Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Talk at Bilkent, April 12: Michael Trestman on Bee Consciousnes (Online Event)

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Title: Flower communication in social bees: a case study in
biophenomenology

Speaker: Michael Trestman

Psychology department seminar.

Date: Monday, 12 April 2021
Time: 16:30
Zoom Meeting Information:
https://zoom.us/j/8760742468?pwd=Q201VENwY09aUS9mb3hEcFpHSHA2UT09
Meeting ID: 876 074 2468
Passcode: 362441

Abstract: In this talk, I argue that behavioral, developmental,
ecological, and evolutionary evidence support attributions of
consciousness to bees, and further, that understanding the ways bees
experience their worlds is essential to fully understanding their
behavior and evolution. For a conscious animal, the world as experienced
is a critically important component of its phenotype, influencing many
aspects of behavior, development, ecology and evolution. In order to
make this discussion concrete, I will focus on the case study of the
social bees in family Apidae, which includes the honeybees, bumblebees
and the highly social stingless bees. In particular, I will focus on the
diversity of communication forms that have evolved in the social bees,
allowing returning foragers to communicate information about the
abundance, location, profitability and safety of specific flower
patches, to bees preparing to leave the nest on their own foraging
expeditions. This evolving behavioral system provides a fascinating
window into the way these animals experience their world, and serves as
an example of how consciousness can have a detectable signature on the
evolution of behavior: I argue that the observed distribution of
communication forms points to the existence, in the common ancestor of
Apidae of both conscious memory consolidation through episodic
recollection and decision-making through conscious episodic prospection.

About the speaker: Dr Trestman is an independent researcher in
consciousness studies and biological theory. He received his PhD in
philosophy in 2010 from University of Caifornia, Davis, and has held
Postdoctoral Fellowships from the USA National Science Foundation (NSF)
and the Tanner Humanities Center at University of Utah.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

April 8, 2021 at 6:29 pm

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Sasha Mudd (Southampton/Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile): “A positive, capabilities-based account of epistemic justice.” 23/04/2021 – Via Zoom

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Sasha Mudd (Southampton/Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, April 23rd, 2021, 5.15 – 7pm (Istanbul time). Everyone welcome.

Linkhttps://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

“A positive, capabilities-based account of epistemic justice.”

ABSTRACT: In this paper, we deliver a positive, distributive, capabilities-based conception of epistemic justice, which is intended to improve upon Fricker’s canonical, failure-first, ‘discriminatory’ conception. We follow Fricker in taking Nussbaum’s capabilities-based approach to social justice as a starting point, however we go further than Fricker in accepting the distributive principle at the heart of Nussbaum’s view.  Here we agree with Coady that Fricker’s reasons for resisting a distributive model of epistemic (in)justice are not persuasive, and that an adequate account of epistemic justice should be centered on a principle of fair distribution.  According to the principle we develop, epistemic justice obtains when there is a distribution of capabilities to all individuals in a given domain that secures their opportunities for minimal epistemic agency. In this paper we explain and defend this conception of epistemic (in)justice, arguing that it does a better job than does Fricker’s conception of capturing the true extension of the concept.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

April 8, 2021 at 3:41 pm

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[CFP] Deadline extended to 18 April for submissions to Ergon

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Dear authors,

After meetings with the editorial board and our faculty advisor Dr. Robert Howton, we’ve decided to extend our original deadline of April 1, 2021 to April 18, 2021 for Spring 2021 submissions.

Submissions on all areas and within all traditions of philosophy are accepted. With that being said, original, insightful philosophical work with rigorous and cogent argumentation is expected and greatly valued. Although Ergon is dedicated to giving undergraduates an opportunity to publish philosophy, after receiving submissions from graduate students we’ve decided with the editorial board and Dr. Robert Howton also to accept submissions written by fresh graduates. Authors that have graduated no earlier than one year prior to the cycle that they plan on submitting may send their papers. So, for instance, if you’ve graduated in Spring 2020 or later, you may submit your paper for the Spring 2021 issue; papers that are submitted by authors that graduated earlier than Spring 2020 will not be accepted.

An updated call for papers, complete with the updated deadline and submission guidelines, is available here: https://ergon.ku.edu.tr/blog/

Sincerely,
Ongun Kılıç
Editor-in-Chief, Ergon


About the journal. Ergon is the undergraduate philosophy journal at Koç University. It was founded in 2020 and is one of the first in Turkey to publish philosophy in English. It is run by Koç University undergraduates. A new issue is published every Fall and Spring.

Spring 2021 Call for Papers. Ergon is now accepting papers for the Spring 2021 volume. Submissions are due April 18, 2021. Email ergon [at] ku [dot] edu [dot] tr for any queries.

Submission Guidelines. The Editors ask that submitted papers meet the following guidelines:

  • Must be a topic on philosophy. Submissions on all areas and traditions of philosophy are accepted.
  • Authors are advised to follow the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors may be asked to reformat if their paper is selected for publication.
  • Authors are encouraged, but not required, to include an abstract of no more than 300 words.
  • Submissions must be between 1500-5000 words and should be 1.5 spaced 12pt.
  • Submitted papers must not include any identifying information, including the author’s name, year of study, university, or major. This information should be sent in a separate document to maintain the impartiality of the blind review process.

For more information, please visit Ergon‘s homepage at ergon.ku.edu.tr.

Written by roberthowton

April 5, 2021 at 6:03 pm

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Conference Announcement: “Interactivism in Perspective: Celebrating Mark Bickhard’s Contributions to the Psychology of the Whole Person”

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Title: Interactivism in Perspective: Celebrating Mark Bickhard’s Contributions to the Psychology of the Whole Person

Dates: 25th – 27th June 2021

Place: Online (Zoom/YouTube)

Conference website: https://www.ecointeractivism.com/conference

Contact: interactivistconference2021@gmail.com

Since its inception as a model of mental representation, interactivism has developed into a broad theoretical framework for understanding whole persons and their complex socio-cultural ontology. The present conference is a celebration of the work of interactivism’s creator and main advocate – Mark Bickhard.

Contemporary cognitive science is undergoing what has been termed “a pragmatic turn”: Opposing the traditional computational views, the current trend focuses on the dynamic, embodied, and embedded nature of psychological phenomena. Many of the theories that have grown to prominence in this action-oriented climate (e.g. enactivism, predictive processing, emulation theory etc.) share significant common-ground with interactivism, while, nevertheless differing from it in various important respects. “Interactivism in Perspective” offers a theoretical discussion between interactivism and such congenial models, as well as presents research conducted within and in relation to the interactivist framework.

The conference will involve three panels dedicated to three areas of major interest to interactivist theory – normativity, representation, and language. It will also feature traditional talks by researchers working within or in close relation to the interactivist framework. There will be no open CFP for this conference, but there will be considerable time allocated to questions from the audience.

Attendance is free and open for all but you are kindly asked to register at https://www.eventbrite.com/e/interactivism-in-perspective-tickets-146941727663.

Panel speakers:

  • normativity (Terrence Deacon, Tom Froese, Alvaro Moreno)
  • representation (Dan Hutto, Ruth Millikan, Marcin Miłkowski)
  • language (Ruth Kempson, Joanna Rączaszek-Leonardi)

Individual talks:

Richard Campbell, Robert Campbell, Müge Kuyumcuoğlu,

Alex Levine, Johanna Seibt, Georgi Stojanov, Lucas Thorpe

Stay tuned for more details!

Organizing Committee,

Jedediah Allen, Oğuz Erdin, Adrian Fraser, Robert Mirski, Itay Shani

Talk at Bilkent, April 1: Jessica Wilson on Metaphysical Indeterminacy in the Multiverse (Online Event)

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Title: Metaphysical Indeterminacy in the Multiverse 

By Jessica Wilson (Toronto, Philosophy) (with Claudio Calosi, Geneva)

Date: Thursday April 1, 2021

Time: 1530-1700 (GMT+3)

This is an online event. All are welcome. For the Zoom meeting access information, click here.

Abstract: Everettian quantum mechanics (EQM) might appear to be inhospitable to metaphysical indeterminacy (MI), given that, as Alastair Wilson (2020) puts it, “the central idea of EQM is to replace indeterminacy with multiplicity” (77). But as Wilson later observes, the popular decoherence-based understanding of EQM (DEQM) appears to admit of MI in world nature. After sketching DEQM (S1), we bolster the case for there being MI in world nature in DEQM (S2). The question remains of how to account for this MI. After briefly describing the two main contenders—a metaphysical supervaluationist approach as per Barnes and Williams (2011), and a determinable-based approach as per Wilson (2013) and Calosi and Wilson (2018 and forthcoming)—we offer four arguments in support of a determinable-based approach’s having a clear comparative advantage so far as accommodating MI in world nature in DEQM is concerned (S3).

About the speaker:  Jessica M. Wilson is a professor of philosophy at the University of Toronto. Her research focuses general metaphysics, the metaphysics of science/mind, metaphysical methodology, and epistemology. Her work has appeared in journals such as Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchPhilosophical StudiesPhilosophers’ ImprintAnalysis, and British Journal for Philosophy of Science. In addition, she has a just published a book with Oxford University Press entitled Metaphysical Emergence. She was awarded the Lebowitz Prize for excellence in philosophical thought by the Phi Beta Kappa Society and the American Philosophical Association.

Web: http://www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr/

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

March 26, 2021 at 3:58 pm

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Doing Things Together: Bilkent University Online Conference on Social Ontology

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Doing Things Together: Knowledge, Lies and Responsibility

Online Conference on Social Ontology

Bilkent University

April 17-18, 2021

Registration is not required. All are welcome to attend.

Zoom link: Please check the conference webpage on the conference day here.

Conference Program:

(Istanbul time, GMT+3)

Printable Program: click here.

Saturday, April 17 2021

14:00 – 15:15  Leonie Smith (University of Manchester)

“What Are the Agents of the Press and What Are the Agents of Social Media?”

Commentator: Dilara Boğa

15:30 – 16:45  Säde Hormio (University of Helsinki)

“Lying Groups”

Commentator: Mete Han Gencer

17:00 – 18:15  Bill Wringe (Bilkent University)

“Never Mind the Gap: Collective Obligations without the ‘Quantum of Blame’”

Commentator: Roohollah Haghshenas

18:30 – 20:00  Kirk Ludwig – Keynote (Indiana University, Bloomington)

“From Individual to Institutional Agency”

Commentator: Tufan Kıymaz

Sunday, April 18 2021

14:00 – 15:15  Duygu Uygun Tunç (Middle East Technical University)

“Collective Scientific Knowledge without a Collective Subject”

Commentator: Eyşan Demirkaya

15:30 – 16:05 Evrensel Sebep (Bilkent University)

“The State as a Collective Agent”

16:10 – 16:45  Barış Kastaş (Bilkent University)

“Pushing Expressivism Further: A Narrative Paradigm for Collective Responsibility”

17:00 – 18:15  Saniye Vatansever (Bilkent University)

“Kant on Humanity’s Duty Toward Itself”

Commentator: Lucas Thorpe

18:30 – 20:00  Nurbay Irmak (Boğaziçi University)

“Artifactual Kinds, Types, and Properties”

Commentator: Utku Sonsayar

http://www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

March 19, 2021 at 12:23 pm

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Uğur Aytaç (Amsterdam) on “Ideology Critique Without Moralism” (28.05.2021) via Zoom

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Uğur Aytaç (Amsterdam) will give a talk (presenting a paper jointly written with Enzo Rossi) at Boğaziçi on Friday, May 28th, from 5-7pm.

Respondent: Gülşen Seven (TEDU)

Linkhttps://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

“Ideology Critique Without Moralism”

Abstract: There has been a renaissance of ideology critique in Anglo-American philosophy over the last few years. These philosophers—most notably Sally Haslanger—put the tools of contemporary analytic philosophy in the service of the traditional aims of critical theory. In this paper we offer some constructive criticism of those approaches, and make the case for an alternative form of ideology critique inspired by the realist turn in contemporary political philosophy. While we share a broad commitment to ideology critique as the identification of epistemic faults in beliefs or concepts, we take issue with the grounds on which most philosophers propose to debunk ideologies. We argue that identifying ideological flaws on the basis of moral qualities risks reproducing the very same type of flaws. We then propose our own approach to ideology critique, grounded in empirically informed genealogies rather than moral commitments. Through a case study of contemporary neo-patriarchal societies in the Middle East, we show how this approach, which we call radical realist social analysis, can debunk the legitimation stories of social practices and political institutions.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 18, 2021 at 1:49 pm

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4th International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference at Bilkent

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Saturday, April 3, 2021 (Online via Zoom)

Registration is free but required. Please register at: Meeting Registration – Zoom

Zoom access information will be sent to the registered attendees.

For details click here.

For printable conference program click here.

Contact: philstudentconf@bilkent.edu.tr

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

March 17, 2021 at 1:47 pm

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Thomas Reid Reading group at Boğaziçi (Spring 2021) via Zoom

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This semester we will be running a reading group on Thomas Reid’s “An Inquiry into the Human Mind on the Principles of Common Sense” on Tuesdays from 6pm-8pm (Istanbul Time) via zoom. Everyone is welcome. If you would like a copy of the text please get in contact with Erdinç: erdincboyaci@gmail.com – (please write REID READING GROUP as subject of email).

The zoom link is here: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/94747323429

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 16, 2021 at 6:46 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 18 March: Gösta Grönroos on Aristotle’s Sentimentalist Ethical Virtue (Online Event)

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Title: Aristotle’s sentimentalist ethical virtue

By Gösta Grönroos (Stockholm, Philosophy)

Date: Thursday March 18, 2021

Time: 1600-1730 (GMT+3)

This is an online event. All are welcome. For the Zoom meeting access information, click here.

Abstract: In this lecture, I will argue that Aristotle’s ethical virtue (ἀρετὴ ἠθική) is an exclusively emotional disposition constitutive of practical wisdom, and that ethical virtue should be distinguished from the particular character virtues such as courage and justice (albeit moderation is intimately related to ethical virtue). Ethical virtue disposes the desires of the non-rational part of the soul not to impair the enjoyment in exercising character virtues. It disposes these desires to be measured, so that they can be forgone without distress or pain. The only way to distinguish between the virtuous and the enkratic person is with reference to their respective affective states. The enkratic person does not count as virtuous since she pained by having to forgo desires in the non-rational part of the soul, and cannot bring exercises of character virtues to completion.

About the speaker: Click here.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

March 12, 2021 at 11:16 am

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New School Graduate Summer Institute Online

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The 29th Democracy and Diversity Graduate Summer Institute at the New School ‘Reinventing our Future’ will be held online on 6-20 July.

See here for details of courses offered and application procedure.

Written by Sandrine Berges

March 11, 2021 at 11:31 am

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Cog-Sci/Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Paula Quinon (Warsaw) on “Cognitive structuralism. Explaining the Regularity of the Natural Numbers” (30.04.2021) – Via Zoom

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Paula Quinon (Warsaw University of Technology) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, April 30th, 2021, 5-7pm.

Respondent: Sam Clarke (Philosophy & Centre for Vision Research, York University, Toronto)

Link: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

“Cognitive structuralism: Explaining the Regularity of the Natural Numbers”

ABSTRACT: According to one of the most powerful paradigms explaining the meaning of the concept of natural number, natural numbers get a large part of their conceptual content from core cognitive abilities. I call the “core cognition paradigm” any framework that commits to the view that the conceptual content of a formal concept is scaffolded on core cognition. It is inspired by work by Spelke in “Core knowledge” (2000) and by Spelke and Kintzler, also called “Core knowledge”, (2007) put forward the idea that complex cognitive skills and concepts can be based on a set of “building block” systems (called also “core knowledge” or “core cognition” systems) that emerge early in human ontogeny, play an important role in phylogeny of concepts, and are detected in non-human animals. Combining representations from these systems enable humans to supervene new complex concepts (which are not a simple combination of the partial concepts, but display original features). Carey (2009) provides a model of the role of core cognition in the creation of mature mathematical concepts, called “bootstrapping”. In my talk, I conduct conceptual analyses of various theories of the acquisition and the development of the concept of natural number that has been formulated within this paradigm, concluding that the theories based on the ability to subitize (i.e., to assess an exact quantity of the elements in a collection without counting them), or on the ability to approximate quantities (i.e., to assess an approximate quantity of the elements in a collection without counting them), or both, fail to provide a conceptual basis for bootstrapping the concept of an exact natural number. In particular, I argue that none of the existing theories explains one of the key characteristics of the natural number structure: the equidistances between successive elements of the natural numbers progression. I suggest that this regularity could be based on another innate cognitive ability, namely sensitivity to the regularity of rhythm (Zenter and Eerola 2010; Winkler (2009); Honing 2012). 

In order to systematize the previously mentioned research on the acquisition and the development of the concept of natural numbers, I propose a new position within the core cognition paradigm, inspired by structuralist positions in philosophy of mathematics. I suggest that as in the philosophy of mathematics, those positions within the core cognition paradigm that make significant use of the conceptual content responsible for the structural aspect of the natural numbers progression, should be thought of in structuralist terms. Structuralism in philosophy of mathematics is summarized by the famous slogan “mathematics is the science of structure” (Shapiro 1991). I propose to call those positions which both refer in an important way to structural properties and make appeal to core cognitive resources, “cognitive structuralism”.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 8, 2021 at 6:28 pm

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Michael Schmitz (Vienna) on “Questions, content and the varieties of force” (16.04.2021) – Via Zoom

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Michael Schmitz (Vienna) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, April 16th, 5.15-7pm.

Link: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

“Questions, content and the varieties of force”

ABSTRACT: Frege argued for the force-content distinction not only by appealing to the logical and fictional contexts most closely associated with the “Frege point”, but also based on the fact that an affirmative answer to a yes-no question constitutes an assertion. Isn’t this only intelligible if the question contains a forceless thought or proposition which an affirmative answer then asserts? I argue that this fact is actually only intelligible if questions operate on assertions and other forceful acts themselves rather than on something forceless. Force is neither added to propositions as on the traditional view, nor is it cancelled in Frege point contexts, as has recently been proposed. Rather higher-level acts such as questioning, but also e.g. conditionalizing, embed and present assertoric or directive acts that are forceful and committal, while suspending commitment to them. The Frege point confounds different varieties of force and the question whether something is merely presented for consideration with the question what is so presented. The force-content dichotomy should be overcome by acknowledging that force has content: through assertoric and directive force indicators subjects present positions of theoretical or practical knowledge, while interrogative acts indicate positions of wondering which strive for such knowledge.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 8, 2021 at 6:01 pm

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Murali Ramachandran (Bilkent) “The Surprise Examination” (09.04.2021) – Via Zoom

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Murali Ramachandran (Bilkent) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, April 9th, 5.30 – 7.30 pm. All welcome.

Respondent: Anil Sezgin (Boğaziçi)

Link: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

The Surprise Examination

THE PARADOX: A trustworthy and trusted teacher makes the following announcements to her class one day:
(E) There will be an examination one morning next week. Existence premise
(S) But, you won’t know which morning you’ll get it until you get it! Surprise premise
However, on the face of it, the students can legitimately infer on the basis of these premises that they cannot be set such an exam! Here is an initial outline of the reasoning: Student’s reasoning (at the weekend – revised from the abstract): First stage. (A) The exam can’t be on Friday, because if it hasn’t been given by Thursday, I will know on Thursday evening that it will be on Friday, contra (S). So, (B) I now know that the exam will be given by Thursday. Second stage. But, then, I can rule out Thursday as well. For, if it hasn’t been given by Wednesday, I will know on Wednesday evening that it must be on Thursday or Friday; but, as I have already ruled out Friday, I will therefore know it will be the Thursday, contra (S). So, I now know that the exam will be given by Wednesday. Later stages. But, then, it can’t be on Wednesday either. Conclusion. The exam cannot be given at all!
We have a paradox: for, (E) and (S) apparently can both be true, e.g. they presumably would be true if the exam were given on Wednesday; yet, the student’s reasoning apparently reveals that (E) and (S) cannot both be true.

MY AIMS: I will argue:
(1) that the student’s use of (A) only makes sense on the assumption that the student’s knowledge of (E) is robust (in a sense to be explained); but, (2) the student cannot rationally maintain that she robustly knows (E) and also that (S) holds; for, to do so would be to maintain a Moorean proposition along the lines of: [I don’t believe it is raining, but as a matter of fact it is]. — Even if such a proposition is true, it cannot be known to be true by the thinker/reasoner. If I am right, the student cannot come to know that the exam will be given by Thursday by way of her reasoning; the paradox is blocked at the very first stage.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 8, 2021 at 5:38 pm

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Amit Pundik (Tel Aviv) “Is Sexual History Evidence Relevant to Free Consent?” (19.03.2021)

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Amit Pundik (Tel Aviv) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, March 19th, 5.15-7pm.

Link: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

Is Sexual History Evidence Relevant to Free Consent?

Abstract: Perhaps the most objectionable use of sexual history evidence in Criminal proceedings is that relating to ‘general sexual history’ (GSH), whereby the defence seeks to support their claim that the complainant’s sexual relations with the accused were consensual with evidence of the former’s consensual sexual relations with other people. However, establishing the irrelevance of GSH has proven notoriously difficult. In this paper, I examine this issue from a different perspective, that of free will, and propose a new argument to defend the claim of irrelevance: GSH is irrelevant to free consent if such consent is understood as uncausedby factors external to the consenting agent. Consent is free only if caused by the consenting person themselves, by choosing which of their subjective reasons to act upon. The main advantage of this argument is that, unlike other attempts, it is able to explain not only why GSH is irrelevant to the complainant’s consent (the actus reus) but also why it is irrelevant to the accused’s alleged belief that the complainant consented (the mens rea). I illustrate how different theories of freedom yield different conclusions as to which types of GSH, if any, are irrelevant. The paper demonstrates that the controversy about GSH reflects a more fundamental disagreement than previously thought about the concept of sexual consent and the type of freedom required for its validity.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 8, 2021 at 4:40 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 11 March: Amie Thomasson on the Explanatory Conception of Ontology (Online Event)

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Title: Should Ontology be Explanatory?

By Amie L. Thomasson (Dartmouth, Philosophy)

Date: Thursday March 11, 2021

Time: 1630-1830 (GMT+3)

This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin. 

For the Zoom meeting access information, click here.

Abstract: Since Quine, it has been common to hold that the goal of ontology is to determine what entities we should or must ‘posit’ as part of a best total explanatory theory. Accordingly, whether putative entities such as meanings, properties, or numbers contribute explanatory power is often taken as a central criterion for whether we should accept that they exist. I will argue that this is a mistake. The explanatory power criterion arises from failing to understand the diverse functions that different areas of discourse can serve. A deeper understanding of the way these forms of discourse enter language, and of the functional roles they play, makes clear why we should reject the explanatory power criterion, and reject the explanatory conception of ontology. I will close with some remarks about how we should rethink our approach to existence questions—and, more deeply, how we should re-focus our philosophical efforts.

About the speakerAmie Thomasson is Daniel P. Stone Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy at Dartmouth University. She works in the areas of metaphysics, philosophical methodology and metaontology, philosophy of art, philosophy of social and cultural objects, philosophy of mind and phenomenology. She is the author of four books: Norms and Necessity (Oxford University Press, 2020), Ontology made Easy (Oxford University Press, 2015), Ordinary Objects (Oxford University Press, 2007), and Fiction and Metaphysics (Cambridge University Press, 1999). She also co-edited  a collection of essays, Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind (Oxford University Press, 2005). ​She has published in journals such as Journal of PhilosophyJournal of Aesthetics and Art CriticismPhilosophy and Phenomenological, Research, and Philosophical Studies.

Web: http://www.phil.bilkent.edu.tr/

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

March 8, 2021 at 10:34 am

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Philosophy talk at Boğaziçi: Daniele Mezzadri (UAEU) on “Kant on the Nature of Logical and Moral Laws” (26.03.2021)

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Daniele Mezzadri (UAEU) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on Friday, March 26th, 5.15-7pm. Link: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

Respondent: Çağlar Çömez (Boğaziçi & MLU Halle-Wittenberg)

“Kant on the Nature of Logical and Moral Laws”

Abstract: In this paper I engage with a recent debate vis-à-vis Kant’s conception of logic, which deals with whether Kant saw logical laws as normative for, or rather as constitutive of, the faculty of understanding. On the former view, they provide norms for the correct exercise of the understanding; on the latter, they define the necessary structure of the faculty of understanding per se. I claim that these two positions are not mutually exclusive, as Kant held both a normative and a constitutive conception of logic. I also aim to sketch a parallelism between Kant’s conceptions of logic and ethics: Kant’s twofold conception of logic parallels his view of moral laws as normative (for the human will) but constitutive (of a pure will).

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 6, 2021 at 11:18 am

Posted in Uncategorized

[CFP] Ergon: An Undergraduate Philosophy Journal

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Ergon: An Undergraduate Philosophy Journal is now accepting submissions for its inaugural issue. The journal welcomes submissions in English on all areas and within any tradition in philosophy. The deadline for submission is April 1, 2021.

About the journal. Ergon is the undergraduate philosophy journal at Koç University. It was founded in 2020 and is one of the first in Turkey to publish philosophy in English. It is run by Koç University undergraduates. A new issue is published every Fall and Spring.

Spring 2021 Call for Papers. Ergon is now accepting papers for the Spring 2021 volume. Submissions are due April 1, 2021. Email ergon [at] ku [dot] edu [dot] tr for any queries.

Submission Guidelines. The Editors ask that submitted papers meet the following guidelines:

  • Must be a topic on philosophy. Submissions on all areas and traditions of philosophy are accepted.
  • Authors are advised to follow the Chicago Manual of Style. Authors may be asked to reformat if their paper is selected for publication.
  • Authors are encouraged, but not required, to include an abstract of no more than 300 words.
  • Submissions must be between 1500-5000 words and should be 1.5 spaced 12pt.
  • Submitted papers must not include any identifying information, including the author’s name, year of study, university, or major. This information should be sent in a separate document to maintain the impartiality of the blind review process.

For more information, please visit Ergon‘s homepage at ergon.ku.edu.tr.

Written by roberthowton

February 3, 2021 at 11:12 am

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Philosophy/Cog-Sci Talk at Bogaziçi: Jacob Beck (York) on “The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers” (22.01.2021)

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Jacob Beck (York) will be giving a talk (via zoom) on Friday, January 22nd. From 5-7pm, Istanbul time (9-11am EST). The zoom address is: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/97817367347

“The Number Sense Represents (Rational) Numbers.”

Abstract: On a now orthodox view, humans and many other animals possess a “number sense,” or approximate number system (ANS), that represents number. Recently, this orthodox view has been subject to numerous critiques that question whether the ANS genuinely represents number. We distinguish three lines of critique—the arguments from congruency, confounds, and imprecision—and show that none succeed. We then provide positive reasons to think the ANS genuinely represents numbers, and not just non-numerical confounds or recherché substitutes for number, such as “numerosities” or “quanticals,” as critics propose. In so doing, we raise a neglected question: numbers of what kind? Proponents of the orthodox view have been remarkably coy on this issue. But this is unsatisfactory since the predictions of the orthodox view, including the situations in which the ANS is expected to succeed or fail, turn on the kind(s) of number being represented. In response, we propose that the ANS represents not only natural numbers (e.g. 7), but also non-natural rational numbers (e.g. 3.5). It does not represent irrational numbers (e.g. the square root of 2), however, and thereby fails to represent the real numbers more generally. This distances our proposal from existing conjectures, refines our understanding of the ANS, and paves the way for future research.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

December 28, 2020 at 9:47 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 17 Dec: Helen Brown Coverdale on Moral Permissibility of Punishment (Online Event)

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Risking penal collateral consequences and the moral permissibility of punishment

By Helen Brown Coverdale (UCL) 

Date: Thursday December 17, 2020

Time: 1330-1500 (GMT+3)

This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin. 

Zoom link: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87545376459?pwd=RnV6Sy9sanRsakVoRjl3anFabzh0Zz09

Meeting ID: 875 4537 6459
Passcode: 654104

Abstract: Offenders need to ‘get lucky’ to avoid significantly harmful outcomes when their punishments interact with their personal and social circumstances. The collateral consequences of punishment have recently received some of the attention they deserve. However, collateral consequences for offenders following from interactions between the sentence and the offender’s circumstances are more complex and morally significant than we have realised. Without paying sufficient attention to circumstances, the state cannot claim to know the risks of collateral consequences, much less defend these risks as morally permissible. To provide equal concern and respect, the state cannot rely on luck to avoid morally impermissible harms to those it punishes. Hence, the state fails to treat offenders as equals, undermining the justification of punishment.

About the speakerHelen Brown Coverdale is a Teaching Fellow in Political Theory in the Political Science Department at University College London. Her core research interest is the moral dimensions of interactions between individuals and the state; particularly the relevance of context for understanding what morally appropriate treatment requires in practice, and the contribution of legal frameworks to supporting morally appropriate treatment of persons by states. She has published in journals including Ethics and Social WelfareTheory and Research in Education and has an article forthcoming with the Journal of Applied Philosophy. Helen previously worked in the criminal justice sector, and as a senior parliamentary researcher in the Westminster parliament.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

December 10, 2020 at 6:41 pm

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Two Full-Time Positions at the Department of Philosophy in Boğazici University

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The Department of Philosophy of Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, invites applications from people who are not Turkish citizens for appointment to a full-time faculty position at the rank of Assistant Professor in our department. In exceptional cases, an appointment at a higher level may be considered.

            Minimum qualification: at least one major English-language publication in an SCI, SCIE, SSCI, or AHCI indexed journal. Area of specialiization (AOS) is open. Desired areas of competence (AOC) include epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of science, ethics, and ancient philosophy. Collegiality and willingness to share departmental responsibilities are essential.

Information about our programs is available at http://www.phil.boun.edu.tr/. For further information please contact Stephen Voss at shvoss@gmail.com. Closing date for receipt of applications is 31 December.  Please submit your complete application as a single PDF file to https://bit.ly/BOUN-PHIL-SUBMIT-DOSSIER. (It will help to follow the instructions in https://www.ilovepdf.com/word_to_pdf and https://combinepdf.com.) And have three confidential letters of recommendation uploaded to the same form.
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The Department of Philosophy of Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, invites applications from Turkish citizens for appointment to a full-time faculty position at the rank of Professor or Associate Professor in our department.

            Minimum qualifications: for Associate Professor, 5 major publications, at least 2 in SCI, SCIE, SSCI, or AHCI indexed journals; for Professor, 4 additional major publications, at least 2 in similarly indexed journals. To be appointed at either rank, a candidate must already have gained that rank elsewhere. Area of specialization (AOS) is open. Desired areas of competence (AOC) include epistemology, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, logic, philosophy of science, ethics, and ancient philosophy. Teaching is two courses per term for students at bachelor, master, and Ph.D. levels. Collegiality and willingness to share departmental responsibilities are essential.

            Information about our programs is available at http://www.phil.boun.edu.tr/. For further information please contact Stephen Voss at shvoss@gmail.com. Closing date for receipt of applications is 31 December.  Please submit your complete application as a single PDF file to https://bit.ly/BOUN-PHIL-SUBMIT-DOSSIER. (It will help to follow the instructions in https://www.ilovepdf.com/word_to_pdf and https://combinepdf.com.) And have three confidential letters of recommendation uploaded to the same form.

Written by ararslan

December 3, 2020 at 12:59 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 27 Nov: Claudio Calosi on Mereological Atomism (Online Event)

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How to Build Things from Atoms

By Claudio Calosi (Geneva) 

Date: Friday November 27, 2020

Time: 1230-1400 (GMT+3)

This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin. 

Zoom linkhttps://us02web.zoom.us/j/81367491177?pwd=NDl1QlBXaTM1NXpZV1BBNi84a3Brdz09

Meeting ID: 813 6749 1177
Passcode: 921453

Abstract: Mereological atomism is the thesis that everything is ultimately composed of atomic parts, i.e., parts lacking proper parts. Typically, this thesis is characterized by an axiom stating, more simply, that everything has atomic parts. The present paper argues that the success of this standard characterization crucially depends both on how the notion of composition is related to the notion of sum and on how the notion of sum is initially defined. In particular, we put forward a novel definition of mereological sum that:

(i) is not equivalent to extant definitions in the literature, provided no strong decomposition principle is assumed;

(ii) can be used to claim that the standard characterization of atomism fails in that having atomic parts is not sufficient to be the sum of atoms; and

(iii) delivers a purely mereological distinction between structured and unstructured wholes.

About the speaker: Claudio Calosi is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Geneva. He has written on a variety of topics in metaphysics and is currently leading a 5-year project on the metaphysics of quantum objects, funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. His work has appeared in such journals as AnalysisErkenntnisSynthesePhilosophical Studies, and the Philosophical Quarterly.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

November 24, 2020 at 1:56 pm

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The Liberal Herald 2020: Stories, Histories, Memories

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Program:

The schedule for Stories, Histories, Memories is now up. A live YouTube stream will be available on this page.

OPENING NOV 20 | 1pm CET

Dagmar Kusá (Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts)

James Griffith (Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Ankara)

PANEL 1 Phenomenology and Historicity | NOV 20 | 1:30pm – 2:50pm CET | Moderated by Alex Nemec

Maria Cristina Vendra (Institute of Philosophy, Czech Academy of Sciences)

“Interaction with the Past and Openness toward the Future. Paul Ricœur and Jan Patočka at the Boundary of Historicity and History”

Francesco Ferrari (Jena Center for Reconciliation Studies, University of Jena)

“Four diseases of temporality and their impact on reconciliatory processes”

Peter Šajda (Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences)

“How to Overcome Political Narratives about the Absolute Enemy”

James Reuter (Department of Philosophy, California State University – Long Beach)

“A Phenomenology of History”

PANEL 2 Art and Literature | NOV 20 | 3pm – 4pm CET | Moderated by Hanna Vasilenka

Haluk Ihsan Talay (Department of English Language and Literature, Yeditepe University, Istanbul)

“The Image of the Turk and Orientalist Discourse in Panait Istrati’s Kyra Kyralina and Ivo Andrić’s The Bridge on the Drina”

Sean Homer (Department of Languages and Theater, American University in Bulgaria)

“History, Narrative and Trauma in Balkan Cinema”

Jaroslava Vydrová (Institute of Philosophy at the Slovak Academy of Sciences)

“Autobiographical Thinking. Alta Vášová’s “The Islands of NonMemory” and their inspiration for philosophy”

PANEL 3 Memory in Public Space | NOV 20 | 4:10pm – 5:40pm CET | Moderated by Nikola Orlovská

Tyler Johnson (Department of Political Science, University of Oklahoma)

“A Lost Cause? Biography, Legacy, and the Future of Memorials to Confederate General Robert E. Lee”

Rafael Pérez Baquero (Department of Philosophy, University of Murcia) “Forsaken bodies, hidden narratives and the reframing of the past”

Alfred Frankowski (Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University – Carbondale)

“Monuments of Racial Terror: Intersections Between Memorial Aesthetics and Land Sovereignty”

María del Rosario Acosta López (Department of Hispanic Studies, University of California – Riverside)

“Grammars of Listening: Building Historical Memory in the Aftermath of Trauma (A Decolonial Perspective)”

KEYNOTE SPEAKER NOV 20 | 6:30pm – 8:00pm CET | Moderated by James Griffith

Charles Sabatos (Department of English Language and Literature, Yeditepe University)

“Bratislava as a cultural borderland in the Danubian narratives of Leigh Fermor and Magris”

PANEL 4 Narratives of the Past | NOV 21 | 1:00pm – 2:00pm CET | Moderated by Tomáš Štrba

Lucie Janotová (Department of Political and Social Science, Scuola Normale Superiore – Florence)

“Hidden histories of Charter ‘77”

Slavka Otčenášová (Department of History, Šafárik University in Košice)

“Our heroes, your enemies: Using historical personalities as identity-formation elements in history textbooks”

Veronika Budaiová & Jonáš Jánsky (Central European University)

“The changing narratives of the Slovak National Uprising: Analysis of presidential speeches and remembrance of nation-building”

PANEL 5 The Politics of Memory | NOV 21 | 2:15pm – 3:15pm CET | Moderated by Vivien Slíž

Michael Samjetsabam (Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology – Bombay)

“History and Puyas: The Case of Meitei Community in India’s North-eastern State of Manipur”

Felix Diaz (Department of Philosophy and Psychology, American University in Bulgaria) “Narratives of Forced Displacement at the Gates of Europe”

Aubrial Harrington (Department of Philosophy, Arizona State University)

“Silent narratives”

PANEL 6 Philosophy of History | NOV 21 | 3:30pm – 4:30pm CET | Moderated by Marek Dubovský

Giovanni Patriarca (Universidad Francisco Marroquín in Guatemala City)

“History as a Cycle: Social Bonds and Changing Values. Rediscovering Ibn Khaldun”

Alexandre Leskanich (Royal Historical Society)

“Retrospective Redundancy: The Anthropocene and the Crisis of Historical Comprehension”

Dashan Xu (De-Wulf Centre for Ancient, Medieval, and Renaissance Philosophy, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)

“Why is Fiction More Serious than History?”

KEYNOTE SPEAKER NOV 21 | 4:45m – 5:45pm CET | Moderated by Dagmar Kusá

Phil Gamaghelyan (Joan B. Kroc School of Peace, University of San Diego)

“Memory as an obstacle to peace in the Caucasus region”

Roundtable on Politics of Memory | NOV 21 | 6pm – 7:30pm CET | Moderated by Dagmar Kusá & James Griffith

Fahd Humayun (Yale University)

Emery Kalema (Stellenbosch University)

Ehud Eiran (University of Haifa/Stanford University)

Robert Sata (Central European University)

Carla Habif (The Federal University of Rio de Janeiro or University of Brazil)

Houda Mzioudet (University of Toronto)

CLOSING NOV 20 | 7:30pm CET

Dagmar Kusá (Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts)

James Griffith (Department of Philosophy, Middle East Technical University, Ankara)

Written by Sandrine Berges

November 16, 2020 at 4:58 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 19 Nov: David Liebesman on Truth-Conditional Semantics (Online Event)

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Copredication and the Possibility of Truth-Conditional Semantics

By David Liebesman (Calgary) (joint work with Ofra Magidor, Oxford)

Date: Thursday November 19, 2020

Time: 1730-1900 (GMT+3)

Click here for Zoom link.

Abstract: Copredicational sentences can be true despite the fact that they ascribe prima facie categorially incompatible properties. For instance, “Lunch was delicious but took hours” can be true even though it is natural to assume that only events can take hours while only food can be delicious. Dramatic lessons have been drawn from this phenomenon. In particular, Chomsky and several of his followers have taken copredication to provide key evidence that we ought to abandon systematic truth-conditional semantics altogether. After clarifying the challenges posed by copredication, we’ll undermine Chomskyan arguments from copredication to scepticism about truth-conditional semantics. We’ll then sketch our favoured view–the property versatility view–which meets the challenges without either abandoning truth-conditional semantics or significantly complicating our semantic theory. 

About the speakerDavid Liebesman is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Linguistics at the University of Calgary. He works primarily in the philosophy of language and metaphysics, and has published numerous articles in such journals as Analysis, the Australasian Journal of PhilosophyMindNoûs, and Philosophers’ Imprint.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

November 10, 2020 at 9:19 am

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SWIP-TR 3 : Program, Youtube Channel and Registration

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Feminist History of Philosophy

The conference will take place online 19-20 November. Some of the talks will be in Turkish and some in English.

The Program, available here has several papers on women in the history of philosophy.

Details about how to register will be available shortly.

Those who are registered will be able to watch the talks on our YouTube Channel.

Registration is now open, here.

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Written by Sandrine Berges

October 29, 2020 at 7:53 pm

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Call for Participants: Int. Workshop on Theory (Re-)Construction in the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (TRC2020), Sat & Sun, 7-8 NOV 2020

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Int. Workshop on Theory (Re-)Construction in the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (TRC2020)

Sat & Sun, 7-8 NOV 2020 (online, using ZOOM)

Boğaziçi University, Dpt. of Philosophy & Cognitive Science Program, 34342 Bebek/Istanbul, Turkey

http://bit.ly/TRC2020-BOUN

http://bit.ly/ProgramTRC2020

CALL FOR PARTICIPANTS

It has been repeatedly observed that the Empirical Social and Behavioral Sciences (ESBS) lack well-developed theoretical superstructures, structures that researchers could apply to generate (point-)predictive empirical hypotheses. The MTR project treats this lacuna as an important reason to explain, and to treat, the ongoing replicability crisis in the ESBS. 

To join this meeting as a discussant, please register on or before 1 NOV 2020.

Participation is on-site or online (using zoom). There are no fees

SPEAKERS

Amit Pundik (University of Oxford, United Kingdom; Tel Aviv University, Israel) – Predictive Evidence and Unpredictable Freedom  

Edouard Machery (Keynote) (University of Pittsburgh, United States) – Are perverse incentives responsible for the replication crisis?  

Erich Witte (University of Hamburg, Germany) – What is a well-supported empirical theory and research program in psychology and how to measure it?  

Holger Andreas (The University of British Columbia, Canada) – Carnapian Structuralism  

Johanna Sarisoy (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom) – Methodological Realism in Psychometrics  

Klaus Fiedler (Keynote) (Heidelberg University, Germany) – Nothing more practical than a good theory…  

Majid Beni (Nazarbayev University, Kazakhstan) – Fleshing out the social aspect of Cognitive Structural Realism  

Maximilian Maier, Noah van Dongen and Denny Borsboom (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands) – Comparing Theories with the Ising Model of Explanatory Coherence  

Roberto Fumagalli (King’s College London, United Kingdom)- A Reformed Division of Labour for the Science of Well-Being  

William Cullerne Bown (Independent, United Kingdom) – Measurement as metaphysics

Registration https://bit.ly/TRC2020-registration

Learn more about MTR  https://mtrboun.wordpress.com/home-2/project/about/

Cog-Sci/Philosophy reading group at Boğaziçi with Mark Bickard (Lehigh) – Fall 2020

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This semester the Boğaziçi Philosophy/Cognitive Science reading group will meet on Wednesdays from 6-8pm (Istanbul Time) on zoom. Starting on October 28th, 2020. The zoom link is: https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/688552381

This semester we will read a book manuscript by Mark Bickhard (Lehigh) and he will attend the weekly meetings. The title of the manuscript is “The Whole Person: Toward a Naturalism of Persons.” We will start this week reading up to p.69.

If you would like to receive a copy of the manuscript, please email Oğuz: oguzerdin@gmail.com

Everyone is welcome.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

October 22, 2020 at 5:11 pm

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Talk at Bilkent 8 Oct: Max Cappuccio on Intentionality in Sport Performance (Online Event)

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Wax on, Wax Off! Skillful control and varieties of intentionality in sport performance

By Massimiliano L. Cappuccio (UNSW, School of Engineering and Information Technology) 

Date: Thursday October 8, 2020 

Time: 1330-1500 (GMT+3)

Zoom link: This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin: https://us02web.zoom.us/j/82644320711  

Abstract: I would like to introduce a thought experiment inspired by the iconic “wax-on-wax-off” Miyagi-sensei’s training routine, as portrayed in the original Karate Kid movie (1984). This experiment provides us with an occasion to revisit the Habitualism vs Intellectualism debate in philosophy of skill & expertise, critically discuss Anders Ericcson’s notion of Deliberate Practice, and appreciate the non-representational nature of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s notion of Motor Intentionality. The key philosophical question to be addressed through this thought experiment is the following: what role does habit formation play in the development of sport skills?

My analysis shows that motor habits are both necessary for and constitutive of sensorimotor skill as they support an automatic, yet inherently intelligent and flexible, form of action control. Intellectualists about skills generally assume that what makes action intelligent and flexible is its intentionality, and that intentionality must be necessarily cognitive in nature to allow for both deliberation and explicit goal-representation. There is some truth to the intellectualist claim that goal-oriented action involves intentionality and that some skilful activities involve cognitive effort, deliberate control, and self-awareness. However, habitual action in sport is too intricate a phenomenon to be accounted for by dichotomies that oppose controlled skillful sport performance (intelligent, deliberate, and controlled actions) and automatized mechanisms (unintelligent, inflexible, motor habits). In this presentation I offer a philosophical alternative that shows how flexibility, control, and intelligence can arise from automatized expert behavior. Against Intellectualism I argue that the habitual behaviours that compose skilful action are accompanied by their specific, non-cognitive form of intentionality: this is motor intentionality, which is purposive and adaptive while involving no explicit deliberation or goal representation.

My account of habit based on Motor Intentionality explains why the formation of motor habits can sometimes act as the sole basis of skill acquisition: Motor Intentionality is inherently purposeful because it is an embodied source of sensorimotor anticipation, pre-reflective motivation, and pragmatic know-how. Skill development through exercise always builds on a motor intentional component even when it is guided by Deliberate Practice to the point that, pace Intellectualism, Deliberate Practice is disclosed, not constrained, by habit formation. As suggested by the fact that repetitive exercises can play a major role in the development of flexible and intelligent sport skills, automatism is not a drawback for strategic control and improvisation but rather their pragmatic foundation.

About the speaker: Massimiliano (Max) Cappuccio is Deputy director of the Values in Defense and Security Technology group at University of New South Wales Canberra. He also holds a secondary affiliation with UAE University, the national university of the United Arab Emirates, where he had been Associate professor of Cognitive science and director of the Cog Sci Lab for several years (August 2011 – December 2018). His research is concerned with the ethical implications of AI and social robotics and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. As a cognitive philosopher and a philosopher of technology, Max’s research on the processes underpinning embodied cognition, social intelligence, and skill acquisition & disruption aims to integrate phenomenological analyses, empirical experimentation, and synthetic modelling. He conducts an intense activity as organizer of academic events, including interdisciplinary workshops, research seminar series, and international conferences (like the TEMPER workshop on Training, Enhancement, and Military Performance at UNSW Canberra and the annual Joint UAE Symposium on Social Robotics in Abu Dhabi). He is the editor of the MIT Press Handbook of Embodied Cognition and Sport Psychology.

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

October 8, 2020 at 9:31 am

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CFP: Prokopton – Bilkent University Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy

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We now accept submissions for the second issue of Prokopton: Bilkent University Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy. 

The submission deadline is November 19, 2020.

Check our first issue here.

Among the kinds of philosophical work we accept are original papers, book and article reviews. You can submit your work either in English or Turkish. We also accept translations of philosophical work from any language to Turkish or Turkish to English.

If you would like to submit anything other than original paper(s), please contact us with the details of your work(s). Doing so will highly increase the chances that your work is accepted. Also, make sure to see our previous issues and the kind(s) of work we publish. If you would like to submit an original paper, please take a careful look at our submission guidelines.

You can send all your submissions to prokoptonjournal [at] gmail [dot] com.

To be eligible for submission, you need to be an undergraduate student in the year of the issue you send your work for. For example, you must be an undergraduate student in at least some part of 2021 in order for us to consider your work for our second issue, which is going to be published in 2021. Undergraduate authors from all fields (not just philosophy) are welcome to submit their work.

For more information: http://prokopton.bilkent.edu.tr/

Written by Tufan Kıymaz

October 6, 2020 at 7:59 am

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CFA: Online student conference

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James Griffith, from ODTU is part of the organizing committee for this student conference. This year it’s happening online, and so we would like to encourage students in Turkey to apply.

Title: Stories, Histories, Memories
November 20 – 21, 2020
Deadline for Abstracts: October 15, 2020
Contact: theliberalherald@bisla.sk
Website: tlherald.wordpress.com
LOCATION: ONLINE    
Link for submission

The Liberal Herald is pleased to issue the Call for Abstracts for its seventh academic conference. The Liberal Herald was founded by students and alumni of the Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts and is organized in partnership with the Central European University and Bard College in Berlin

The conference brings together students and experts from several continents and academic fields to present their research on equal footing. The best contributions have the opportunity to be published in a book publication.

The conference is supported by research grants from the Slovak Research and Development Agency (grant No. APVV-15-0682) and Bringing Theory to Practice, an independent project in partnership with the Association of American Colleges and Universities.

Stories, Histories, Memories

We understand the world and ourselves through stories. We tell stories about who we are, as individuals, families, communities. These stories tell where we come from, what our purpose is, who are our enemies, what we believe in, and why. Stories create nations, elevate leaders, or make them fall. Stories of the past, in particular, are closely intertwined with our identities and politics. Yet these stories often conflict, with those others tell themselves and between themselves in a single person or culture. What do we understand, then, when we understand ourselves and the world through conflicting stories? Do we understand stories as conflicting or ourselves as in conflict? What stories do we choose to believe in and why these over others?

In Latin, both ‘stories’ and ‘histories’ are historarium and this overlap survives in Italian, French, Portuguese. Yet are the stories we tell ourselves histories, especially when they conflict? Are they narratives chosen for reasons separate from the story itself, for reasons that themselves have histories? Can history operate in the singular? Is there ever, can there ever, should there ever be history as such, at least as anything more than a certain dream of certain historians? Are histories always themselves just stories, perhaps just-so stories, regardless of the scientific rigor with which they are told?

Bernard Bailyn differentiated history from collective memory based on the latter’s “emotional, not intellectual” relation to the past. Historians are supposed to record and guard facts, objectively report events, whereas memory is selective and emotional, placing heroes and entire eras on a pedestal or damning them to hell. Yet, though the historian’s task is to look at the past through established facts and nothing but, he or she sifts through and selects only those they deem important to narrate a story, interpret connections, establish causes and consequences. Meanwhile, political leaders often operate with collective memory. They appeal to and justify their decisions by it, tap into the emotions associated with it. Governments establish institutional designs—laws, memorials, curricula and textbooks—that mold and are molded by our collective relation to the past and present. 

Recent populist politics in India, the United States, United Kingdom, and Hungary as well as challenges to simple narratives established by statues in the United States, United Kingdom, and South Africa all highlight the use of collective memory and historical grievances for political goals, as do the statements on or silence over the thirtieth anniversaries of the 1989 revolutions in Central European countries. 

This conference will explore the political and methodological questions concerning the relationship between stories, histories, and memories. That is, it aims to untangle, to the extent is possible, the difference between these connected phenomena.

GENERAL TOPIC SUGGESTIONS

1.      History and historiography
The craft of history
History textbooks and curricula
History in the singular?

2.      Politics of Memory and Identity
Collective memory in politics
“Dead bodies”: Statues, memorials, ceremonies
Emotions in the political use of the past
Public space and memorialization

3.      Narratives
Narrative constructions of history and memory
The historian as storyteller
Hidden stories: Alternative histories, resistance
to mainstream narratives 

4.      Temporality
Changing relations to the past
Government’s crafting of collective temporality through institutional and legislative designs 

CRITERIA FOR ABSTRACTS
Contributors must submit abstracts which are
– pertinent to the subject matter
– scholarly
– in English
– max. 300 words long

Authors of selected abstracts will be informed by October 20, 2020. Authors will be required to submit their complete entries by November 10, 2020. 
All abstracts should be submitted via online form (LINK: https://forms.gle/hNAg8Wf65A1NzkXQA).

COMPLETE PAPER CRITERIA
Papers should be
– 2000 – 3500 words long
– revised and edited
– in APA citation and reference style format 

Organizers and Contacts:
Bratislava International School of Liberal Arts (BISLA), Bratislava, Slovak Republic
Mgr. Dagmar Kusá, PhD., James Griffith, PhD
Email: kusa@bisla.sk,  theliberalherald@bisla.sk, Phone: + 421 915 373 226
Central European University, Budapest (CEU), Budapest Hungary
Robert Sata, satar@ceu.edu
Bard College in Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Michael Weinman,  m.weinman@berlin.bard.edu

Written by Sandrine Berges

September 18, 2020 at 11:50 am

Posted in cfp