Conference at Boğaziçi: Enriching Embodied Cognition, with Dan Hutto (Wollongong) and Erik Myin (Antwerp). 9-11/06/2015
Enriching Embodied Cognition
With Daniel Hutto (Wollongong) and Erik Myin (Antwerp)
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
Demir Demirgil Salonu
June 9th-11th, 2015
A video of how to find the Demir Demirgil Salonu once on campus can be found here.
Directions explaining how to get to Boğaziçi University by metro can be found here.
I have Inserted links to some of the talks into the program below and will add links to new papers if and when I receive them. Everyone welcome!
Tuesday 9th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “REC: Revolution Effected via Clarification”
11:30- 1:00 Erik Myin: “Radicals Assembled: The Case of Perceiving”
2:30-3:30 Anita Leirfall (Bergen, Philosophy) “A Proto-Proprioceptive Affected Causal Power of Thinking?
Kant on the Directions of Mind”
3:30-4:30 Victor Laughlin (Antwerp, Philosophy) “Anticipatory Mechanisms, the Hard Problem of Content
5:00-6:00 Matthew Jernberg (Bogazici, Philosophy) “Reformulating the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy”
Wednesday 10th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “An Overly Enactive Imagination?”
11:30- 1:00 Daniel Hutto & Erik Myin: “Extensive Minds”
2:30-3:30 Bill Wringe (Bilkent, Philosophy) “Some Worries about Embodied Imagination.”
3:30-4:30 Istvan Aranyosi (Bilkent, Philosophy) “Extensive Pain”
5:00-6:00 Annette Hohenberger (METU, Cog-Sci) “When is Cognition Embodied or Disembodied?
Evidence from Behavioral Discontinuities.”
Thursday 11th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “The Natural Origins of Content”
11:30- 1:00 Erik Myin: “Radically Enactive Computation: Reasoning tis but RECkoning”
2:30-3:30 David Davenport (Bilkent, Computer Engineering) “”Not Content? Think(ing) Computation!”
3:30-4:30 Jasper Van Den Herik (Rotterdam, Philosophy) “Getting Real About Words”
5:00-6:00 Mathew Harvey (Southern Denmark, Philosophy) “Language without Representations”
Kant’s Anthropology: Between Universalism and Inegalitarianism
Prof. Dr. Marc Rölli, Zürich (Switzerland)
Thu. 28 May 2015, 5.15 – 7.15 pm
(Talk in English)
Click on poster to enlarge
All welcome, registration not required.
for directions see
Political Aesthetics – Remarks on the Philosophical Foundations
Professor Marc Rölli is head of the research focus „theory and methods“ at Zurich University of the Arts
The research field referred to as ‘political aesthetics’ is currently a very active inter- or transdisciplinary workplace. It is a nodal point for several ongoing debates: image research under the aegis of cultural studies; political theory studies on the distinction between politics and ‘the political’; sociology research linked to the proclaimed ‘spatial turn’; and new developments in the field of media theory.
In the paper a number of philosophical topic clusters will be reviewed essential to theoretical clarification of the philosophical assumptions underlying political aesthetics. I begin with aesthetics itself, describing the concept’s origins in Idealism and the difficulties associated with it (1). A second step leads to the philosophical theory of perception, its history closely interwoven with that of aesthetics (2). In a third section I address the concept of ‘the political’ and the question of whether the dimension of power and dominance, accentuated by the currently much-debated ‘political difference’, is linked to the intensification of political rhetoric manifested in every present-day cultural arena (from the street to cinema and television to the internet) (3). Finally I shall turn to two of the variants of a philosophy of the “lived world”, anthropology and pragmatism, so as to return to the terrain of social theory and highlight the enduring nature of certain political themes or their special relevance to problems of political aesthetics (4).
Please join us:
Talk at Bogazici, Alper Turken, “Hegel’s Concept of True Infinite and the Idea of a Post-Critical Metaphysics”
Please join us:
Friday, June 5th, 5-7pm, TB 130 (Anderson Hall 130)
I argue for an interpretative and a philosophical claim in this paper. My interpretative claim is that a viable interpretation of Hegel, in distinction from a philosophical position that is merely inspired from him, should accommodate the concept of true infinity in a manner faithful to its meaning for Hegel. The choice of true infinite is not arbitrary. In Hegel’s words, “it is the basic concept of philosophy”1 and “it gives us the nature of speculative thought displayed in its determining feature”2 and involves the conceptual kernel of all of the richer speculative concepts of Logic. An overview of Hegel’s concept of true infinity is presented and its incompatibility with non-metaphysical interpretations of Hegel are defended with particular reference to Pippin and Brandom.
My philosophical claim is the philosophical correlate of my interpretative proposal. The speculative turn was purposefully introduced by Hegel to rehabilitate some important deficiencies that he believed was inherent in Kant’s critical philosophy. Hegel’s Logic was intended as a completion of Kant’s project as the true critique of pure reason. The concept of true infinity is at the heart of this speculative turn and represents Hegel’s primary conceptual innovation. According to this, Hegel is neither a metaphysical thinker in the pre-critical sense, nor was he a non-metaphysical thinker. His project was formulating the possibility and actual carrying out of a post-Kantian ontology based on the innovative conceptual resources he introduces through his speculative turn. Understanding Hegel’s speculative turn in these lights and recognizing the centrality of his concept of true infinite in that project should be a step forward in assessing his legacy and domesticating his key insights into contemporary discussions on metaphilosophy as well as the nature of self-consciousness, normativity and autonomy.
1 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopedia Logic, trans. T. F. Geraets, W. A. Suchting, H. S. Harris (Indianapolis, Cambridge: Hacket Publishing Company, 1991), 191.
2 Ibid., 152.
Please join us. It is open to the public. Please click on the link below for the conference poster which has more details.
Please join us for this talk.
Monday, May 25th, 5-7pm
TB 130 (Anderson Hall 130)
In this paper, I consider the anti-monuments or counter-monuments of German installation artist, Horst Hoheisel, “built” to commemorate victims of the German National Socialist Movement. Linking the work of Emmanuel Levinas to Hoheisel’s constructions gives ethical significance to Hoheisel’s attempt to bring to presence that which is essentially absent.
Eric Boynton is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Religious Studies at Allegheny College in Western, Pennsylvania. He is both chair of the Philosophy and Religious Studies Department and Director of Interdisciplinarity. In 2006, he was awarded the Thoburn Award for Excellence in Teaching and in 2015 the Jullian Ross Award for Excellence in Teaching. He received an MA from Vanderbilt University and Ph.D. form Rice University in philosophy of religion. His research involves the study of Continental figures such as Martin Heidegger, Jean-Luc Marion, Jacques Derrida, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hannah Arendt and his interests include the question of evil, current debates in meta-ethics, and the relation of philosophy, art, film, and theology. He has published articles on the Continental philosophy of religion, aesthetics, and film. He guest-edited a special issue of the journal Janus Head on contemporary considerations of evil and is currently working on his third edited volume titled: “Trauma and Transcendence: Limits of Theory and Prospects in Thinking” with Fordham University Press.
Next week we’ll have David Liebesman (Calgary) in town for a read-ahead paper workshop and a talk. Please join us. Here are some details:
Read-ahead paper Workshop:
“Counting as a Type of Measuring”
Thursday, May 28th, 3-5pm, TB 365 (Anderson Hall)
There is an intuitive contrast between counting and measuring. Counting, the thought goes, consists of correlating non-identical objects with cardinal numbers. Measuring, on the other hand, seems to require more: invoking a conventional scale that allows for more-fine-grained values. I argue that this contrast doesn’t bear scrutiny. When we appreciate the full range of counts, it becomes clear that counting is a type of measuring.
(please email firstname.lastname@example.org for a copy of the manuscript if you would like to attend).
“Criteria of Partiality and the Mass/Count Distinction”
Friday, May 29, 4-6pm, TB 130
Why can’t we count using mass nouns like “water”? A familiar idea is that mass nouns don’t come with a built-in criteria of individuation. This familiar idea is now unpopular. I argue that it contains a grain of truth. The difference between mass and count nouns is not that the former lack a criteria of individuation, but, rather, that they lack a criteria of partiality. The notion of a partial house is perfectly sensible. A partial water, however, is not. On the view I develop, this contrast underlies the mass/count distinction.