kingdom)- A Reformed Division of Labour for the Science of Well-Being William Cullerne Bown (Independent, United Kingdom) – Measurement as metaphysics |
Registration https://bit.ly/TRC2020-registration
Learn more about MTR https://mtrboun.wordpress.com/home-2/project/about/
Mariam Thalos at Bilkent
Title: The Gulf Between Practical and Theoretical Reason
Abstract: I will argue that it’s a great mistake to blur the line between practical and theoretical forms of reasoning (as done for instance in the pragmatistic traditions of epistemology, which are now prominently exemplified in Subjective Bayesianism), not least because the diagnosis of bias in science becomes distorted if the line is blurred. In this talk I will articulate the distinction between practical and theoretical reasoning in terms of differences in the norms themselves, with the most important being asymmetries in their preemption patterns. Elements of this account have roots in lines of argument found in Aristotle and Kant. The differences between practical and theoretical I will adduce will explain a certain puzzle: why is it that we (correctly) judge Buridan’s ass to be completely above reproach when he picks (randomly, if necessary) between two identical and equally convenient bales of hay, but that a detective or judge faced with identical evidence for the guilt of two different suspects is decidedly at fault if she should simply “pick” one as the guilty party. The answer is—as it must be—that the standards of reasoning to which we hold the principals accountable in these contrasting cases are categorically different.
Date: Monday 5 December, 2016
Time: 1640-1800
Place: G160
Biography: Mariam Thalos is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Utah. Her work focuses primarily on foundational questions in the sciences, especially the physical, social and decisional sciences, as well as on the relations amongst the sciences. Her book on these subjects, called Without Hierarchy: The Scale Freedom of the Universe, was published in 2013, by Oxford University Press. She has just completed her second book, called A Social Theory of Freedom (Routledge, 2016), which offers a new answer to the timeless philosophical question of human freedom, one that engages with social science but repulses the relevance of questions around determinism, biological and otherwise. It thus advances the cause of an existential theory of freedom in new ways—and it does so without denying the relevance of science, especially social science, for illuminating human agency. She is currently being funded by the National Science Foundation to study precautionary decision making in relation to catastrophic risk, especially in public contexts.
She is the author of numerous articles on causation, explanation and how relations between micro and macro are handled by a range of scientific theories; as well as articles in political philosophy, action theory, metaphysics, epistemology, logical paradox and feminism. Her work has been published in journals such as The Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, American Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese and Philosophical Studies. Her work has won the Royal Institute of Philosophy inaugural Essay Prize (2012), and again in 2013, and the American Philosophical Association’s Kavka Prize (1999). She is the former fellow of the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Institute of Advanced Studies of the Australian National University, the Tanner Humanities Center, the University of Sydney Center for Foundations of Science, and the Institute of Philosophy, University of London.
Early Career Scholars Conference in Philosophy of Psychiatry: Overcoming Mind-Brain Dualism in 21st Century Medicine
21-22, November 2014
Center for Philosophy of Science, 817 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA USA 15260
Conference website: http://www.pitt.edu/~pittcntr/Events/All/Conferences/others/other_conf_2014-15/11-21-14_mindbrain/mindbrain-cfp.html
Notification By: July 7, 2014
Email submissions to: pittmindbrainmedicine14@gmail.com
For questions and comments, contact Serife Tekin, serife.tekin@daemen.edu
Summary: The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry.
CFP:
Psychiatry’s aspirations as a branch of medicine are often in conflict with its aspirations as a branch of science. As a branch of medicine, it aims to clinically address the complaints of individuals with mental disorders, including the subjective, mental, and first- person aspects of psychopathology (such as feelings of worthlessness and hallucinations). As a branch of science, on the other hand, it targets the objective, embodied, and third-person correlates of mental distress (such as atypical brain mechanisms and behavioral anomalies). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the psychiatric taxonomy used in the US and increasingly around the world, has traditionally been employed to identify both the scientific and medical targets of psychiatry, as well as in the service of sociological, pedagogical, and forensic projects. In attempting to be everything for psychiatry, however, the manual has succeeded in fully pleasing no one. The virtually universal dissatisfaction with contemporary nosology has led to a tension between critics who argue the way forward is focusing on the needs of the clinic and those who believe psychiatry should work harder to resemble the sciences.
We believe that the resolution of this dilemma is hindered by a contemporary form of dualism, in which psychiatric disorders are seen as either disembodied problems in living or as subtypes of somatic disease. There is a tendency to perceive the etiology of psychiatric disorders as either brain-based (organic or biological), to be investigated by the biomedical sciences, or mind-based (functional or psychological), to be investigated by behavior-based schemas such as the DSM or patient-centered approaches that take a more holistic approach to disorder. There is also a tendency to divide psychiatric treatments into those that directly target the brain, e.g., antidepressants, and those that purportedly target the mind, e.g., cognitive behavior therapy, — often to the detriment of the latter. While significant work has been done to overcome the dualistic conception of persons in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science and in the philosophy of neuroscience, the results of these debates have not been fully transferred to the domain of psychiatry.
The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry through an integration of approaches from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science (including philosophy of cognitive science and neuroscience) and philosophy of medicine. One goal of such re-evaluation is to reconcile the claim that psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to keep the experience of the sufferer at its core.
Format of Conference: The conference will take place over two days. Eight papers by early career scholars (graduate students, postdocs, and untenured faculty) will be commented on by senior philosophers who have expertise in philosophy of science, philosophy of neuroscience, or philosophy of medicine.
By matching each junior presenter with a senior commentator, our aim is to give junior scholars an opportunity to receive thoughtful and targeted feedback on their work and to facilitate lively discussions. Further, this format will initiate junior-mentor relationships that will help strengthen the philosophy of psychiatry community.
Each presenter will be given 25 minutes for his or her paper, followed by 15 minutes for commentary and 15 minutes for discussion.
If you are a senior scholar and would like to participate in the conference as a speaker or commentator, please contact Serife Tekin, at serife.tekin@daemen.edu.
Organizing Committee: William Bechtel, Trey Boone, Mazviita Shirimuuta, Peter Machamer, Edouard Machery, Ken Schaffner, Kathryn Tabb, and Serife Tekin.
Keynote speakers:
Jennifer Radden, PhD (Professor Emerita of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Boston).
John Sadler, MD (Professor of Psychiatry and Clinical Services, University of Texas Southwestern).
Commentators:
Mazviita Chirimuuta (University of Pittsburgh)
Peter Machamer (University of Pittsburgh)
Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
Kenneth F. Schaffner (University of Pittsburgh)
Jacqueline Sullivan (Western University)
Jonathan Tsou (Iowa State University)
Two-Day Conference on Neurology, Philosophy of Biology, and Artificial Intelligence, organized by Koç University Philosophy Department (Venue: Beyoglu – RCAC)
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Speakers include but are not limited to: Bernard Stiegler (Université de Technologie Compiègne), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Barry Smith (University of London), and Güven Güzeldere (Harvard University)
Conference Program
May 25th Saturday
9.30 Opening
9.45-11.45 First Session
Hilmi Demir: “A Recent History of Philosophy of Mind: Convergence Points between Cognitive Sciences and Phenomenology”
Barış Korkmaz: “Self: Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis”
Aziz Zambak: “Plasticity: The Forgotten Principle in Artificial Intelligence”
11:45-12:00 Coffee Break
12:00-13:00 Second Session
Bernard Stiegler: “From Neuropower to Noopolitics”
13:00-14:30 Lunch Break
14:30:16:30 Third Session
Patrick Roney: “Neuro-aesthetics”
Zeynep Direk: “Neuroethics and the question of alterity”
Stephen Voss: “What do I mean when I say I”
May 26th Sunday
9:30-10:30 First Session
Alva Noë: “The Fragile Manifest: Presence in Thought and Experience”
10:30-10:45 Coffee Break
10:45-12:45 Second Session
Barry Smith: “Are Flavours in the Brain? The Phenomenology and Neuroscience of Flavour Perception”
Güven Güzeldere: “Unity of Consciousness in a Divided Brain?”
12:45-14:30 Lunch Break
14:30-16:30 Third Session
Fuat Balcı: “Reward Maximization: The Role of Time and its Psychophysics”
Emrah Aktunç: “On Bickle’s ‘Ruthless Reductionism in Cellular/Molecular Neuroscience: What are they Reducing?”
Hakan Gürvit: “Plasticity: Via Regia to the Neuroscientific Subjectivity”
Venue: Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations – Beyoglu
TALK: Siyaves Azeri (Queens, Canada) on “Conceptual Cognitive Organs: Toward a Historical Materialist Theory of Scientific Knowledge”, 17/12/2012
Siyaves Azeri (Queens, Canada) will give a talk at Bogazici on Monday, December 17th from 5-7pm in TB130.
“Conceptual Cognitive Organs: Toward a Historical Materialist Theory of Scientific Knowledge”
ABSTRACT: The relation between scientific concepts and reality cannot be satisfactorily explained unless the empiricist supposition that dramatically differentiates “appearance” and “reality” is dropped. Concepts are components of sign systems, which function as tools of cognitive activity. Conceptual cognition, qualitatively speaking, is not different than perceptual cognition. Concepts are extensions of human sense organs. They are particular higher cognitive organs the function of which is cognitive activity.
Unlike empiricists that locate perception and cognition in human mind, Vygotsky’s historical approach locates perception and cognition outside the psyche or consciousness. It is the degree of abstraction and generalization that differentiates between perceptual and cognitive activities and between different forms of cognition. Scientific concepts and conceptual systems (theories) appear to be a particular form of higher mental activity. They are cognitive tools that provide the ability of systematic cognition of phenomena, which are not available to the grasp of ordinary sense organs. They are tools of scientific “groping” of phenomena. Scientific concepts free perceptual and cognitive activity from determination of “biological” sense organs by providing a high degree of cognitive abstraction and generalization. Scientific cognition, like perceptual activity, is actualized by consciousness but outside the consciousness.
Keywords: Activity, cognition, concept, consciousness, empiricism, reality, science, theory, Vygotsky
Tim Williamson at Bogazici (07/12/2012)
Tim Williamson (Oxford) will be giving a talk at Bogazici on Friday December 7th, in TB130 from 5-7pm. The title of his talk is:
“Logics as Scientific Theories”
Tim Williamson is the Wykeham Professor of Logic at Oxford, and is perhaps the most influential philosopher currently working in the UK. In addition to his talk on Friday, Tim will also be visiting my graduate seminar on Thursday.
ABSTRACT: Logic is often regarded as a neutral arbiter between substantive theories in science and metaphysics. Neutrality is also invoked as a criterion for deciding whether to count a truth as a logical truth. The lecture will argue that logic is much more like other branches of science than such a view allows. An alternative will be developed based on Tarski’s account of logical consequence. In particular, an abductive methodology will be explained for assessing proposals to revise logic; it uses standard criteria for scientific theory choice.
Talk at Bogazici: Mehmet Elgin (Mugla) on “What is Science? Popper and Evolutionary Theory” (26/11/2012)
“What is Science? Popper and Evolutionary Theory”
Philosophy/Cog-Sci Workshop at Bogazici. Saturday 24/11/2012
Brains, Mind and Language #2
A philosophy/cognitive science workshop.
Saturday 24/11/2012, 1pm-6pm Venue: TB130 [This is on the ground floor of the philosophy department. As the building is closed at weekends, one should enter from the back of the building).
Program:
13:00 – 14:30
Emrah Aktunc (Philosophy)
“Resolving Duhemian Problems in Cognitive Neuroscience”
14:45 – 16:15
Annette Hohenberger (Cognitive Science Department, Informatics Institute, ÖDTU)
“The Understanding of Normativity, Free Will and Emotions in Preschool Children.”
16:30 – 18:00
Oliver Wright (Psychology, Baçheşehir)
“The Whorfian (linguistic relativity) Hypothesis and Empirical Investigations in the Domain of Color.”
Abstracts below the fold:
Talk at Bogazici: Emrah Aktunc on “Determining the Underdetermined: Evidence, Inference, and Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience.” 18/10/2012
Emrah Aktunc (Koc) will be giving a talk at Bogazici on
“Determining the Underdetermined: Evidence, Inference, and Knowledge in Cognitive Neuroscience.”
Thursday, October 18th from 5-7pm in TB130 (in the philosophy department).
Everyone welcome.
Medical History Workshop at New Research Institution for Medical Humanities in Istanbul
On 11 September 2012, the first ever event will be held at the new Besikcizade Medical Humanities Center (Beşikçizade Tıp ve İnsani Bilimler Merkezi, BETİM), launched by hayatvakfı (http://www.hayatvakfi.org.tr/ ).
Prof. Dr. Werner Kümmel from Mainz University Medical Center (Germany) will lead a one-day workshop on the topic ‘Medicine and National Socialism’ from 9.15am to 3.30pm.
Workshop languages are Turkish and German (with simultaneous translation provided).
Registration is required electronically asap, please, contact betim.bilgi@yandex.com, providing your name, institutional affiliation, mobile phone number, and e-mail address
“Oral phenomenology” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
“Oral phenomenology” Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
Guest Editor: István Aranyosi (Bilkent University)
Csontváry, “Old woman peeling apple”, 1894, (detail)
Philosophy Talk, Istanbul Technical University, 03.04
“When Scientific Theories Constrain Scientific Concepts: The Case of the Antagonistic Pleiotropy Theory of Ageing and the Concept of ‘Rate of Ageing’”
Stefano Giaimo
IFOM-IEO, Milan
Date: 3rd April, Time: 13:30. Place: Seminar Room. Department of Humanities and Social Science, Faculty of Science and Letters. Istanbul Technical University, Ayazağa Campus. On the Taksim metro line.
Iulian Toader (Bucharest) at Bogazici, March 30th.
Iulian Toader (University of Bucharest — Center for Logic, History and Philosophy of Science) will be giving a talk on “Weylean Skepticism” at Bogazici University this Friday, March 30th, from 3-5 pm in TB130.
Iulian Toader received his Phd from the University of Notre Dame, where he worked with Michael Detlefsen and Don Howard.
Abstract:
In this paper, I present a view according to which there is a fundamental tension between the conditions required for scientific objectivity and those needed for mathematical understanding: to the extent that it helps one attain objectivity, mathematics may do so only at the expense of understanding, and to the extent that it aims at understanding, may do so only by sacrificing objectivity. I think that this view should be attributed to Weyl and I therefore call it Weylean skepticism. After clarifying what Weyl himself thought were the necessary conditions for understanding and objectivity, I explain why they lead to this type of skepticism. Then I argue that there is no tenable answer to Weylean skepticism in the contemporary literature, which motivates my exploration of some possible responses.
Helen Longino at Bogazici (Monday, March 19th, 2012)
Helen Longino (Stanford), one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science (and perhaps the most influential feminist philosopher of science) will be giving a talk at Bogazici. Everyone welcome.
“Studying Human Behavior: Epistemological,Ontological, and Social Quandaries” Monday, March 19th, 4-6pm, M1170 (Engineering Building).
Psychiatry: Far From the Madding Grief?
The Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders is the official classification manual developed for use in clinical, educational, and research settings; it is published by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and is regularly revised. The fifth edition (DSM-5) is expected to appear in May 2013. In the DSM’s current edition (DSM-IV), feelings of sadness and associated symptoms (e.g., insomnia, poor appetite, and weight loss), following the death of a loved one are excluded from the criteria for a Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), but a cautionary clause states that if these symptoms continue beyond two months and impair the individual’s psychological, social and occupational functioning, she may be given an MDD diagnosis.
The DSM-5 Working Group for the Mood Disorders has recently proposed the removal of the bereavement exclusion from the diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive Disorder (MDD), arguing that the available evidence does not support distinguishing bereavement from other stressors that underlie MDD.
This proposal has led to a controversial debate on the advantages and disadvantages of distinguishing between the cases that involve individuals who develop major depression in response to bereavement and those who develop depression following other severe stressors. For instance, Allen Frances, the lead editor of DSM-IV, is concerned that removing the bereavement exclusion will result in over-diagnosing and over-treating non-pathological grief by labelling it MDD.
Hesperus is Bosphorus 