Archive for the ‘Philosophy of Cognitive Science’ Category
Call For Abstracts: Enriching Embodied Cognition
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
June 9th-11th, 2015
This workshop will be centered around material for the manuscript of Hutto and Myin’s latest book, Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework, which is a follow-up to their 2013 book Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content.
Articles and draft material will be circulated to the participants in advance, and in the morning sessions Hutto and Myin will present and discuss core arguments with the participants. In the afternoon participants will present papers. These papers should be on themes discussed in the book, but do not have to be direct responses to Hutto and Myin’s work. If you would be interested in presenting a paper at the workshop, please send a short abstract to firstname.lastname@example.org by April 20th. Successful applicants will be informed by April 25th.
Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework will provide an enriched understanding of embodied cognition: showing just how embodied it is and just how it is embodied. This book integrates what is best in the replacement approaches, advancing the sciences of the mind by providing a novel framework for non-representational embodied cognition one that refines and critically synthesizes the main insights of the enactivist and ecological traditions. Hutto and Myin argue that once unified replacement approaches have all that is needed to do the necessary enriching work. In making their case Hutto and Myin highlight a recognized danger call it the Retention Worry that many applications of embodied, enactive cognition, (with headline cases in psychology, psychiatry and sports science) are missing the point. The Retention Worry arises for any account of embodied cognition that retains too much traditional thinking about the role of mental representations in cognition, for such accounts fail to successfully motivate any role for the body or environment, let alone the one identified in the research]. Only by clarifying what, if any, role representations play in cognitive science explanations will we gain a deeper and clearer understanding of the nature of embodied cognition.
This workshop is organized as part of Lucas Thorpe’s Tubitak project: Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action.
The proposed chapter structure of the book can be found below the fold:
2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science, April 19, Sunday, 2015, ODTU (METU), Ankara.
ISBCS 2015, the 2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science,
is going to be held in April 19, Sunday, 2015, at ODTU (METU), Ankara.
ISBCS wants to be a gathering in Turkey for cogsci researchers worldwide, and for cogsci researchers in Turkey. Read the rest of this entry »
Philosophy/Cog-Sci Reading Group: Concepts and Beliefs, from Perception to Action (Wednesdays, 17.15-19.00, Bogazici University, TB365)
As part of a three year Tubitak 1001 project on “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” we will be running a weekly reading group, that will meet on Wednesdays from 17.15-18.00 in TB365 at Bogazici University. If you would like to participate and be added to our mailing list (and receive copies of the readings) please contact Merve Tapinc (email@example.com)
Hopefully we will have a website for the project up and running in a month or so.
The schedule for the first 5 weeks of the reading group will be as follows:
(1) September 24th, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83
(2) October, 1st, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83 (continued)
(3) October 8th, 2014
Lawrence and Margolis (cont.)
(4) October 15th, 2014
James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, LEA Publishers, 1979
(5) October 22nd, 2014
Talk at Bogazici: Suleman Shahid (Tilburg) on “Child-robot Interaction: A cross-cultural perspective” (10/06/2014)
Boğaziçi University Cognitive Science Program cordially invites you to a lecture by Dr. Suleman Shahid (Tilburg)
Child-robot Interaction: A cross-cultural perspective
Date: June 10, 2014 Tuesday
Location: Boğaziçi University South Campus – Vedat Yerlici Conference Centre, Room 5
ABSTRACT: In this study, we investigates how children from two different cultural backgrounds (Pakistani, Dutch) and two different age groups (8 and 12 year olds) experience interacting with a social robot (iCat) during collaborative game play. We propose a new method to evaluate children’s interaction with such a robot, by asking whether playing a game with a state-of-the-art social robot like the iCat is more similar to playing this game alone or with a friend. A combination of self-report scores, perception test results and behavioral analyses indicate that Child-Robot Interaction in game playing situations is highly appreciated by children, although more by Pakistani and younger children than by Dutch and older children. Results also suggest that children enjoyed playing with the robot more than playing alone, but enjoyed playing with a friend even more. In a similar vein, we found that children were more expressive in their non-verbal behavior when playing with the robot than when they were playing alone, but less expressive than when playing with a friend. Our results not only stress the importance of using new benchmarks for evaluating Child-Robot Interaction but also highlight the significance of cultural differences for the design of social robots.
Short Bio: Suleman Shahid received the PhD degree in communication sciences in 2011. He is currently an assistant professor at the Tilburg Centre for Cognition and Communication (TiCCC), Department of Communication and Information Sciences, Tilburg University. Before joining Tilburg University in 2007, he received the professional doctorate in engineering degree from the Eindhoven University of Technology. During his stay in Eindhoven, he also spent almost a year at Philips Research, Eindhoven. He has a background in media computing, but in the last few years, he has been involved in interaction design and social aspects of affective computing, particularly in a cross-cultural setting.
Cog Sci Talk at Yeditepe: Fuat Balcı (Koç) on “Psychological Time and Decisions: An Overarching Approach” (02/05/2014)
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY, INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, COGNITIVE SCIENCE SEMINARS (SPRING 2014)
by Fuat Balcı (Koç University) on May 2, at 16.00, in Law Building Room 332.
“Psychological Time and Decisions: An Overarching Approach”
ABSTRACT: Interval timing refers to the ability to perceive, remember, and organize responses around durations ranging from seconds to minutes. This fundamental ability is observed in many species (e.g., fish, pigeons, mice, rats, humans) with virtually the same statistical properties. In this talk, I will briefly introduce interval timing along with its psychophysics. Then, the relation of interval timing to decision-making will be explored at the level of the underlying processing dynamics and with respect to optimality (reward maximization). Different model-based approaches to time perception will be discussed and evaluated in terms of their neural plausibility. To this end, I will specifically introduce our drift-diffusion model of interval timing and extend the scope of its application to temporal decision-making. I will demonstrate that the processing dynamics that underlie interval timing and account for its psychophysical properties within the framework of the drift-diffusion model can also account for the accuracy and latency (i.e., response times) of decisions about time intervals. Finally, the importance of interval timing for reward maximization in temporal and non-temporal decision-making will be discussed with an emphasis on the role of temporal noise characteristics in determining optimal decision strategies.
Talk at Yeditepe by Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Sehir) on “Consciousness and Misrepresentation” (21/03/2014)
YEDITEPE UNIVERSITY COGNITIVE SCIENCE SEMINARS (SPRING 2014)
“Consciousness and Misrepresentation”
by Assist. Prof. Dr. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Şehir University), on March 21, at 16.00, in Law Building Room 332.
Abstract: No one denies that we humans differ significantly from what one might call our cognitive relatives, i.e. complex machines such as robots or other forms of living beings. However what marks the difference is difficult to pin down. Consciousness has been taken to be one of the best candidates to account for this difference but an account of consciousness is just as difficult to give. In this talk I focus on one particular theory of consciousness, viz. the higher-order theory of consciousness and a troubling aspect of this theory. Higher-order theories assert that a mental state is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of that mental state. For instance the perception of a blue chair is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of the perception. But since representations are not infallible, higher-order theorists embrace the possibility of having a conscious perception of a blue chair where there is a perception of a red chair or even where there is no perception. The former is usually called a misrepresentation and the latter radical misrepresentation. Even though higher-order theories have many virtues, I suggest that the possibility of a radical misrepresentation undermines some of those virtues. As such either the possibility of a radical misrepresentation needs to be denied or the phenomenon of a radical misrepresentation needs to be understood in a different way.