Archive for the ‘Philosophy of Cognitive Science’ Category
2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science, April 19, Sunday, 2015, ODTU (METU), Ankara.
ISBCS 2015, the 2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science,
is going to be held in April 19, Sunday, 2015, at ODTU (METU), Ankara.
ISBCS wants to be a gathering in Turkey for cogsci researchers worldwide, and for cogsci researchers in Turkey. Read the rest of this entry »
Philosophy/Cog-Sci Reading Group: Concepts and Beliefs, from Perception to Action (Wednesdays, 17.15-19.00, Bogazici University, TB365)
As part of a three year Tubitak 1001 project on “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” we will be running a weekly reading group, that will meet on Wednesdays from 17.15-18.00 in TB365 at Bogazici University. If you would like to participate and be added to our mailing list (and receive copies of the readings) please contact Merve Tapinc (email@example.com)
Hopefully we will have a website for the project up and running in a month or so.
The schedule for the first 5 weeks of the reading group will be as follows:
(1) September 24th, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83
(2) October, 1st, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83 (continued)
(3) October 8th, 2014
Lawrence and Margolis (cont.)
(4) October 15th, 2014
James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, LEA Publishers, 1979
(5) October 22nd, 2014
Talk at Bogazici: Suleman Shahid (Tilburg) on “Child-robot Interaction: A cross-cultural perspective” (10/06/2014)
Boğaziçi University Cognitive Science Program cordially invites you to a lecture by Dr. Suleman Shahid (Tilburg)
Child-robot Interaction: A cross-cultural perspective
Date: June 10, 2014 Tuesday
Location: Boğaziçi University South Campus – Vedat Yerlici Conference Centre, Room 5
ABSTRACT: In this study, we investigates how children from two different cultural backgrounds (Pakistani, Dutch) and two different age groups (8 and 12 year olds) experience interacting with a social robot (iCat) during collaborative game play. We propose a new method to evaluate children’s interaction with such a robot, by asking whether playing a game with a state-of-the-art social robot like the iCat is more similar to playing this game alone or with a friend. A combination of self-report scores, perception test results and behavioral analyses indicate that Child-Robot Interaction in game playing situations is highly appreciated by children, although more by Pakistani and younger children than by Dutch and older children. Results also suggest that children enjoyed playing with the robot more than playing alone, but enjoyed playing with a friend even more. In a similar vein, we found that children were more expressive in their non-verbal behavior when playing with the robot than when they were playing alone, but less expressive than when playing with a friend. Our results not only stress the importance of using new benchmarks for evaluating Child-Robot Interaction but also highlight the significance of cultural differences for the design of social robots.
Short Bio: Suleman Shahid received the PhD degree in communication sciences in 2011. He is currently an assistant professor at the Tilburg Centre for Cognition and Communication (TiCCC), Department of Communication and Information Sciences, Tilburg University. Before joining Tilburg University in 2007, he received the professional doctorate in engineering degree from the Eindhoven University of Technology. During his stay in Eindhoven, he also spent almost a year at Philips Research, Eindhoven. He has a background in media computing, but in the last few years, he has been involved in interaction design and social aspects of affective computing, particularly in a cross-cultural setting.
Cog Sci Talk at Yeditepe: Fuat Balcı (Koç) on “Psychological Time and Decisions: An Overarching Approach” (02/05/2014)
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, COGNITIVE SCIENCE SEMINARS (SPRING 2014)
by Fuat Balcı (Koç University) on May 2, at 16.00, in Law Building Room 332.
“Psychological Time and Decisions: An Overarching Approach”
ABSTRACT: Interval timing refers to the ability to perceive, remember, and organize responses around durations ranging from seconds to minutes. This fundamental ability is observed in many species (e.g., fish, pigeons, mice, rats, humans) with virtually the same statistical properties. In this talk, I will briefly introduce interval timing along with its psychophysics. Then, the relation of interval timing to decision-making will be explored at the level of the underlying processing dynamics and with respect to optimality (reward maximization). Different model-based approaches to time perception will be discussed and evaluated in terms of their neural plausibility. To this end, I will specifically introduce our drift-diffusion model of interval timing and extend the scope of its application to temporal decision-making. I will demonstrate that the processing dynamics that underlie interval timing and account for its psychophysical properties within the framework of the drift-diffusion model can also account for the accuracy and latency (i.e., response times) of decisions about time intervals. Finally, the importance of interval timing for reward maximization in temporal and non-temporal decision-making will be discussed with an emphasis on the role of temporal noise characteristics in determining optimal decision strategies.
Talk at Yeditepe by Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Sehir) on “Consciousness and Misrepresentation” (21/03/2014)
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY COGNITIVE SCIENCE SEMINARS (SPRING 2014)
“Consciousness and Misrepresentation”
by Assist. Prof. Dr. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Şehir University), on March 21, at 16.00, in Law Building Room 332.
Abstract: No one denies that we humans differ significantly from what one might call our cognitive relatives, i.e. complex machines such as robots or other forms of living beings. However what marks the difference is difficult to pin down. Consciousness has been taken to be one of the best candidates to account for this difference but an account of consciousness is just as difficult to give. In this talk I focus on one particular theory of consciousness, viz. the higher-order theory of consciousness and a troubling aspect of this theory. Higher-order theories assert that a mental state is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of that mental state. For instance the perception of a blue chair is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of the perception. But since representations are not infallible, higher-order theorists embrace the possibility of having a conscious perception of a blue chair where there is a perception of a red chair or even where there is no perception. The former is usually called a misrepresentation and the latter radical misrepresentation. Even though higher-order theories have many virtues, I suggest that the possibility of a radical misrepresentation undermines some of those virtues. As such either the possibility of a radical misrepresentation needs to be denied or the phenomenon of a radical misrepresentation needs to be understood in a different way.
Early Career Scholars Conference in Philosophy of Psychiatry: Overcoming Mind-Brain Dualism in 21st Century Medicine
21-22, November 2014
Center for Philosophy of Science, 817 Cathedral of Learning, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA USA 15260
Notification By: July 7, 2014
Email submissions to: firstname.lastname@example.org
For questions and comments, contact Serife Tekin, email@example.com
Summary: The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry.
Psychiatry’s aspirations as a branch of medicine are often in conflict with its aspirations as a branch of science. As a branch of medicine, it aims to clinically address the complaints of individuals with mental disorders, including the subjective, mental, and first- person aspects of psychopathology (such as feelings of worthlessness and hallucinations). As a branch of science, on the other hand, it targets the objective, embodied, and third-person correlates of mental distress (such as atypical brain mechanisms and behavioral anomalies). The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), the psychiatric taxonomy used in the US and increasingly around the world, has traditionally been employed to identify both the scientific and medical targets of psychiatry, as well as in the service of sociological, pedagogical, and forensic projects. In attempting to be everything for psychiatry, however, the manual has succeeded in fully pleasing no one. The virtually universal dissatisfaction with contemporary nosology has led to a tension between critics who argue the way forward is focusing on the needs of the clinic and those who believe psychiatry should work harder to resemble the sciences.
We believe that the resolution of this dilemma is hindered by a contemporary form of dualism, in which psychiatric disorders are seen as either disembodied problems in living or as subtypes of somatic disease. There is a tendency to perceive the etiology of psychiatric disorders as either brain-based (organic or biological), to be investigated by the biomedical sciences, or mind-based (functional or psychological), to be investigated by behavior-based schemas such as the DSM or patient-centered approaches that take a more holistic approach to disorder. There is also a tendency to divide psychiatric treatments into those that directly target the brain, e.g., antidepressants, and those that purportedly target the mind, e.g., cognitive behavior therapy, — often to the detriment of the latter. While significant work has been done to overcome the dualistic conception of persons in the contemporary philosophy of cognitive science and in the philosophy of neuroscience, the results of these debates have not been fully transferred to the domain of psychiatry.
The goal of this conference is to address the crisis in psychiatric research and treatment by exploring the ways in which the mind-brain dualism can be overcome in contemporary psychiatry through an integration of approaches from philosophy of mind, philosophy of science (including philosophy of cognitive science and neuroscience) and philosophy of medicine. One goal of such re-evaluation is to reconcile the claim that psychopathology needs to be scientific with the claim that it needs to keep the experience of the sufferer at its core.
Format of Conference: The conference will take place over two days. Eight papers by early career scholars (graduate students, postdocs, and untenured faculty) will be commented on by senior philosophers who have expertise in philosophy of science, philosophy of neuroscience, or philosophy of medicine.
By matching each junior presenter with a senior commentator, our aim is to give junior scholars an opportunity to receive thoughtful and targeted feedback on their work and to facilitate lively discussions. Further, this format will initiate junior-mentor relationships that will help strengthen the philosophy of psychiatry community.
Each presenter will be given 25 minutes for his or her paper, followed by 15 minutes for commentary and 15 minutes for discussion.
If you are a senior scholar and would like to participate in the conference as a speaker or commentator, please contact Serife Tekin, at firstname.lastname@example.org.
Organizing Committee: William Bechtel, Trey Boone, Mazviita Shirimuuta, Peter Machamer, Edouard Machery, Ken Schaffner, Kathryn Tabb, and Serife Tekin.
Jennifer Radden, PhD (Professor Emerita of Philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Boston).
John Sadler, MD (Professor of Psychiatry and Clinical Services, University of Texas Southwestern).
Mazviita Chirimuuta (University of Pittsburgh)
Peter Machamer (University of Pittsburgh)
Edouard Machery (University of Pittsburgh)
Kenneth F. Schaffner (University of Pittsburgh)
Jacqueline Sullivan (Western University)
Jonathan Tsou (Iowa State University)