Talk at Koç, this Friday 16.00 (April 26th): Mehmet Erginel ‘Plato and Mill on Pleasure and the Appeal to Experience’
Koç univeristy, Building SNA, Room 158, from 16.00
ABSTRACT: Mill argues, in chapter 2 of his Utilitarianism, that pleasures may be evaluated in terms of not only quantity as Bentham had supposed, but also quality. According to the ‘qualitative hedonism’ that Mill develops, a pleasure is of higher quality than another if it is preferred by those who are “competently acquainted with both”. It is well-known that a precursor of this famous argument appears in Book IX of Plato’s Republic, in a pivotal role for one of the three proofs for the overarching thesis of the dialogue, that the just man is happier than the unjust. In the second proof (580c-583b), Plato argues that for the purpose of comparing the pleasantness of alternative kinds of life, we may treat the judgment of philosophers as authoritative, since they are, like Mill’s “competent judges”, superior with respect to experience (empeiria) as well as wisdom (phronesis) and reason (logos). (581e) The appeal to the judgment of those with greater experience with a variety of pleasures leads, in both Plato’s and Mill’s versions, to the conclusion that philosophical/intellectual pleasures are superior qua pleasures. While the parallelism between the two arguments is striking, scholars have typically offered no more than a mention in passing, without a detailed examination of the differences between them. In this paper, I argue that on a careful reading of both texts, Plato’s use of the appeal to experience is more compelling for a number of reasons, and less vulnerable to some of the common objections. First, Plato’s argument presupposes his tripartition of the soul and aims to establish the greater pleasantness of a life ruled by the rational as opposed to the spirited or appetitive parts of the soul, enabling him to limit the challenges to the philosopher’s experience. Second, Plato’s appeal to experience in the second proof is linked to, and complemented by, another appeal in the third proof (583b-588a). In the latter appeal those with experience compare the pleasantness not of lives but rather of individual pleasures, concluding that any pleasure of the rational part of the soul is more pleasant than any pleasure of the other two parts. Despite its boldness and prima facie implausibility, this claim rests on the purity criterion and the relatively plausible thesis that only the rational pleasures are pure, all others being mixed with pain.
Talk at Bilkent, April 25: Jack Woods on Generic Validity
Title: Generic Validity
By Jack Woods (University of Leeds, Philosophy)
Date: Thursday, April 25, 2024
Time: 1530-1700
Room: H232
Abstract: Until 20 years ago, it would have been very difficult to deny that there was a most basic, foundational, or fundamental relation of logical consequence. These days, though, logical pluralism is on the rise (Beall and Restall 2005, Field 2009, Russell 2008) and some have even made the stronger claim that no notion of logical consequence holds across all contexts (Shapiro 2014, Russell 2018). Yet many of us still hold onto the thought that there really is one most basic, foundational, fundamental notion of logical consequence which underlies all the rest. I’ll refer to this notion of logical consequence as generic in what follows, for reasons that will become clear below.
Why think that there really is a notion of generic validity? There are a number of sophisticated considerations and one pugnacious one. The sophisticated ones range from the idea that there’s a fixed domain of existing propositions which are logically related to each other, to the necessary use of logic in areas like abduction, the theory of credences, and belief revision, to the thought that no pluralist picture could do explain the uniformity of our judgments of what we’re committed to by means of the beliefs and theories we adopt. Put these to the side, though I think they’re individually compelling and jointly conclusive. The pugnacious reason is equally damning and far more fun. It’s best thought of in the form of an obnoxious question to the pluralist. Which logic is your book written in?
Of course, that’s facile. The serious version goes like so: the books and papers defending logical pluralism contains arguments and those arguments are presumably meant to be taken seriously. That is, they’re taken to be at least valid. We can thus fairly ask which notion of validity is employed in arguing for logical pluralism. As well as asking which logic is used in evaluating which logic is best for which purpose, which logic outlines connections between results in one domain and another, and which logic is used for the metatheory in which pluralism is usually defined. This is especially important since whether or not we can justify various claims made in defending particular pluralisms depends on which logic we use when evaluating those claims.
The most natural and unified answer to these questions is that there’s a single notion of validity that provides the standard of argument for pluralist claims. Moreover, the most charitable interpretation of their systematic lack of discussion of the pugnacious question is that they intend their interlocutors to use, when evaluating their arguments, a relation of logical consequence which is uniquely appropriate to the context of deciding about philosophical views like logical pluralism. My contention in this paper that this relation simply is the most basic, foundational, fundamental relation of logical consequence.
About the speaker: Jack Woods is University Academic Fellow in Mathematical Philosophy at the University of Leeds. His research focuses on issues in the philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and metaethics. His work has appeared in such journals as Ethics, Nous, the Philosophical Review, the Journal of Philosophical Logic, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, and Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. In 2021 he co-edited (with Gil Sagi) “The Semantic Conception of Logic: Essays on Consequence, Invariance, and Meaning”, published by Cambridge University Press.
Philosophy talk. Friday 26th April. Boğaziçi University. Correy Shores ‘Givenness Lost, Experience Regained’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium Talk
Friday 26th April 17:00
Correy Shores (Assistant Professor, Middle East Technical University)
‘Givenness Lost, Experience Regained: Deforming Phenomenology with Deleuze’s Aesthetics of Disruption’Abstract
The contemporary field of phenomenology can trace its roots to Edmund Husserl’s seminal works. Yet, a number of those who were highly dedicated to Husserl’s project also questioned some of his fundamental claims, taking phenomenology down divergent yet fruitful paths. We might wonder: how far can phenomenology veer from Husserl’s original vision and still be phenomenology? To test its limits, we consider Gilles Deleuze’s “anti-phenomenological” aesthetics. Through his studies on painting and cinema, Deleuze challenges many of traditional phenomenology’s most basic assumptions and findings, including horizons, intentionality, first-personhood, intersubjectivity, and even its firmest foundation, givenness. Yet, Deleuze to a limited extent studies experience by means of experience, just as phenomenologists often do. So we will consider the possibility of rethinking phenomenology in terms of a broader conception, “philosophy of experience,” in order to build a more constructive dialogue between phenomenology and its critics.
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Dr. Davide Battisti on “Procreative Responsibility and Assisted Reproductive Technology” (24.04.2024) Via Zoom
Dr. Davide Battisti (University of Bergamo) will give a talk at Marmara Philosophy. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday 24 April, 2024
Time: 17:00 – 19:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Procreative Responsibility and Assisted Reproductive Technology”
About the Speaker: Davide Battisti is a postdoctoral researcher in Philosophy of Law and Bioethics at the Department of Law of the University of Bergamo. He also serves as an adjunct professor of Bioethics in the Politics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs Program at the University of Milan and the Vita-Salute San Raffaele University. He has published several papers on topics such as reproductive ethics, the allocation of scarce healthcare resources, the ethics of science communication, and research ethics. His work has appeared in journals such as Bioethics, the Journal of Medical Ethics, Social Epistemology, and Ethics of Human Research.
Abstract: Traditionally, assisted reproductive technologies are understood as practices aimed at extending the procreative freedom of prospective parents. However, some scholars argue that they also give rise to new moral constraints. I build on this viewpoint by presenting a person-affecting perspective on the impact of current and future assisted reproductive technologies on procreative responsibility, with a specific focus on reproductive genome editing and ectogenesis. I will show that this perspective is defensible both from a consequences-based person-affecting perspective and from a person-affecting account that considers morally relevant intuitions and attitudes.
Philosophy talk. Friday 19th April. Boğaziçi University. Sanem Yazıcıoğlu ‘Encountering the Indeterminacy of the Self’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium Talk
Friday 19th April 17:00
Sanem Yazıcıoğlu (Professor, Istanbul University)
‘Encountering the Indeterminacy of the Self’Abstract
In recent decades, phenomenology and hermeneutical phenomenology have taken the lead in addressing the question of personal identity through the inquiry of “who are you?”. Figures such as Heidegger, Arendt, and Ricoeur, all rooted in Husserlian phenomenology, have contributed diverse interpretations that provide an opportunity to reexamine the complexities of this question. The relationality between self, others, and the surrounding world, characterized by its ever-changing nature, compel us to view identity in a similar light. Thus, the primary focus of this discussion is twofold: firstly, exploring how to reconcile these complex relations into a unified conception of personal identity by following Husserl’s theory of variation, and secondly, considering the limits of defining this unity as a “biography or autobiography” in accordance with Arendt’s notion of a “life-story”. This latter point prompts a reconsideration of personal identity as a process, leading to a genetic phenomenological perspective that recognizes “indeterminacy of the self.”
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk. Friday 5th April. Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Andrew Fyfe ‘If I Were You: Plan-Based Expressivism and Planning in Another’s Shoes’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium Talk
Friday 5th April 17:00
Andrew Fyfe (Lecturer, University of Maryland)
‘
‘If I Were You: Plan-Based Expressivism and Planning in Another’s Shoes’Abstract
Expressivism views moral judgments (“Murder is wrong”) not as assertions about what actions possess “wrongness” but rather as expressions of non-belief mental states — such as a negative feeling (“Boo Murder!”) or a directive (“Don’t murder!”). Plan-based expressivism (PBE) is expressivism’s latest iteration. PBE interprets moral judgments as expressions of personal planning commitments (“I will never murder.”).
However, PBE faces a challenge. Moral judgments aren’t only about us. They also concern others. So, how does a personal no-murder pledge encompass the wider assertion that others also shouldn’t murder? PBE’s solution depends upon the notion of “If I were you” planning. This involves projecting into others’ shoes and deciding from there. I plan not to murder, even if I were you.
However, the coherence of “If I were you” planning is questionable. Can one plan for what to do as someone else? It doesn’t seem so. In this talk, I will attempt a rescue. I aim to reconcile the colloquial use of ‘If I were you’ in our common-sense practices of advising one another with the philosophical demands of PBE. Ultimately, I argue for the feasibility of “If I were you” planning exactly as envisioned and needed by plan-based expressivist metaethicists.
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk. Friday 29th March. Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Ömer Aygün ‘Socrates without Plato: Evaluating the Images of Socrates in Non-Platonic Sources’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium Talk
Friday 29th March 17:00
Ömer Aygün (Assistant Professor, Galatasaray University)
‘Socrates without Plato: Evaluating the Images of Socrates in Non-Platonic Sources’Abstract
The main source of our idea of Socrates is Plato and his followers. Nevertheless, in the 20th century, Plato has often been accused of distorting the figure of Socrates in his works in order to make an overly sharp distinction between philosophy and sophistry, and to dissimulate his own repressive political agenda behind the more democratic and ethical figure of Socrates. The aim of this paper is to evaluate this accusation by reviewing the accounts of Socrates in non-Platonic sources, particularly in the Laks & Most 2016 Loeb edition of Early Greek Philosophy and by comparing them with the “Platonic image of Socrates”. Is this dePlatonized, so allegedly undistorted, image of Socrates philosophically reliable, or at least more reliable than the “Platonic image of Socrates”? We shall suggest that the images of Socrates in these sources do not substantially contradict the Platonic images of Socrates, and that, when they do contradict them, the non-Platonic images of Socrates mostly prove themselves to be less reliable than the Platonic ones. If our mistrust in the “Platonic image of Socrates” is unfounded, then we may question Socrates’ characterization by Laks and Most as a “sophist” as well as his removal from his pivotal position in the history of Ancient philosophy.
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)Bogazici.edu.tr
Philosophy talk. Wednesday 20th March. Boğaziçi University, Zeynep Talay Turner ”On Being Annoyingly Forgiving’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. 20/03 (next Wednesday), 17:00
Zeynep Talay Turner (Assistant Professor, Bilgi University)
‘On Being Annoyingly Forgiving’
Abstract
The problem of forgiveness is a longstanding philosophical problem. What is forgiving? Is it possible to forgive and if so, what are the conditions of it? The answers depend on whether forgiveness involves two parties, that is, the wrong-doer and the injured-party or just one party, that is, the injured-party. The different approaches in the literature resolve themselves into ideas of conditional versus unconditional forgiveness. In the first part, I will give a general overview of these different perspectives. Thereafter I will focus on Derrida’s account of forgiveness. Here we will see that though Derrida holds a broadly unconditional account of it, his differs notably from others of the same type. Finally, I will refer to Nietzsche, who suggests we abandon forgiveness altogether, on the grounds that whether it is conditional or unconditional, it is impossible or meaningless.
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Dr. Zeynep Direk on “Einfühlung and Entanglement in Phenomenology” (27.03.2024)
Prof. Dr. Zeynep Direk (Koç University) will give a talk at Marmara on Wednesday. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday 27 March, 2024
Time: 13:00 – 15:30
Location: Marmara University Göztepe Campus, at the old Faculty of Technology building (above TÖMER, A block Room 301).
“Einfühlung and Entanglement in Phenomenology”
About The Speaker: Zeynep Direk was born in Istanbul in 1966, graduated from Galatasaray High School in 1984 and from Boğaziçi University in 1990. In 1992, she received her MA degree from Boğaziçi University and her PhD degree from the University of Memphis in 1998. Until 2014, she worked as a faculty member in the Department of Philosophy at Galatasaray University. Since 2014, she has been a faculty member at the Department of Philosophy at Koç University. Her research focuses on various problems in Contemporary French Philosophy, Ethics, and Feminist Philosophy. She is the editor of Derrida Critical Assessments (Routledge, 2001) and A Companion to Derrida (Blackwell, 2014). Her books include Başkalık Deneyimi (Yapı Kredi 2005), Cinsel Farkın İnşaası (Metis 2018), Ontologies of Sex: Philosophy in Sexual Politics (Rowman and Littlefield, 2020) Çağdaş Kıta Felsefesi (FOL Yayınları 2021) and Derrida İstanbul’da: Sekülerizm, Öteki ve Sorumluluk (FOL Yayınları 2022). She has numerous articles in Turkish, English and French. She has prepared many Turkish compilation books for publication such as Cinsiyetli Olmak (Yapı Kredi, 2004), Cinsiyeti Yazmak (Yapı Kredi, 2017) Sonsuza Tanıklık (Metis 2003) Dünyanın Teni (Metis 2017), Jean-Paul Sartre: Tarihin Sorumluluğunu Almak (Metis, 2010), Irk Kavramını Kim İcad Etti? (Metis, 2001) Çağdaş Fransız Düşüncesi, (Epos, 2004), Levinas Okumaları (Pinhan, 2011), Platon’un Eczanesi (Pinhan, 2011).
Abstract: In Edmund Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations, a work that is classified within the transcendental turn in Husserl’s thought, the problem of the other, a difficult problem for philosophers who begin philosophizing with subjective consciousness, is claimed to be resolved. How does Husserl’s argument work? What presuppositions does it make? How did Merleau-Ponty in The Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible, respond to Husserl’s argument? What modifications does Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology bring to the phenomenological consideration of the problem of the Other? Finally, I shall try to show that Merleau-Ponty’s indirect ontology is intersectional.
Talk at Bilkent, March 14: Heidi Maibom on The Instrumentalist: Psychopathy and Moral Psychology
Title: The Instrumentalist: Psychopathy and Moral Psychology
By Heidi Maibom (Philosophy, Cincinnati)
Date: Thursday, March 14, 2024
Time: 1530-1700
Room: H-232
Abstract: It is uncontroversial that psychopaths have a severe moral deficit. But whereas philosophers typically recast it so as to fit on either side of the sentimentalism vs. rationalism divide, I proceed directly from the data to suggest a new way of conceiving of amoralism. Psychopaths are driven by a will to dominate, use almost exclusively means-end reasoning, and have poor attachment to others. Ideally, this will turn out to be the reverse of what we might call good moral functioning, namely desire to get along, respect, and attachment to other people. As such, this constitutes a substantially new proposal when it comes to the moral underpinnings of morality.
About the speaker: go to www.heidimaibom.com
Philosophy talk. Friday 15th March. Boğaziçi University Philosophy Colloquium. Kathleen Harbin ‘Aristotle on Akrasia’
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium Talk 15.03 (next Friday). 17:00
Kathleen Harbin (Assistant Professor, Ashoka University)
‘Aristotle on Akrasia: Beyond the Ignorance vs. Desire Debate’
Abstract
Akratic agents, like virtuous agents, at least seem capable of recognizing what they should do, and seem motivated to act accordingly. Their practical thinking thus bears strong similarities to that of those who act well, yet they do the wrong thing. This is mysterious, and Aristotle’s explanation of the phenomenon can seem equally puzzling. In the voluminous secondary literature on his account, the central focus has been whether Aristotle argues for a Socratic account of akrasia, which holds that akrasia is the result of ignorance about which course of action is best, or instead a Platonic or commonsense account, which holds that akrasia results from a conflict between desire for the pleasant and desire to do what the agent knows to be best. I hold that Aristotle’s view is not straightforwardly Socratic or Platonic, but seeks to accommodate the intuitions behind both kinds of account. His discussion of the akratic’s thinking shows which of the agent’s practical cognitive capacities fails in cases of akrasia, and this enables us to see both how the thinking of the akratic person diverges from that of the virtuous person, and how, despite this, the akratic (unlike the vicious person) might be cured.
Location
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
John Freely Building
JF 507
Bebek
Istanbul
Security Policy
Due to campus security policy, anyone planning to attend the talk who does not have a Boğaziçi University ID should send me their name at least 24 hours before the event, so that I can I pass it onto campus security, who will have a list of guests at the main gate.
Please send your name to my institutional email: barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium, Friday 8th March, Heidi Mailbom, ‘Emotions That Go Together’
Heidi Mailbom
Research Professor, University of the Basque Country/Professor, University of Cincinnati
‘Emotions that Go Together’
When trying to understand what emotions are, we should not simply think of them in terms of distinct and somewhat static affective episodes, but instead of temporally extended affective episodes that are often mixed. That is, emotions are often experienced together. I present three examples to illustrate this fact: distress and concern/empathic distress and sympathy, guilt and shame, and sadness and relief in grief. These three pairs throw light on how emotions work, but each in their own way. The empathy pair suggests that empathic episodes are more complex than they are ordinarily portrayed, which may be why definitions of empathy are so diverse. The guilt-shame pair suggests that because of complex environments, it is often appropriate to experience more than one emotion in one situation. And lastly, the sadness-relief pair indicates that ambivalence is a big part of human life.
The talk will be 17:00 in JF 507 (John Freely Building, South Campus, Boğaziçi University, Bebek, Istanbul)
Due to campus security policy, if you don’t have a Boğaziçi ID and you wish to attend the talk, you should inform me of your intention to participate (at this email address barry.stocker(at)bogazici.edu.tr, preferably at least 24 hours in advance) so that I can pass on your name to campus security.
Talk at Bilkent, March 5: Kendy Hess on the Inevitability of Corporate Character
Title: The Inevitability of Corporate Character
By Kendy M. Hess (Holy Cross, Philosophy)
Date: Tuesday, March 5, 2024
Time: 1730-1900
Room: H232
Abstract: If we assume — as I will, here — that firms and other highly organized groups can qualify as rationally autonomous actors in their own rights, I argue that they will necessarily possess Aristotelian characters as well. I will begin with a brief introduction to collective agency in general and corporate agency in particular. I will sketch some of the very different mechanisms that enable rational autonomy at the level of a collective agent and draw out some of the philosophical implications, then turn to the argument about character. Making this argument requires us to abstract somewhat from the human version of character that Aristotle developed, but the abstraction changes less than might be imagined. With characters, corporate agents like firms can also have virtues, vices, enkratic and akratic states, and all the rest.
The more interesting question, as I will suggest at the end, is not whether corporate agents can have virtues and vices but what counts as a virtue or a vice for such an entity. For example, claims from Carr (1968), French (1984), and Heath (2014), among others, about the exotic nature of business entities and market transactions might seem to suggest that the “virtues” of a firm, at least — the excellences of character that enable it to navigate its particular social setting well — might include ruthlessness, dishonesty, and greed. Aristotle again provides everything we need to refute such claims, and to guide us back toward holding collective agents to the same moral standards and human agents … which is a relief, for those of us who have to live with them.
About the speaker: Click here.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Asaad F. Shaker on “The Ends and Method of Philosophical Reasoning in the Ḥikma Tradition” (28.02.2024) Via Zoom
Prof. Asaad F. Shaker will give a talk at Marmara Philosophy. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday 28 February, 2024
Time: 17:00 – 19:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“The Ends and Method of Philosophical Reasoning in the Ḥikma Tradition”
About the Speaker: Anthony (Antun) Asaad F. Shaker is a scholar of philosophy and its history. He has authored several books in ʿilm al-ḥikma and contemporary philosophy, most recently Reintroducing Philosophy: Thinking as the Gathering of Civilization (US, 2021) and Modernity, Civilization and the Return to History (US, 2017). His English translation and critical Arabic edition of Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī’s Iʿjāz al-bayān will be published in early 2024 (UK). He has also translated four books from Ghazālī’s Iḥyāʾ al-ʿulūm (Islamic Texts Society, Cambridge, UK). His published papers include: “Interpreting Mullā Ṣadrā on Man and the Origin of Thinking,” Synthesis Philosophica (Zaghreb, Croatia, 2020); “Nature along Man’s Journey of Return,” Journal of Philosophical Theological Research (Qom, Iran, 2023); “The Paradigmatic Significance of Perception In Mullā Ṣadrā’s Philosophy of Being,” Journal of Philosophical Investigations (Tabriz, Iran, 2018); “Man, Existence and the Life Balance (Mīzān) in Islamic Philosophy,” Journal of Islamic Studies (UK, 2015). Several others have been translated into Turkish and appear in Sabah Ülkesi; and an interview with him appears in Spanish translation in two issues of Sadra: Revista de Filosofia Islamica (Cuba/Iran, 2022). He obtained his doctorate and master’s from the Institute of Islamic Studies (McGill University, 1997). He is presently researching and writing a new monograph tentatively entitled A Study of Philosophical Reasoning, Its Method and Ends Since Qūnawī. In the late 1990s, he was elected to the Executive Council of the Canadian Parliament’s official opposition party, where he chaired two committees, contributed to the formulation of policy and exchanged views with national political leaders.
Abstract: There are many questions surrounding philosophy, its purpose, and even its viability as a discipline. The local English usage of the word “philosophy”, when measured by other world traditions, pertains mostly to English-speakers and the short history of English philosophy, and therefore is unacceptable as a truly universal designation. This lecture has two chief objectives. First, it seeks to paint a general picture of what philosophy has become today. Over the years, there have been murmurings about the need for completeness in knowledge, as a logical problem and an epistemological one. Ḥikma tradition considers completeness according to the dynamics of knowing and being—a preoccupation dating back to the Presocratics. And second, this paper examines some basic features of the ends and methods of the philosophical reasoning developed in ʿilm al-ḥikma. It uses Farghānī as a source, with references to Fārābī, Qūnawī, and Ṣadrā. ʿIlm al-ḥikma has exhibited unusual consistency in its development, unlike the erratic trajectory of contemporary “Western”, “Western”-inspired philosophy, and “Western” thought’s medieval Scholastic precedents (well before English and French or any English and French national identities were even born). The fruit of this is an unparalleled tradition that laid the main foundations of the exact and human sciences, law, etc.—as well as philosophy—not to speak of the principles of civilized human relations, governance and commerce that we take for granted today. And unlike philosophy today, “philosophy” in the Ḥikma tradition was both an expression and a product of society. This is obvious with respect to Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī’s legacy, one of the most notable early examples of which is Fanārī, the great learned scholar and first Ottoman şeyhül-islām.
A ‘versus’ event in Boğaziçi: 21 February, Wednesday
We will be having a ‘versus’ event with as BÜFET (Boğaziçi Philosophy Community) with Barış Çetin Eren and Fikret Adaman. The discussion will be held around the question “Is Marxism dead?”, and we will be listening to two opposing views in that regard. The event will be held in Turkish.
*The event will not be held in TB310 as the poster states. The details about the classroom and time will be shared through our mailing list and social media accounts (links below).
Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/bufet_boun/
Twitter (X): https://twitter.com/bufet_boun
Mailing list subscription: https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSdfQzrWdmLogm1vagAGz25W4LDrMwGL0qscd9DiQVJmkm0QHA/viewform?fbclid=PAAaYOBUByOgIaH278y7PAvOvaDuAJPDZyyc-T7vsqBtyn8HTFu2QAma-Wc8A&pli=1
Sellars Reading Group at Boğaziçi: Tuesdays 6-8pm (Spring 2024)
Our Wilfred Sellars reading group will continue this semeser on Tuesdays 6-8pm at Bogazici University, JF507. This semester we will read papers from the new collection of his articles The Metaphysics of Practice.
We will start on 20/02/2024 by reading chapter 4, “Science and Ethics”. If you would like to be put on the mailing list, and receive copies of the readings, please email Anna: annachaltseva@gmail.com
[If you are not at Boğaziçi you should email Anna and let us know you plan to come so we can leave your name at the front gate.]
7th Bilkent International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
7th Bilkent International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference will take place on Saturday, February 10, 2024, via Zoom.
To attend the conference, please see the registration link here:
Registration is free but required. Once you are registered, Zoom meeting information will be sent to you via e-mail.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Dr. Rahim Acar on “How to Read Classical Islamic Thought” (24.01.2024) Via Zoom
Prof. Dr. Rahim Acar (Marmara University, Faculty of Theology) will give a talk at Marmara Philosophy. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday 24 January, 2024
Time: 17:30 – 19:30 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“How to Read Classical Islamic Thought”
About the Speaker: Rahim Acar teaches philosophy of religion at Marmara University, Faculty of Theology. He received his Ph.D. at Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations Department at Harvard University in 2002. Rahim Acar is a member of the Society for the Philosophy of Religion (Istanbul/ Turkey). His publications include Talking about God and Talking about Creation: Avicenna’s and Thomas Aquinas’ Positions (Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2005); “Avicenna’s Position Concerning the Basis of the Divine Creative Action,” The Muslim World, 94/1 (2004), pp. 65-79; “Creation: Avicenna’s Metaphysical Account,” Creation and the God of Abraham içinde. Ed. David Burrell, Carlo Cogliati et alii. (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dinî Çoğulculuk: İdealler ve Gerçekler (Religious Pluralism: Ideals and Realities) (Ankara: Elis Yayınları, 2007); Teolojik Dilin Husûsiyeti ve Ateist Argümanların Sınırı (The Characater of Theological Language and the Limits of Atheistic Arguments) (Istanbul: 2013).
Abstract: The heritage of medieval Islamic thought is received and read by different people in different ways. Four major ways of reading the heritage of medieval Islamic thought may be separated. (1) Historical reading, (2) disciplinary reading, (3) theological reading and (4) philosophical reading. In my talk, first, I am going to draw a general outline of major ways of reading the heritage of medieval Islamic thought. Then I am going to highlight the importance of reading the heritage of the medieval Islamic thought from a philosophical perspective. Certainly all other ways of reading Islamic thought are important on their own and contributed to the development of Islamic thought and shaped the Muslim mind for centuries. However, as people living in the 21th. Century, it may be more productive and beneficial to attempt at a philosophical reading of the Islamic thought, even though it may compel one to accept the limits of certain ideas and theories defended by medieval Muslim scholars.
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Alberto L. Siani ‘Kant’s Places. Habitats, Aesthetics, Culture’ ,12.01.24, 17:00
Alberto L. Siani (Associate Professor, Pisa University) will give his talk ‘Kant’s Places. Habitats, Aesthetics, Culture’ on Friday 12th January at 17:00.
Abstract
This paper stems from two main roots. The first is an interpretation of Kantian aesthetics that might be called “pragmatist”. The second is a more recent interest in the philosophy of landscape. Kant and the landscapes have found a confluence in the first chapter on a book on Landscape Aesthetics due to appear 2024. In that chapter, I argue that the philosophical location of landscapes is a theory of habitats which I outline based on Kant. What I present in this paper is the more strictly Kant-related material from that chapter.
I begin by investigating the Kantian taxonomy of philosophical spaces in the second paragraph of the Introduction to his Critique of Judgment, entitled On the domain [Gebiet] of philosophy in general, with a specific focus on his notion of “habitat” (Aufenthalt). Habitats are the spaces of empirical contingency, where humans cannot hope to establish necessary and universal laws, but at most a provisional, a posteriori order of familiarity. As I will highlight in the following section, the groundwork for this possibility is an aesthetic one. On this basis I then proceed to discuss the paradoxical centrality of the liminal space of the “habitat” and sketchily develop it toward a non-dualistic, pragmatist idea of culture in its relationship with the inhabited space and on the background of, in a broad sense, environmental concerns.
Location
JF 507 (John Freely Building)
Boğaziçi University
South Campus
Bebek
Istanbul
Entry without Boğaziçi ID
Due to campus security policy, people without a Boğaziçi University ID can only enter campus for the talk if they send their name to my institutional email (barry.stocker@boun.edu.tr) so that I can pass it onto campus security, who will allow you to enter campus if they can see your name on the list of guests for the talk.
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. James Kinkaid, ‘Husserl and the Marks of the Mental’. Friday 29th December. 17:00
James Kinkaid (Assistant Professor, Bilkent University) will present his paper ‘Husserl and the Marks of the Mental’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00, Friday 29th December.
Abstract
An active area of research in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation between the two marks of the mental: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. One position that has recently gained in popularity is the phenomenal intentionality theory, according to which intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality theory recognize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as a precedent, but little work has been done to locate Husserl within the contemporary landscape of views on the relation between the marks of the mental. My aim is to do just that. I start by arguing that Husserl qualifies as an inseparatist: he holds that original intentionality and phenomenal consciousness necessarily co-vary. I then give a Husserlian critique of a notable and radical version of the phenomenal intentionality theory defended by Angela Mendelovici, focusing on her accounts of color perception and thought. Finally, I sketch a Husserlian version of the phenomenal intentionality theory that I think ought to be a serious contender in the contemporary scene
Location
Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul.
John Freely Hall, JF 507
DUE TO CAMPUS SECURITY POLICY, PEOPLE WITHOUT A BOĞAZİÇİ ID MUST EMAIL ME USING MY INSTITUTIONAL EMAIL (barry.stocker(at)boun.edu.tr) PREFERABLY AT LEAST A DAY IN ADVANCE WITH THEIR NAME , SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED ONTO CAMPUS SECURITY WHO NEED IT IN ORDER TO ALLOW GUESTS TO ENTER.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Aliş Sağıroğlu on “Language as a Power Game: A Wittgensteinian Perspective” (27.12.2023) Via Zoom
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aliş Sağıroğlu (Galatasaray University) will give a talk at Marmara. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday 27 December, 2023
Time: 17:30 – 19:30 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Language as a Power Game: A Wittgensteinian Perspective”
About the Speaker: Assoc. Prof. Dr. Aliş Sağıroğlu was born in Istanbul in 1962. He graduated from Galatasaray High School and completed his undergraduate studies in the Philosophy Department at Boğaziçi University. He finished his master’s thesis at Sorbonne. He wrote his doctoral thesis at Galatasaray University. Currently, he works as an Assistant Professor in the Philosophy Department at Galatasaray University and teaches Introduction to Philosophy, Epistemology, Introduction to Ontology, and Introduction to Logic.
Abstract: Wittgenstein, in his exploration of the impossibility of a private language argument, challenges the idea that language can be defined as a self-referential meaning framework. Instead, he proposes that language functions as a context-dependent intersubjective game, grounded in shared rules and their common application, all within the confines of the objective world. This approach places considerable significance on the concept of a rule. To delve deeper into Wittgenstein’s framework, we aim to refine the understanding of a rule as a social power relation. Our analysis suggests viewing these rules as intricate power structures, mirroring the dynamics of real political frameworks. In this context, the rules of the language game parallel those of actual political structures. Consequently, language transcends its linguistic boundaries, emerging as a political arena. As a rule-based game, this language paradigm offers innovative avenues for the analysis of politics, challenging conventional perspectives. This presentation will explore the ramifications of Wittgenstein’s approach, highlighting potential directions for further research within this philosophical framework.
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Pascale Roure, ‘Between Turkey and America: Reichenbach’s Epistemology of Uncertainty’. Friday 22nd December. 17:00
Pascale Roure (Assistant Professor, Yildiz Technical University) will present her paper ‘Between Turkey and America: Reichenbach’s Epistemology of Uncertainty’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00, Friday 22nd December.
Abstract
After dismissal from office under Nazi legislation, Hans Reichenbach obtained a position at Istanbul University in 1933, before moving to California in 1938. Against the historiographical tendency to consider this stay in Istanbul as a mere parenthesis on the road to America or from the perspective of a unilateral transfer of knowledge, I highlighted the role of the Turkish experience in the development of Reichenbach’s epistemology, in continuity with the research programme of the Berlin Group (Roure 2022). Often misrepresented as a member of the Vienna Circle, Reichenbach opposed during this period the so-called “positivism” of his Viennese colleagues to the Berlin Group’s method of science analysis. This issue led me to more closely examine the dialogue Reichenbach engaged in with American philosophy the mid-1930s, including currents newly imported by European emigration, such as logical positivism and Gestalt psychology. Based on this soon-to-be published book chapter, my talk presents Reichenbach’s remote contribution to the discussions raised by the American reception of logical empiricism. I start with some historical remarks on philosophy of science and scientific psychology in interwar Turkey and on the role of American institutions and academic exchanges in this context. I then consider Reichenbach’s critical assessment of behaviourist psychology and its function in the formulation of his “epistemology of uncertain knowledge” (Bisbee 1938). I conclude by clarifying Reichenbach’s ambivalent but strategic position toward positivism and pragmatism in Experience and Prediction (1938).
Location
Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul.
John Freely Hall, JF 507
DUE TO CAMPUS SECURITY POLICY, PEOPLE WITHOUT A BOĞAZİÇİ ID MUST EMAIL ME USING MY INSTİTUTİIONAL EMAIL (barry.stocker(at)boun.edu.tr) PREFERABLY AT LEAST A DAY IN ADVANCE WITH THEIR NAME , SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED ONTO CAMPUS SECURITY WHO NEED IT IN ORDER TO ALLOW GUESTS TO ENTER.
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Faik Kurtulmuş, ‘Learning from the Enemies of Freedom’. Friday 15th December. 17:00
Faik Kurtulmuş (Assistant Professor, Sabancı University) will present his paper ‘Learning from the Enemies of Freedom: Freedom of Expression and Collective Power’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00 Friday 15th December.
Abstract
People need to act together to protect themselves from domination and to direct their common life. To be able to act together they need to overcome coordination problems. Freedom of expression helps build the common knowledge needed for overcoming coordination problems and is, for this reason, a source of collective power. But it is not sufficient. It should be supplemented by a system of freedom of expression that contains public sources of information that are reliable, trusted and democratically accountable. These sources of information would help sustain a large body of common knowledge that would empower citizens. A system of freedom of expression also needs to provide citizens with the opportunity to speak and be heard in ways that will enable them to contribute to their society’s stock of common knowledge. The paper develops this argument by drawing lessons from China’s censorship regime and discussing the challenges faced in generating common knowledge within liberal democratic societies.
Location
Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul.
John Freely Hall, JF 507
DUE TO CAMPUS SECURITY POLICY, PEOPLE WITHOUT A BOĞAZİÇİ ID MUST EMAIL ME USING MY INSTİTUTİIONAL EMAIL (barry.stocker(at)boun.edu.tr) PREFERABLY AT LEAST A DAY IN ADVANCE WITH THEIR NAME , SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED ONTO CAMPUS SECURITY WHO NEED IT IN ORDER TO ALLOW GUESTS TO ENTER.
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Eylem Özaltun, ‘Paralogisms Revisited: Transcendental Object as Arbitrary Object’ Friday 8th December. 17:00
Eylem Özaltun (Asst Professor, Koç University) will present her paper ‘Paralogisms Revisited: Transcendental Object as Arbitrary Object’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00 Friday 8th December.
Abstract
I start by registering that Kant’s concern in the passages where he talks about I think is the possibility of objective thought and rational discourse. Hence any account of Kant’s I think must first and foremost make its role in establishing this possibility intelligible. The main claim of my paper is that any account of I think according to which “I” refers to an individual cannot meet this adequacy criterion. I show this by investigating a curios expression Kant uses, namely, “=X”. This expression appears in B404: “Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thoughts = X”. I argue that “=X” is Kant’s device for emphasizing the indeterminacy of a certain representation. It is a specific kind of indeterminacy which makes this indeterminate representation suitable for figuring in deductive inferences like universal instantiation and universal generalization. “=X” is a vehicle for generality for Kant. I further argue that Kant models the vehicles of generality he employs in his metaphysics on the use of such devices in ordinary mathematical discourse. Namely, he models his notion of the transcendental on the notion of the arbitrary in mathematics. I take it that when Kant uses “transcendental” to modify “object” or “subject” he uses it as synonymous with “arbitrary” as in “Let X be an arbitrary triangle”.
How do arbitrary objects work as a vehicle of generality in ordinary mathematical discourse? In order to answer this question in a way that will help us to interpret Kant, we need a study of the discourse as a study of natural language of mathematics. After all Kant did not look at mathematics via the post-Fregean logical reconstructions of its reasonings. Now if there are some significant mismatches between such reconstructions and the ordinary practice, we cannot use the former to see what Kant saw in mathematical reasoning. What we need is a study of how mathematicians use arbitrary objects as a vehicle of generality without explicit quantification. I find what we need in Kit Fine’s work: in his account of arbitrary objects as variable objects constructed by Locke-Cantor abstraction.
I show that Locke-Cantor conception of abstraction is the best model for how Kant abstracts to get to the arbitrary objects of his metaphysics, namely, the transcendental object and transcendental subject. Being abstract objects, they are logically distinct type of objects than the individual objects that fall in their range. (For example, an arbitrary integer is not identical to any particular integer. Such an identity claim would not only be false but a category mistake). I argue that Kant appeals to their being of logically distinct type to expose the formal mistakes of rational psychologists in Paralogisms. I show that Kant’s criticism can be summarized with a slogan:do not confuse a reference to an arbitrary object with a reference to an individual object in its range! Then I argue that thinking that the “I” of I think refers to an individual is just this confusion. Finally, I show that the same confusion would result in reduction of Kant’s account of recognition of others as rational beings to an argument from analogy.
Location
Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul.
John Freely Hall, JF 507
DUE TO CAMPUS SECURITY POLICY, PEOPLE WITHOUT A BOĞAZİÇİ ID MUST EMAIL ME USING MY INSTİTUTİIONAL EMAIL (barry.stocker(at)boun.edu.tr) PREFERABLY AT LEAST A DAY IN ADVANCE WITH THEIR NAME , SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED ONTO CAMPUS SECURITY WHO NEED IT IN ORDER TO ALLOW GUESTS TO ENTER.
SWIP-TR6 Conference program
The 6th annual conference of SWIP-TR will take place at Kadir Has University, İstanbul. The event will be hosted at Cibali Campus, on 2nd & 3rd December 2023, with the theme of Moral and Political Philosophy.
Invited Speakers:
Sandrine Bergès (Bilkent University)
Chryssi Sidiropoulou (Boğaziçi University)
Organizing Committee:
Tuğba Sevinç (Kadir Has University)
Seniye Tilev (Kadir Has University)
Scientific Committee:
Saniye Vatansever (Bilkent University)
İmge Oranlı (Arizona State University)
Selda Selman (Kültür University)
Gamze Keskin ( Kırklareli University)
Çiğdem Yazıcı (Üsküdar University)
Maya Mandalinci (Kadir Has University)
Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium. Hatice Karaman, ‘A Poetic Debt: Acts of Hermeneutic Meaning’. Friday 1st December. 17:00
Hatice Karaman (Asst Professor, Yeditepe University) will present her paper ‘A Poetic Debt: Acts of Hermeneutic Meaning’ to the Boğaziçi Philosophy Colloquium at 17:00, Friday 1st December.
ABSTRACT
In one of his astounding lectures on pardon in 1998, “forgiveness” says Jacques Derrida, “then, is the poem” (2022, p.105). Derrida, always being a philosopher of ambivalence, rarely provided his readers with such clear remarks or elaborations on the concepts he worked with. Therefore, this tiny but significant definition by a philosopher who almost tenaciously refrains from defining is remarkable. In Paul Celan’s Todtnauberg, the poem which is written after the poet’s visit to Heidegger’s hut, Derrida saw forgiveness. This is an echo of a statement from an earlier text where he explains “there is no literature that does not ask, from its first word, forgiveness” (2007, p. 157). Forgiveness is among the core concepts that come forward especially in Derrida’s late philosophy. Together with Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning and the New International (1993), it can be observed that Derrida’s ethico-political concerns grow around certain notions such as mourning, debt, learning-to-live, hospitality, justice, forgiveness, and the gift. These conjoining notions are “situated at the juncture of ethics and politics” (Balibar, 2009 p. 5). Although Derrida discusses such related notions in connection with a diverse spectrum of philosophical references from antiquity to Freud, Heidegger, Husserl, Levinas, and others; he picks many of his departure points from a wide array of literary texts by Shakespeare, Kafka, Hölderlin, Celan, et al. In Specters of Marx, Derrida poses “learning to live” as an ethico-political attitude which necessitates a constant, intergenerational conversation with “ghosts”. Speaking with the ghost, for Derrida, is imperative in order to learn to live more justly. Deconstruction as justice reflects upon inheritance, hence involves facing parades of ghosts. That’s how literature, together with philosophy, forms a ground for Derrida to meet the ghosts, to kill the fathers, to mourn, and to forgive them if possible. Within the ethico-political interaction Derrida interweaves between literature and philosophy via deconstruction, he also glimpses at “hermeneutic mourning” as a spectral act of interpretation. This “name” Derrida chooses for defining Heidegger’s reading of Hölderlin’s work, is illuminating in terms of reconsidering the philosopher’s acts of literary philosophy, so to speak. In Derrida’s oeuvre, hermeneutic mourning only appears once in the Wellek Library Lectures dedicated to Paul de Man (1989) remaining undefined and unexplained. This unrevealed term, nevertheless, can be reconsidered in relation to the famous notions of the philosopher such as forgiveness, debt, mourning, and/or hauntology. Accordingly, the present study attempts to discuss potential definition(s) for “hermeneutic mourning” by revisiting the bonds among forgiveness, literature, and hauntology as suggested by Derrida.
BIONOTE
Hatice Karaman is an Asst. Prof. in the Department of English Language and Literature at Yeditepe University. She holds a BA in Comparative Literature, an MA in English Literature, and a PhD in Philosophy. Her MA thesis focused on novels by Orhan Pamuk, Pierre Loti and Cornelia Golna, investigating the city, Istanbul, as a rhizomatic space of desire following the reflections of Deleuze & Guattari. In her doctoral dissertation, she has analyzed selected Shakespearean tragedies, pursuing the idea of spectral justice in the plays. She has been teaching undergraduate and graduate courses on contemporary literary theory, British Novel, and contemporary philosophy. Her main research interests are philosophy and literature, Shakespeare and philosophy, and contemporary literary theory. She has published articles in different journals and a book chapter on intertextuality and the autonomy of the female authors/philosophers (Women Philosophers on Autonomy. Routledge, 2018).
Location
Boğaziçi University, South Campus, Bebek, Istanbul.
John Freely Hall, JF 507
DUE TO CAMPUS SECURITY POLICY, PEOPLE WITHOUT A BOĞAZİÇİ ID MUST EMAIL ME (PREFERABLY AT LEAST A DAY IN ADVANCE) WITH THEIR NAME AND AFFILIATION, SO THAT THIS INFORMATION CAN BE PASSED ONTO CAMPUS SECURITY WHO NEED IT IN ORDER TO ALLOW GUESTS TO ENTER.
Barry Stocker
barry.stocker(at)boun.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Anders Herlitz on “Fixing Person-Based Stakes in Distributive Theory” (29.11.2023) Via Zoom
Anders Herlitz (Lund University) will give a talk at Marmara on Wednesday. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday November 29, 2023
Time: 17.30 – 19.30 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Fixing Person-Based Stakes in Distributive Theory”
About The Speaker: Anders Herlitz is Associate Professor of Practical Philosophy at Lund University and Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies. His research focuses on distributive theory, value theory and population-level bioethic.
Abstract: This paper explores an often-overlooked distinction in distributive theory and its importance. The paper illustrates that there are at least three ways to interpret substantive proposals of how to distribute goods based on what is at stake for different individuals (or their “claims” or “complaints”) and that the interpretation affects what the proposals recommend. It then argues that each of the interpretations is associated with significant problems since they all seem to violate plausible requirements of rationality. A fourth interpretation of how to understand person-based stakes is introduced, but some questions regarding whether this is compatible with distributive theories that appeal to such stakes are raised.
CFA: Social Ontology Faces the Future
Dates: Friday May 31 & Saturday June 1, 2024
Location: Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
Keynote: Rach Cosker-Rowland (Leeds), “The Future of Gender”
Submit abstracts of 750-1000 words (inclusive of references) to socialontologyfacesthefuture@gmail.com by March 1st. Decisions will be communicated by mid-March.
Abstracts will be refereed by an international committee of researchers in social ontology. Submissions will be blind-reviewed.
This two-day workshop will occur at the beautiful and historic campus of Boğaziçi University in Istanbul. On the evening of June 1, we’ll have a workshop dinner (probably at either Bi Nevi Deli or Vegan Masa).
The theme: Social ontological issues concerning the future (including but not limited to the future of social ontology). Here is an incomplete list of suitable topics:
- Issues concerning the future for social categories and kinds, such as gender, race, religion, law, ethnicity, social movements (e.g., veganism, feminism, trans rights, anti-racism), disability, nationality, culture, language, and so on
- Issues in social ontology concerning future generations—their existence and ontological status, their interests, their relations to present generations, and/or our ethical obligations to them
- Group agency and the future; issues involving temporally extended group agents
- Collective intention and action across time and into the future
- Social construction and the future: e.g., is the future itself a social construction?
- Conceptual dimensions of social ontology and the future: e.g., do our future-oriented concepts call for ameliorative analysis?
- Social ontology and emerging technologies (such as artificial intelligence)
- Social ontology, aesthetics, and the future
- The academic discipline of social ontology: How will it evolve in the future? How should it evolve?
We will invite but will not require participants to circulate workshop papers in advance for pre-reading.
Workshop participants will have an opportunity to offer their papers for consideration for a journal special issue or edited volume that will be assembled after the workshop is completed.
Organizers: Seçil Aracı (Boğaziçi), Zeynep Celik (Bilkent), David Killoren (Koç), and Bill Wringe (Bilkent)
Hesperus is Bosphorus 