Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Workshop at Bilkent: Consciousness and First-Person Access

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Mini-Workshop on Consciousness and First Person Access

Friday 23rd February, 2018

1030-1230 & 1400-1700

Bilkent University, Main Campus, Room: H-232

Organized by the Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Group at Bilkent University.

Click here for program and abstracts. 























Morning session

1030-1040 Welcome

1040-1130: Key note – Murat Aydede (UBC, Philosophy) “Is the Pain Experience Transparent? Introspecting Phenomenal Qualities

1140-1155: Respondent – Istvan Aranyosi (Bilkent, Philosophy)

1155-1210: Respondent – Tufan Kıymaz (Bilkent, Philosophy)

1210-1245: Discussion


Afternoon session

1440-1525: Mina Elhamiasl (Bilkent, Neuroscience/ UMRAM) “Health Anxiety: Where Interpretation Bias and Sensitivity to Bodily Sensations Meet”

1535-1620: Tufan Kıymaz (Bilkent, Philosophy) “Is Consciousness Phenomenal Conceptualization of the Physical?”

1630-1715: Bill Wringe (Bilkent, Philosophy) “First Person Access, Collective Emotions and Other Minds”


Written by Sandrine Berges

February 16, 2018 at 1:26 pm

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Nicholas Di Bella at Bilkent 15 February

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Probabilistic Proof of an External World”

Nicholas Di Bella (Stanford, Philosophy)

Thursday 15th February, 2018, 1540-1715, H-232


Abstract: I provide a novel internal critique of skepticism about the external world. Appealing to premises that an external-world skeptic could accept, I argue that the skeptic should (by her own lights) be extraordinarily confident that an external world exists. These premises include commitments to various forms of a priori reasoning–including commitments to classical logic, set theory, and probabilistic reasoning–as well as radical empiricism about evidence. As I argue, these premises entail that the skeptic should, by her own lights, be at least 99.99999% confident–just shy of certain–that an external world exists.

Written by Sandrine Berges

February 12, 2018 at 9:41 am

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Talk at Boğaziçi: Cinzia FERRINI on ‘on Hegel’s Science of Logic and his Revision of the ‘Doctrine of Being’ (1812, 1832): The New Significance of ‘becoming other” (Friday, 16/02/2018)

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Written by gozdeyildirim1

February 10, 2018 at 11:36 am

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Philosophy/Cog-Sci Reading group at Boğaziçi this semester.

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We will continue with our philosophy cog-sci reading group at Boğaziçi this semester on Mondays from 5.30-7.30pm. John Freely Building, Room 507.

We will read the following articles for the first two weeks:

Monday February 5th

Paul Cisek, Beyond the computer metaphor Behaviour as InteractionJournal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 11-12 (1999) pp. 125-42.

Monday February 12th 

Paul Cisek, Cortical Mechanisms of Action Selection: the affordance competition hypothesis Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2007) 362, 1585–1599

Paul Cisek and John F. Kalaska, Neural Mechanims for interacting with a world full of action choicesAnnu. Rev. Neurosci. (2010) 33:269–98


This Monday we will decide what to read for the rest of the semester.  If you would like to be added to our mailing list please email conceptsandbeliefs@gmail.com

Written by Lucas Thorpe

February 3, 2018 at 3:57 pm

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Talk by Rafael Ventura (Duke) at Bilkent 5 February

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“Ambiguous Signals, Partial Beliefs, and Propositions”

Rafael Ventura (Duke, Philosophy)

Monday 5th February, 2018, 1640-1800, H-232.


Abstract: Propositions are usually taken to help explain the behavior of rational agents. However, a closer look at signaling games suggests otherwise: rational agents often acquire partial beliefs, and many of their signals are ambiguous. Signaling games also suggest that it is rational for agents to mix their behavior in response to partial beliefs and ambiguous signals. But as I show in this talk, propositions cannot help explain the mixing behavior of rational agents. My suggestion is that we should abandon propositions in explanations of rational behavior and adopt instead a probabilistic notion of content.

Written by Sandrine Berges

January 30, 2018 at 11:16 am

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Sehir Philosophy Talks 37 Alberto Siani 2 February Friday 14:00

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Written by metindemirsehir

January 30, 2018 at 10:35 am

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Talk by Sara Aronowitz at Bilkent, 2 Feb

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“Memory is a Modeling System”

By Sara Aronowitz (University of Michigan Ann Arbor, Philosophy)

Friday 2nd February, 2018, 1100-1230, H-232


Abstract: This talk addresses the question: how does memory help us learn? I start by re-thinking the epistemic problem that memory systems solve in light of memory successes and failures in humans, rodents, and artificial systems. Rather than merely functioning to store information or to preserve justification, I argue that the core function of any memory system is to support accurate and relevant retrieval. This problem formulation has consequences for which structures and mechanisms make up a memory system. In brief, memory systems are modeling systems. This means that they generate, update and manage a series of overlapping, simplified, relational representations that map out features of the world. Succeeding at building and maintaining models requires the kind of active knowledge generation traditionally associated only with deliberative reasoning.

Written by Sandrine Berges

January 25, 2018 at 5:53 pm

Posted in Uncategorized