Archive for February 2016
We will start this Tuesday (15/02/2016) by discussing a work in progress by Ken Westphal on “Kant, Aristotle and our Fidelity to Reason”. We will also make a decision about what to read for the rest of the semester.
If you would like a copy of this paper, or to be added to our mailing list, please email Melisa: firstname.lastname@example.org
Support for this reading group is provided by the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project AF140071 “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government” run by Lucas Thorpe (Boğaziçi) and Sasha Mudd (Southampton).
This semester we will continue with our Cog-sci/Philosophy Reading group this semester. We will meet on Mondays from 5-7pm in TB365.
We will have our first meeting this coming Monday (15/02/2016). At this meeting we will discuss the following paper:
Nicholas Silins, “Silins, Nicholar (2016) Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception“, Philosophy Compass, 2016
We will also discuss what to read for the rest of the semester.
If you are interested in being on our mailing list, please email Elif at: email@example.com
This reading group is organised as part of the Tubitak project (114K348): “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action“.
Center for Ethics in Society
“Practice Views Revisited”
DATE: Thu 11 February 2016
PLACE: G-160, Bilkent University, Ankara
Thomas Scanlon and others have argued that ‘practice views’ give
the wrong kind of reasons for moral duties, which shows up in the fact
that they identify the wrong addressees of these duties. The reason
why I must not break my promise to you, for instance, should lie in
the harm that this does to you—rather than in the harm that it does to
the practice of promising or to our community. I demonstrate that the
wrong reason objection indeed applies to some practice views, notably
rule-conquentialism and (Hobbes’) contractarianism. Drawing on ideas
by Elizabeth Anscombe, however, I offer an alternative understanding of
the role of the practice in ethical justifications.
According to “conventionalist” or “practice views,” at least some moral
duties exist within social practices, and these practices play an important
role in justifying the respective duties. Among others, the theories of Hobbes,
Gauthier, Hooker and Rawls are commonly classified as practice views.
Thomas Scanlon has levelled a formidable and widely used objection against
practice views: They give the wrong reasons for our duties, which shows up
in the fact that they identify the wrong addressees. The reason why I must
not break my promise to you, for instance, should lie in the harm that this
does to you—rather than in the harm it does to the practice of promising or
to all the participants in that practice.
I grant that Scanlon’s objection applies to the mentioned theories. But I offer
a surprising diagnosis: (i) I argue that the conventionalism of these theories
is superficial. (ii) I show that the objection applies to them precisely because
they are not genuinely conventionalist and that (iii) any genuinely conventionalist
theory gives the correct reasons and identifies the correct addressees of our duties.
As a last step, (iv) I outline one such theory, using the understanding of the practice
in moral justifications that I find in Elizabeth Anscombe’s work. (v) My particular
proposal has an interesting application to rights: It enables us to be conventionalists
about rights without being cultural relativists about rights.
Talk at Bilkent by Ulf Hlobil (Pittsburgh): “Do It! But Don’t Listen to Me!: Moral Testimony and Practical Inference”
Department of Philosophy
University of Pittsburgh
“Do It! But Don’t Listen to Me!: Moral Testimony and Practical Inference”
DATE: Wed 10 February 2016
PLACE: G-160, Bilkent University, Ankara
What, if anything, is wrong with acting on moral beliefs that we accept
merely on the say-so of others? Why could it be problematic to act on a
moral belief that we take to be true without understanding why it is true?
I defend a qualified and novel version of what is called “pessimism” in
the controversy over pure moral testimony. I argue that we can rationally
come to hold the premises of moral reasoning through testimony, but that
moral testimony is problematic in cases where the agent lacks the ability
to make the correct practical inference. The problem is that inferential
abilities cannot be shared via testimony. The role that moral testimony
can play in our moral lives is therefore limited. My account gives the
correct verdicts for common examples in the literature on moral testimony.
It, moreover, incorporates many of the optimists’ insights and is more
general and informative than rival accounts.
Yeditepe University, Department of Philosophy
Istanbul, May 5-6th 2016
The workshop is organized in the frameworks of the newly instituted hub “Turkish European Network for the Study of Women in Philosophy” and of the newly instituted Joint Master Program “History of Women Philosophers/History of Philosophy” (University of Paderborn-Yeditepe University Istanbul). The overall aim of these two projects is the study of women philosophers and of the changes in the canonical history of philosophy resulting from a thorough consideration of the women contribution. Within this broader framework, this workshop addresses the women philosophers’ contribution to a particularly relevant topic: the notion of autonomy. Autonomy, together with its cognate concepts (self-determination, self-mastery, self-government etc.), is among the central concepts across the whole history and the whole spectrum of the philosophical debate, yet the women philosophers’ contribution to its development has been seldom investigated.
For the list of participant, see here.