3pm-5pm The Interactivist Model
Abstract: A shift from a metaphysical framework of substance to one of process enables an integrated account of the emergence of normative phenomena. I show how substance assumptions block genuine ontological emergence, especially the emergence of normativity, and how a process framework permits a thermodynamic-based account of normative emergence. The focus is on two foundational forms of normativity, that of normative function and of representation as emergent in a particular kind of function. This process model of representation, called interactivism, compels changes in many related domains. The discussion ends with brief attention to three domains in which changes are induced by the representational model: perception, learning, and language.
Abstract: Interactivism and enactivism spring from some similar insights and intuitions. There are, however, some arguably significant divergences, and I will explore a few of the important similarities and differences. Topics addressed include the basic notions of how cognition and mind emerge in living systems; how growth, learning, development, and adaptation can be modeled within the basic frameworks; and how phenomenological investigations can be taken into account and their phenomena modeled.
This talk is organised as part of Lucas Thorpe‘s TÜBİTAK project “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” ( 114K348).
Three Scholarships for Turkish academics and graduate students to attend UK Kant Society Conference in Southampton from the 5th to 6th of September 2016
2016 UK Kant Society Annual Conference: Kant, Normativity, and Naturalism
As part of the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government” (Jointly run by Lucas Thorpe and Sasha Mudd) we have three scholarships of of £750 for Turkish academics and graduate students to participate in the 20016 UK Kant Society conference to be held in Southampton from 5 – 6 September 2016. Any academics and graduate students based in Turkey are eligible to apply.
Those interested should send an abstract (excluding any self-identifying information) of between 800 and 1000 words to email@example.com by July 1st 2016. Successful applicants will be informed by July 10th.
(UPDATE: a couple of people have already asked me if the deadline for Turkish applicants is JULY 1st, and the answer is yes).
Details about the conference can be found here.
Please join us.
Tuesday, May 24th, 3-5pm, TB 130 (Anderson Hall)
Until recently, the idea that counterfactuals — conditionals of the form “If A were the case, then C would be the case” — might simply be strict conditionals — universal modal quantifiers scoping over material conditionals — was not taken seriously. For a strict conditional says that in all worlds, if A is the case then C is the case. But this seems too demanding: it might be true that if I had gone to the party, then I would’ve had a good time; but surely there is some possible world where I go to the party and don’t have a good time, e.g. if a fire breaks out halfway through.
Please join us for a talk and a two-part workshop at Bogazici University, both by Samuel Fletcher. Details below. All are welcome.
All events take place in TB 130 (Anderson Hall).
- “The Principle of Stability” (Colloquium) How can inferences from idealized models to the phenomena they represent be justified when those models deliberately distort the phenomena? Pierre Duhem considered just this problem in part II, chapter III (“Mathematical Deduction and Physical Theory”) of The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (1914), arguing that inferences and explanations from mathematical models of phenomena to real physical applications must also be demonstrated to be approximately correct when the (idealized) assumptions of the model are only approximately true. Despite being included in Duhem’s most influential contribution to philosophy of science, this chapter and the principle it contains is little discussed among philosophers. Yet mathematicians and physicists both contemporaneous with and subsequent to Duhem took up this challenge (if only sometimes implicitly), yielding a novel and rich mathematical theory of stability. My goals in this presentation are thus twofold: first, to trace some of the history of this principle of stability and its precursors in reference to their application in science, and second, to present a modern version of the principle, exploring some of its applications and implications, as well as comparing it to related notions that have received more attention.
- The Logic of Severe Testing (Two-part Workshop) Deborah Mayo has for many years advocated for a modified version of classical Neyman-Pearson statistical testing as the correct account of inductive inference, most famously in her monograph Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (Chicago, 1996). While this approach uses probabilities, it does not assign them to hypotheses or propositions as Bayesians would. Instead, testing procedures assign “fit” and “severity” scores to hypotheses or propositions based on observed data. Those hypotheses or propositions passing a sufficiently high threshold for both receive justification for being fallibly inferred: they have been severely tested. This work is an attempt to develop a general logical framework for Mayo’s account of severe testing that is a generalization from the specific examples she gives (usually z-tests). The framework involves a two-dimensional many-valued logic–one dimension each for “fit” and “severity”–that is superintuitionistic: stronger than intuitionistic logic but weaker than classical logic. This is a welcome result, since a particular hypothesis (e.g., “this chemical causes cancer”) not being severely tested should sometimes but not in general entail that its negation is severely tested.
If you have any questions, please contact firstname.lastname@example.org
Sehir University International Workshop Time, Eternity, Cosmology in Islam and Byzantium: Aristotelian Receptions—and Beyond
Tuesday 24 May, 15.00-17.30
New philosophically oriented Master’s in Science, Technology and Society at Istanbul Technical University
The purpose of this society for women in philosophy is to make things a bit easier, to give our current female undergraduates a better chance of succeeding as well as their male counterparts; and to give those of us who struggle in our jobs for promotion or recognition a forum where we can get together and help each other. More specifically, this society aims to foster exchanges between women philosophers studying or working in the field in Turkey, but also to involve Turkish women studying or working in philosophy abroad who want to stay in touch with developments here. To this end we intend to instigate an annual SWIP-TR conference, where any woman philosopher can submit a paper and, after a process of blind refereeing, present this paper. In time, we also want to hold workshops, e.g. on professional development for graduate students, and set up a mentoring scheme, so that younger members of the profession may benefit from the experience of others and learn about funding opportunities. We also aim to create links with SWIP groups in other countries, so as to facilitate the international networking of our members.