Tamara Fakhoury ‘Non-Normative Behavior and the Virtue of Rebelliousness’, Boğaziçi University, 26th May , 17:00
Tamara Fakhoury
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
Non-Normative Behavior and the Virtue of Rebelliousness
For many people subjected to systemic injustice, life under oppression involves participating in what philosophers have called “non-normative behavior,” or behavior that fails to comply with oppressive norms. Current discussions of the value of such actions tend to emphasize the benefits they can have for other victims of oppression. I argue that while benefiting others is a noble goal, there are victims for whom such altruistic reasons do not apply. For all that, non-normative behavior may still be ethically worthwhile. I highlight another source of value for such actions, stemming from victims’ personal projects and relationships. Finally, I argue that ethical discussions of non-normative behavior, both its personal value and its value for others, suggest that having a disposition to engage in non-normative actions – a trait which I call rebelliousness (a mean state between obsequiousness and impudence) – is a virtue under oppressive conditions.
May 26th, 17:00
John Freely Hall
Room 507
Seminar at Marmara: Prof. Dr. Gábor Boros on “Avenues From The Written Ethics Back To Spinoza’s Unwritten Philosophy ” (25.05.2023)
Prof. Gábor Boros (Gáspár Károli University) will give a seminar at Marmara on Thursday. All are welcome.
Date: Thursday May 25, 2023
Time: 15:30 – 17:30
Location: Marmara University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences Conference Hall
“Avenues from the Written Ethics Back to Spinoza’s Unwritten Philosophy”
About The Speaker: Prof. Dr. Gabor Boros is a Professor of Philosophy at the Karoli University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He served as the president of the Hungarian Philosophical Society, also of the Philosophical Committee of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and German-Hungarian Philosophical Society for Scientific and Academic Affairs. His research interests are French Philosophy, Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Emotions, History of German Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Philosophical Concepts of Love, Ethics, History of Ethics. He has also many books, and articles mainly on the Philosophy of Love, Ethics, Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes.
Abstract: In his early work Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect,Spinoza made several hints at another writing he referred to as “my Philosophy”. This project “Philosophy” remained, in fact, unrealized. I will argue that, on the one hand, when mentioning this “Philosophy” Spinoza must have envisioned a systematic treatise encompassing all the topics considered pertaining to philosophy, similar to Descartes’ project of the Principles of Philosophy. On the other hand, however, I will attempt to reach a deeper layer in Spinoza’s thinking. My main thesis is that what we are familiar with as the Ethics of Spinoza is a work intending to posit the finite human being in relation to the infinite basis, Substance of this, and all other kinds of being. This is what European thinkers have traditionally called God. Ethics Part I starts with the moment of the investigative mind’s leaving behind the intuitive vision of the unique Substance in which it has been immersed and entering the world graspable by the discursive cognitive activity of the finite human intellect. As far as the point of ending, Ethics Part V rounds up the work with the discursive human intellect’s being reintegrated into God’s infinite intellect. Between the starting point and the moment of completion, Spinoza provides us with a detailed analysis of the everyday existence of the finite modes; he concentrates his efforts on determining the place of the human being within his world, and the ways open for him to the reintegration in God’s intellect. The movement of the descent in Part 1 and that of the ascent in Part 5 complement each other mutually, and constitute the circular movement we are familiar with in Neo-Platonic thought beginning with Plotinus. Therefore, I will argue that Spinoza’s frame of mind is Neo-Platonic: his system of philosophy presupposes a primordial intuition of the sphere of unitary wisdom not-yet-explicated that precedes any articulation, explication by conceptual and linguistic means. So understood, Spinoza follows for example the inner logic of Plotinus’s treatise “On the three primary levels of reality”. After presenting and arguing for this thesis, I will have a look at the Ethics articulated by the discursive activity of the mind, and distinguish layers in Spinoza’s oeuvre to better configure our methods of deciphering the proper messages of particular text passages. First of all, the Ethics sub specie aeternitatis is to be distinguished from the Ethics sub specie vitae cottidianae. I will compare this difference to the distinction between the methods of analysis and synthesis in Descartes. I will maintain that Spinoza coupled the “synthetic” argumentation of the propositions and demonstrations with the series of other types of texts; in so doing, he integrated the “analytic” part into the “synthetic.” I will also adopt the distinction of the TTP between Euclidean-style and Biblical-style books. Given that the Ethics is not written entirely in the Euclidean style, I will maintain that its major part allows for and even calls for investigations by way of the hermeneutical method applied to the Bible. Of course, the part Spinoza considered to be written in Euclid’s style also allows for and even calls for being investigated in this way, but the reasons for this are different. The approach I propose can help us find support for special interpretations of particular text passages, or help us rectify false interpretations influenced by fashionable contemporary ideas.
Adriel M. Trott, “Reconsidering Normativity in Aristotle’s Hylomorphism and Generation”, Talk at Galatasaray University (06/06/23 @ 19:00)
On Tuesday June 6th, we will be holding a conference on Aristotle with Adriel M. Trott. Trott is an associate professor, faculty member and head of the philosophy department at Wabash College, Indiana, USA. She holds the “Andrew T. and Anne Ford” chair in social sciences. Her two highly deemed books are named “Aristotle on the Nature of Community” and “Aristotle on the Matter of Form: A Feminist Metaphysics of Generation”. The conference will be held in English. However, Ömer Aygün has kindly provided a translation that can be considered as a simple summary of the upcoming conference. We will share this with you too. In addition, since Ömer will not be in Turkey on the day of the conference, he will connect via Zoom and give a summary speech in Turkish after the conference. If everything goes well, he’s stated that he wants to translate our questions to Mrs. Trott spontaneously.
Until the conference, take care and please don’t forget to fill out the participation form:
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Dr. Gábor Boros on “Contrasts for a Quartet of Philosophers: Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger from the Perspective of Georg Misch” (24.05.2023) Via Zoom
Prof. Gábor Boros (Gáspár Károli University) will give a talk at Marmara on Wednesday. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday May 24, 2023
Time: 17:00 – 19:00
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Contrasts for a Quartet of Philosophers: Dilthey, Husserl, Heidegger from the Perspective of Georg Misch”
About The Speaker: Prof. Dr. Gabor Boros is a Professor of Philosophy at the Karoli University of the Reformed Church in Hungary. He served as the president of the Hungarian Philosophical Society, also of the Philosophical Committee of Hungarian Academy of Sciences and German-Hungarian Philosophical Society for Scientific and Academic Affairs. His research interests are French Philosophy, Philosophy of the History of Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Emotions, History of German Philosophy, Early Modern Philosophy, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, Philosophical Concepts of Love, Ethics, History of Ethics. He has also many books, and articles mainly on the Philosophy of Love, Ethics, Spinoza, Leibniz and Descartes.
Abstract: My lecture will focus on a peculiar constellation within German philosophy in the first half of the 20th century. During two decades, such word-famous thinkers as Dilthey, Husserl, and Heidegger seem to have been of equal rank with Georg Misch, a thinker who does not play any relevant role in today’s philosophy. In that period, they all wished to renew philosophy, and all, except for Husserl, wished to carry out this plan by way of the Hermeneutics practiced by exegetes of secular and sacred texts to be transformed now into a philosophical discipline. None of them, except for Misch needs to be introduced among philosophers today. Born in 1878, he was a disciple of Dilthey, and later, he became his son-in-law as well. As the successor of Husserl, he held an influential professorship in Göttingen. After his return from his forced exile in England during WW2, his only aim and hope that survived were to complete the volumes of the History of Autobiography he started to elaborate on in the 1900s. Because of this tragic development, his own philosophy has not been put forward in systematic treatises but needs to be excavated from his early approach to the philosophies of Dilthey, Husserl, and Heidegger, which is sometimes affirmative, sometimes critical. The most important publication to be used when we attempt to carry out the excavation was his book Philosophy of Life and Phenomenology in which he tried to criticize Heidegger’s way to combine Dilthey and Husserl in his Being and Time notwithstanding his enthusiasm about Heidegger’s penetrating eyes and systematic strength. The lecture will focus on some of the arguments of this book, especially on how Misch tried to criticize Heidegger and Husserl while acknowledging their general importance in philosophy and, at the same time to defend Dilthey despite the acknowledgment that his approach to metaphysics falls short of legitimate expectations.
Instructor opening at Koc University
Koç University (College of Social Sciences and Humanities)
Istanbul, Turkey
Koç University’s Department of Philosophy invites applications for a part-time Philosophy instructor.
Qualified candidates are expected to hold an MA or Ph.D. in Philosophy.
The successful candidate will teach up to 3 courses per semester, with a mix of introductory courses and upper-division courses.
Teaching will occur in person on the main campus of Koç University in Istanbul (Sarıyer), Turkey. The language of instruction is English.
More information about Koç University is available at http://www.ku.edu.tr
Applications will be considered on a rolling basis.
Please include the following items in your application: cover letter, CV, and contact information of two references.
Send your application by email to David Killoren: Dkilloren@ku.edu.tr
Call for Papers for the 2nd Issue of Kant Çalışmaları Journal
The first issue of Kant Çalışmaları Journal took its place in bookstores as of March 2023 with the support of Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları. As the publishing team, we would like to thank our referees, authors and translators who contributed to this issue. The journal can be purchased from the web page of Vakıfbank Kültür Yayınları at a discount.
Our second issue will be published in the Fall of 2023. The journal accepts previously unpublished and original research articles about any aspects of Kant’s philosophy. This includes the relationship between Kant and other thinkers, as well as Kant’s influence on contemporary philosophical debates. Submissions can be sent to dergi@kantcalismalari.org until the 15th of June, 2023. You are cordially invited to submit your articles for the second issue. Please find further information and instructions by following this link.
Hadeel Naeem, Seminar, Boğaziçi Dept of Philosophy, Friday May 5th, 17:30. ‘My beliefs or Alexa’s? Belief attribution in human-AI extension’
Hadeel Naeem is a visiting researcher in the Department of Philosophy at Boğaziçi University and will present the following paper ‘My beliefs or Alexa’s? Belief attribution in human-AI extension’ in a seminar on
Friday May 5th,
17:30.
John Freely Building, Room 507
South Campus
Bebek, Istanbul
Abstract
This paper investigates how we ought to attribute beliefs in the kinds of human-AI inter- actions that give rise to extended beliefs. Compared to classical cases of extension, AI- extended agents have a less active role in forming their beliefs, and this paper explores how we might nonetheless be able to ascribe beliefs to them. Toward this goal, I look for a suitable account of belief attribution in the extended mind literature. I examine the dynam- ical systems theory (DST), the boundary of the mind according to Markov blankets, and the virtue reliabilist concept of cognitive integration. I find all of these wanting. Of all the examined accounts, cognitive integration is best suited to explain how we attribute beliefs in non-AI extension cases, but it still ultimately fails in cases of AI extension. I show that AI systems will soon monitor their own cognitive integration, leaving no room for agents to manifest sufficient cognitive agency for these extended epistemic states to be attributed to them.
Keywords: AI, extended mind thesis, belief attribution, cognitive integration, Markov blan- ket, cognitive agency bloat
Graduate Conference in Istanbul: Philosophy, Science and Religion
Philosophy Graduate Conference at Ibn Haldun University Istanbul: “Philosophy, Science, and Religion”
The conference will take place on May 6-7, 2023, at the Süleymaniye Campus of Ibn Haldun University in Istanbul.
It is open to all students and esteemed scholars, including the public. Our program promises to offer a diverse range of topics and perspectives, with a particular focus on the intersection of philosophy, science, and religion.
Social and Political Ontology at Bilkent – Registration open
Social Ontology in Political Philosophy
Bilkent Library 5-6 May 2023
Collective action plays a central role in politics. Understanding the conceptual underpinnings of collective agency, including related ideas such as collective responsibility and collective capability should therefore play a central role in political philosophy. These issues are most often explored with in an area of philosophy known as ‘social ontology’, which draws on work in philosophy of mind, analytic metaphysics and ethics, and which has implications for disciplines such as psychology, law and political science.
Our aim in this conference is to bring together established and emerging researchers in political philosophy and social ontology, including some who have published prize-winning work in this area, and others whose work is at the centre of recent discussions.
You can register on eventbrite here: http://socialontologyandpoliticalphilosophy.weebly.com/register.html
The details of the conference and program are here: http://socialontologyandpoliticalphilosophy.weebly.com
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Dr. Yasin Ramazan on “Aspects of Extraordinary” (26.04.2023) Via Zoom
Dr. Yasin Ramazan (Marmara University) will give a talk at Marmara on Wednesday. All are welcome.
Date: Wednesday April 26, 2023
Time: 17:00 – 19:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Aspects of Extraordinary”
About The Speaker: He graduated from Ankara University Divinity School in 2008. He received his Phd in 2018 from Indiana University Bloomington with the title “Nature, God, and Creation: A Necessitarian Case”. He published three books on critical thinking and logic and several articles on rationality of religious beliefs, metaphysics of theism and science and religion debate.
Abstract: In this talk, I explore aspects of the concept of extraordinary. What do we mean by extraordinary when we attribute it to an event? Can it be justified in any sense? Is it a justification for any claim? This concept has been indirectly utilized in metaphysical, epistemic, and scientific theses by various philosophers and I would like to clarify its use.
Conference at Bilkent: Social Ontology in Political Philosophy, May 4-7
Stephanie Collins, Monash University Australia
Frank Hindriks, Groningen University, Netherlands
Avia Pasternak, University of Toronto
Anne Schwenkenbecher, Murdoch University, Australia
Hans Bernhard Schmid, University of Vienna, Austria
and
Jade Fletcher (St. Andrews), Niels de Haan (Vienna), Säde Hormio (IFS Stockholm), Leonie Smith (Manchester)
Collective action plays a central role in politics. Understanding the conceptual underpinnings of collective agency, including related ideas such as collective responsibility and collective capability should therefore play a central role in political philosophy. These issues are most often explored with in an area of philosophy known as ‘social ontology’, which draws on work in philosophy of mind, analytic metaphysics and ethics, and which has implications for disciplines such as psychology, law and political science.
Our aim in this conference is to bring together established and emerging researchers in political philosophy and social ontology, including some who have published prize-winning work in this area, and others whose work is at the centre of recent discussions.
| A conference supported by Bilkent University and the International Society for Social Ontology (ISOS) Organizers: Bill Wringe, Evrensel Sebep, Ahmet Gönüllü, Barış Kaştaş |
| Contact: SocOntPolPhil2023@gmail.com, billwringesemail@gmail.com Registration: details TBA |
PROGRAM
Friday May 5th (Provisional)
9.00 – 9.30: Coffee and Registration
9.30 – 9.45: Opening Remarks – Professor Simon Wigley, Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, Bilkent University
9.45 – 11.00: Stephanie Collins (Monash University):States’ Culpability Through Time
11.00 – 11.30 Tea/coffee
11.30 – 12.45 : Niels de Haan (University of Vienna):Political Legitimacy and Basic Hypothetical Consent
12.45 -14.00: Lunch
14.00 – 15.15: Säde Hormio (Institute for Future Studies, Stockholm/University of Helsinki ):
The Collective Responsibility of National Oil Companies
15.15 – 15.30: Tea Break
15.30 – 16.30: Graduate student session
16.45 – 18.15: Avia Pasternak (University of Toronto): TBA
19.00 CONFERENCE DINNER
Saturday May 6th (Provisional)
10.00 – 11.15 Hans-Bernhard Schmid (University of Vienna): TBA
11.30 – 12.45 Anne Schwenkenbecher (Murdoch University/University of Bielefeld): I-mode Reasoning vs We-Mode Reasoning in Moral Deliberation
12.45 – 14.00 Lunch
14.00 – 15.15 Leonie Smith (University of Manchester): Collective Nostalgic Attention and Working-Class Identity
15.30 – 16.45 Frank Hindriks (Groningen University ): Can Collective Agents Have Moral Rights
17.00 – 18.15 Jade Fletcher (University of St. Andrews): The Role of Feminist Values in Metaphysics
19.00 INFORMAL DINNER
For more information: socialontologyandpoliticalphilosophy.weebly.com
Tamara Fakhoury, Non-Normative Behavior and the Virtue of Rebelliousness. Boğaziçi University, May 26th
Tamara Fakhoury
Department of Philosophy, University of Minnesota, Twin Cities
Non-Normative Behavior and the Virtue of Rebelliousness
For many people subjected to systemic injustice, life under oppression involves participating in what philosophers have called “non-normative behavior,” or behavior that fails to comply with oppressive norms. Current discussions of the value of such actions tend to emphasize the benefits they can have for other victims of oppression. I argue that while benefiting others is a noble goal, there are victims for whom such altruistic reasons do not apply. For all that, non-normative behavior may still be ethically worthwhile. I highlight another source of value for such actions, stemming from victims’ personal projects and relationships. Finally, I argue that ethical discussions of non-normative behavior, both its personal value and its value for others, suggest that having a disposition to engage in non-normative actions – a trait which I call rebelliousness (a mean state between obsequiousness and impudence) – is a virtue under oppressive conditions.
May 26th
Boğaziçi University
Department of Philosophy
John Freely Hall
Room 507
CFP Workshop on Ethics & Relationships
Workshop on Ethics & Relationships (Call for papers)
Dates: August 10-11, 2023
Location: Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
Deadline for submissions: April 14, 2023
This workshop is generously supported by Koç University and Boğaziçi University
Confirmed speakers:
Robert Streiffer (University of Wisconsin-Madison)
Bill Wringe (Bilkent University)
We invite submission of abstracts of 500-1000 words.
Please prepare abstracts for blind review and submit abstracts to the organizers: Seçil Aracı (secilaraci@gmail.com) and David Killoren (david.j.killoren@gmail.com)
Workshop format:
We intend to have six-or-so speaking slots. Speakers will present for 30 minutes followed by a 30-minute Q&A. Pre-circulation of a draft will be welcomed but not required. Refreshments will be served throughout the event and a workshop dinner and drinks will occur on the final day of the workshop (Friday). (All food provided will be 100% vegan.) On the Saturday after the workshop, there will be an optional group tour of some of the most beautiful and historic spots in Istanbul.
Topics may include but not limited to:
- Explorations of philosophical and/or ethical questions about particular types of relationships, such as: friendships; familial relationships; workplace relationships; rivalries, enemy-ships, frenemy-ships; political relationships (e.g., relationships between citizens of the same country; relationships between immigrants and citizens); relationships between collective entities (e.g., relationships between countries; relationships between corporations); relationships between individuals and collective entities (e.g., relationships between individuals and states; relationships between individuals and corporations).
- Metaphysics of relationships: What are relationships? How do they differ from mere relations? For example, how (if at all) does the left-of relation differ in kind from relationships such as friendships, familial relationships, etc.? How are relationships individuated? How many relationships does each of us have? What does it take to form a relationship? Can you be in a relationship with someone without knowing it? How do we exit relationships?
- Relationships and obligations: Are there “special obligations” to those with whom we have relationships? If so, which relationships can give rise to these sorts of obligations?
- The value of relationships: Are relationships valuable—either instrumentally or non-instrumentally? Are there any relationships that have no value or negative value?
- Relationships and rights: Is there a moral right to certain kinds of relationships (e.g., is there a right to friendship, or to romantic relationships)? What are the ethical, metaphysical, and/or conceptual connections between rights and relationships?
- Relationships and reasons: If you have a particular relationship with someone, does this fact all by itself supply you with reasons for or against treating them in certain ways? Alternatively, do relationships affect the weight of relationship-independent reasons? Or are relationships and reasons connected in other ways?
Philevents page: https://philevents.org/event/show/10926
Kant Conference at Bilkent, March 11
Organized by Bilkent University Department of Philosophy, Turkey Kant Society and Bilkent Philosophical Society.
Location: Bilkent University
Room: H232
Date: March 11, 2023
Web: phil.bilkent.edu.tr
Talk at Bilkent, Mar 9: Daniel Sutherland on Kant on the Singularity of Intuition
Title: Kant on the Singularity of Intuition
By Daniel Sutherland (University of Chicago at Illinois, Philosophy)
Date: Thursday March 9, 2023
Time: 15.30-17.00
Room: H-232
Abstract: The difference between the contributions of concept and intuitions to human cognition is fundamental to Kant’s critical philosophy. Kant states that concepts are general and mediate representations, while intuitions are singular and immediate representations. Virtually all Kant scholars have understood the singularity of intuition as consisting in the representation of a single individual or object. I argue that this is mistaken. I argue that the form of intuition is a mode of representing singularly, which does not itself require the representation of individuals and objects. I argue that intuition allows us to represent indeterminate extent such as space and time without representing parts and represents it in a singular way. Moreover, representing extent singularly underlies the singularity of individuals or objects represented in space and time.
About the speaker: Daniel Sutherland received his PhD from UCLA in 1998, was a Postdoctoral Fellow in the History and Philosophy of Science Department of Indiana University from 1998-99, and came to UIC in 1999. His primary interests include the relationship between philosophy, mathematics and science in the work of Immanuel Kant, and mathematical cognition more generally. He was a visiting professor at Harvard University in Spring 2006, and taught at the University of Chicago in Fall 2008. He has been awarded grants by the NSF (2006-7) and the American Philosophical Society (2010-11). Some of his publications are “Kant’s Philosophy of Mathematics and the Greek Mathematical Tradition,” Philosophical Review (2004), “The Role of Magnitude in Kant’s Critical Philosophy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy (2005), “Kant on Arithmetic Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (2006), “From Kant to Frege: Numbers, Pure Units, and the Limits of Conceptual Representation,” Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement (2008), and “Philosophy and Geometrical Practice in Leibniz, Wolff, and the Early Kant,” in Discourse on a new Method: Reinvigorating the Marriage of History and Philosophy of Science (2010). His book entitled Kant’s Mathematical World: Mathematics, Cognition, and Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2021) presents a novel reconstruction of Kant’s philosophy of mathematics and his account of the mathematical character of the world.
Web: phil.bilkent.edu.tr
Talk at Bilkent, Mar 2: Christoph Horn on “To which extent can one defend Kant’s moral philosophy?” – Online
Title: To which extent can one defend Kant’s moral philosophy?
By Christoph Horn (Bonn University, Philosophy)
Date: Thursday March 2, 2023
Time: 15.30-17.00 (GMT+3)
This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the Zoom link here when the event is due to begin.
Abstract: To which extent can one defend Kant’s moral philosophy? Kant’s moral philosophy is certainly one of the most attractive parts of his thought. At the same time, serious objections have repeatedly been raised against it, especially in the ethical debate of the last 20-30 years. In the lecture, I explore the question of how convincing these objections are and up to what point Kant’s position can be defended. In my view, much of value remains, even if one takes the counterarguments as seriously as they deserve.
About the speaker: Christoph Horn is Professor and Chair of Practical Philosophy and Ancient Philosophy at the University of Bonn. He primarily works on ancient philosophy (specially Plato and Aristotle) and practical philosophy (especially Kant, moral philosophy and contemporary political philosophy). In addition to dozens of journal articles and book chapters, he has published nine books dealing with the philosophies of Plotinus, Augustine, and the ancient art of living. He is also the editor of the journals Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie and Gnomon.
Web: phil.bilkent.edu.tr
CFA Graduate Conference at Ibn Haldun university: Philosophy, Science and Religion
Philosophy, Science and Religion (Call for Abstract)
Dates: May 6-7, 2023
In-person (Suleymaniye Campus, Ibn Haldun University, Istanbul, Turkey)
Deadline for submissions: March 22, 2023
The Department of Philosophy at Ibn Haldun University invites submissions from graduate students for its International Philosophy Graduate Conference. We welcome submissions that explore the overlaps between religion and science. Possible topics include but are not limited to:
1. Philosophy of religion
2. Philosophy of science
3. Contemporary philosophy
All abstracts must be either of the following:
• Extended abstract describing the broad outline of the arguments.
• Short abstract describing the thesis statement.
Abstracts will be submitted in mail at ibnhaldun2023@gmail.com.
Please address any inquiries regarding the conference to the organizers at jehansalsabila7@gmail.com.
Talk at Bilkent, Jan 27: Andrew Fyfea on Diachronic Agency as Group Agency and the Kantian Formula of Humanity
Title: Diachronic Agency as Group Agency and the Kantian Formula of Humanity
By Andrew Thomas Fyfe (University of Maryland, Philosophy)
Date: Friday January 27, 2023
Time: 15.30-17.00
Room: H-232
Abstract: A common way of arguing for Kantian ethics relies on the following questionable premise: “By taking my choices to confer goodness upon my freely chosen ends, I am thereby committed to also taking the choices of others as having the same power.” In my talk, I will defend this important premise by putting forth a somewhat paradoxical sounding theory of individual agency. One that treats temporally extended individual agency as a manifestation of group agency. I argue that diachronic individual agency results when the different momentary time-slice deliberators occupying our body serially (à la Derek Parfit) deliberate and work together as a team to set joint ends and perform joint actions. This leads me to defend the important Kantian premise given above in a manner inspired by Thomas Nagel’s The Possibility of Altruism (1978). Specifically, I argue that to be a diachronic agent, I must cooperate and engage in team reasoning with my future time-slices. However, those future time-slices are just as much a stranger to me currently as other agents. The upshot is that in order to have the correct sort of team reasoning attitude toward the future time-slices which occupy this body and ground my own diachronic agency, I must first have this attitude toward all potential agents. This result will ultimately ground my argument for the need for us to not just value the ends we choose for ourselves but also the ends chosen by others.
About the speaker: click here.
Web: phil.bilkent.edu.tr
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Dr. Carmen Lea Dege on “A Critical Theory of Myth? – Dispatches from 20th Century Political Thought” (27.01.2023) Via Zoom
Dr. Carmen Lea Dege will give a talk at Marmara on Friday. All are welcome.
Date: Friday January 27, 2023
Time: 18:00 – 20:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“A Critical Theory of Myth? – Dispatches from 20th Century Political Thought”
About The Speaker: Dr. Carmen Lea Dege is a Visiting Scholar at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies at Harvard University and a Polonsky Postdoctoral Fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem Institute. She holds a Ph.D. in Political Theory from Yale University and a M.A. in the Social Sciences from the University of Chicago. Her work focuses on the role of myth and ignorance in democratic societies. In particular, she argues that myth is more significant to how societies respond to crises and uncertainty than acknowledged by the history of modern political thought. In addition, her argument is normative and suggests that myth has a claim on truth that differs from objective rationality and subjective experience and allows us to distinguish democratic from non-democratic ignorance.
Abstract: Plato’s simultaneous advance of the noble lie and ban of the poets marks one early example of what has been famously described as myth’s ambiguous character: it is equally illusory and real, imaginative and consequential. Myth’s ambiguous stature, so the argument continues, derives from its non-propositional or tacit meaning which also explains why myths and imaginaries cannot be criticized like facts or ideologies: they lack the reflexive element and claim to truth that critique must be able to draw on. As a result, the growing significance of conspiracy theories, misinformation, and science denialism is partly attributed to their allegedly mythical dimension and, in turn, immunity to democratic plurality and social criticism.
My presentation turns to thinkers in 20th century critical theory, black existentialism and philosophical anthropology who question this legacy of myth. I observe that these thinkers frequently replace or extend the concept of myth by other terms such as mimesis (Theodor Adorno), “as if” (Hans Vaihinger), cipher (Karl Jaspers), imaginary (Cornelius Castoriadis), or ignorance (Frantz Fanon). Frustrated by the apparent failure of Enlightenment rationality but wary of the possible abuse of myth in public life, they identify myth with a third standpoint of critique next to rationality and power which I conceptualize as learned ignorance. I argue in particular that 20th century myth debates offer various attempts at transitioning from willful ignorance to learned ignorance. While willful ignorance typically isolates a position from its limits in order to defend the certainty of a conviction – also in ways that do not need to be restricted to a consciously enacted will – learned ignorance relies on the ambiguity of belief structures to live and act under conditions of uncertainty.
On this view, returning to Plato, rather than constituting an attempt to manipulate and deceive the many, myth can amount to an act of fiction-making that stimulates and strengthens the abilities of the many to seek the truth and pursue justice in their lives. The presentation is guided by the question whether this democratic (re)interpretation of myth succeeds or fails, if myth can itself become the object of critique, and how it might help us respond to the challenges of post-truth politics today.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Espen Gamlund on “The Right To Moralize” (30.12.2022) Via Zoom
Prof. Espen Gamlund (University of Bergen) will give a talk at Marmara on Friday. All are welcome.
Date: Friday December 30, 2022
Time: 18:00-20:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“The Right to Moralize (Chapter from his forthcoming book Minding Other People’s Business, OUP)”
About the Speaker: Espen Gamlund has a PhD in philosophy from the University of Oslo in 2009. He joined the Department of Philosophy, University of Bergen as an associate professor in 2010, and became a professor there in 2016. Gamlund works in ethics and moral philosophy, with a particular interest in questions related to moral psychology. He has published on forgiveness, animal ethics, environmental ethics, death, and health care priorities. He is currently writing a book on gratitude (in Norwegian) and a book on moralism (under contract with OUP).
Abstract: In this presentation, I will defend the view that we have a right to moralize. This right can be derived from the fundamental rights to freedom of thought and freedom of expression. The right to moralize is a right to direct moral criticism at opinions, attitudes, actions, practices, and institutions that one judges to be morally problematic or wrong. Although we have a right to moralize, that does not mean that in all situations it will be right to exercise this right. Therefore, I discuss the different considerations that are relevant in order to determine whether one should exercise one’s right to moralize. These considerations are positionality, knowledge, consequences, and moral requirements. I end with some thoughts about the aims and value of moralism.
Talk at Bilkent, Dec 22: Nina Dmitrieva on Early Reception of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (via Zoom)
Title: Early Reception of Kant’s Practical Philosophy: Ch.W. Snell (1755–1834) & F.W.D. Snell (1761–1827)
By Nina Dmitrieva (Kaliningrad, Academia Kantiana IKBFU/ Princeton, Philosophy)
Date: Thursday December 22, 2022
Time: 16.00-17.30 (GMT+3)
This is an online event. All are welcome. If you would like to listen to the talk please click on the following link when the event is due to begin.
For Zoom information, please visit here.
Abstract: The brothers Snell remain an unread page in the history of early Kantianism. Their philosophical maturation coincided with the beginning of Kant’s critical period. Both became enthusiastic admirers of Kantian philosophy and deservedly earned a reputation as its active promoters. Both brothers focused on Kant’s practical philosophy as well as on aesthetics, and only slightly on logic and metaphysics. Their close attention to ethics and the philosophy of religion, as well as to issues of education, is probably due to the fact that both had devoted a considerable part of their lives to gymnasium teaching. Moreover, they were among the first who raised the hardly trivial question of what form the popularisation of philosophical knowledge should take. This reflection, which found practical application, was probably one of the reasons for Russian professors of philosophy to translate the textbook by the brothers Snell into Russian. The stranger is the dismissive assessment of this textbook and its authors by the Hegelian disciple Karl Rosenkranz (1840). In my talk I will question this assessment and offer an overview of their work on the basis of primary sources.
About the speaker: Nina Dmitrieva is a Professor of Philosophy at Moscow Pedagogical State University and she is the scientific director of the Academia Kantiana Research Institution at the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University. Currently, she conducts her research at Princeton University as the visiting research scholar. She is a member of various prestigious societies and research programs. Most notably, she is also an Associated Member of the Interdisciplinary Center for European Enlightenment Studies, which is based in Martin-Luther-University of Halle-Wittenberg; and serves as the corresponding member abroad of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Her research focuses on Russian and German Neo-Kantianism, Kant’s reception in Russia, History of Russian and Continental Philosophy in the 19th and 20th Centuries and History and Theory of Intellectuals. She is the editor-in-chief of the recently established Kantian Journal based in Kaliningrad, Russia and the author of numerous publications, including two books: one entitled Russian Neo-Kantianism. “Marburg” in Russia: Historical-Philosophical Essays (published in 2007, in Rus.), and the second one entitled Boris A. Fokht [Vogt]: to the History of Russian Neo-Kantianism (1999, in Rus.).
Talk by David Killoren on Friday, Dec 23 at Boğaziçi University “What sorts of reasons do we have to be strict vegans?”
David Killoren from Koc University will be giving a talk this Friday, Dec 23, at 17:00 at JF507. Everyone is welcome.
Title: What sorts of reasons do we have to be strict vegans?
Abstract: Strict vegans adhere to certain restrictions that seem pointless and arbitrary. For example, strict vegans avoid eating leftover meat that will be thrown away if it isn’t eaten. For another example, strict vegans avoid consumption of bivalves such as oysters and clams, even though these animals seem unlikely to be sentient. Do we have any reasons at all to be strict vegans? And if so, are these reasons sufficient to make strict veganism morally obligatory? I’ll argue that the answer to both of these questions is ‘yes.’ Along the way, I’ll propose and defend an account of what veganism is.
Talk by Julian Hauser on “The structure of minimal self-representation” at Boğaziçi University, Dec 16, 5:30pm
Julian Hauser from University of Barcelona will be giving a talk on Friday, Dec 16, 2022 at Boğaziçi University (JF507) at 5:30pm. You may find the details below.
Title: The structure of minimal self-representation
Abstract: One of the less discussed puzzles about self-representation concerns its functional structure. A creature may represent its own properties in various ways, and only some of them will count as self-representation. In this paper, I argue that a distinction between egocentric and non-egocentric forms of representation — known primarily from the literature on spatial cognition — can help with formulating an account of the structure of minimal self-representation. Using examples drawn from animal cognition and developmental psychology, I show that a similar distinction applies to representations of one’s temporal, bodily, and cognitive properties. Self-representation, on such an account, involves representing one’s properties in such a way that an explicit differentiation is made between the properties the system actually exemplifies and those exemplified by other objects (or its own merely possible states). The upshot is a view on which different creatures may self-represent (in this minimal sense) more or fewer properties in various domains. More substantive conceptions of self-representation (for instance, as exemplified by neurotypical adult human beings) exist when minimal self-representers represent the right kinds of property (usually involving one’s spatial, temporal, and social properties).
SWIP-TR 2022 Program and Zoom link
Dear all,
We are very happy to announce our program for the Fifth SWIP-TR Conference, which will take place online on 9-10 December 2022.
We will be using the same zoom link for both days, no need for password.
Zoom: https://us02web.zoom.us/s/82326522119
Meeting ID: 823 2652 2119
Hope to see many of you there.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Silvia Caprioglio Panizza on “Attention and the Foundations of Morality” (25.11.2022) Via Zoom
Silvia Caprioglio Panizza (University of Pardubice, University College Dublin) will give a talk at Marmara on Friday. All are welcome.
Date: Friday November 25, 2022
Time: 18:00 – 20:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Attention and the Foundations of Morality”
About the Speaker: Silvia Caprioglio Panizzais Marie Skłodowska-Curie Fellow at the Centre for Ethics, University of Pardubice, working on a project on moral impossibility (MIGHT), and honorary fellow at the PEriTiA project on public trust at the Centre for Ethics in Public Life, University College Dublin. She is the author of The Ethics of Attention: Engaging the Real with Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil (Routledge 2022), co-editor of The Murdochian Mind (Routledge 2022) and co-editor of Simone Weil’s literary works (Bloomsbury 2019 and 2023). Her research focuses on meta-ethics, moral psychology, environmental ethics, and animal ethics, for which she is has founded the research group Vegan Studies Network (VSN).
Abstract: in this paper I present an argument for an ethics of attention, i.e. a conception of ethics which takes attention as fundamental. I will do this by drawing on and developing insights from Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil. I present two axes along which to consider attention ethically: the presence and absence of attention (attention as truth-revealing), and the objects of attention (attention as focusing our minds and structuring our visions via some particular objects). Together, these axes show that whether we attend and what we attend do determine the background upon which moral thinking, deliberation, and action take place. Hence, attention does not replace, but is prior, to much of what is considered in contemporary academic moral discourse. It follows that, to address moral issues, we first of all need to pay attention to attention.
Talk on Friday at Boğaziçi University: ‘DICE: A HAZARDOUS SYMBOL FOR CHANCE?’ by Jean-Yves Beziau
Dear all,
There will be a talk on Friday, Nov 18, 2022, at 5pm at JF507. Everybody is welcome.
Title: DICE: A HAZARDOUS SYMBOL FOR CHANCE?
Abstract: In this talk we examine up to which point dice throwing is a good symbolization of chance. This is the opportunity to examine the notion of chance relating it to other notions like determinism and causality in the perspective of a general theory of semiotics distinguishing symbols from arbitrary signs, related to the use of formalism in logic and mathematics.
by Jean-Yves Beziau, Federal University of Rio de Janerio
6th Bilkent International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference
6th Bilkent International Undergraduate Philosophy Conference will take place on Saturday, November 19, 2022, via Zoom. This year, we have 6 speakers from 5 countries.
To attend the conference, please see the registration link here:
Registration is free but required. Once you are registered, Zoom meeting information will be sent to you via e-mail.
Philosophy Talk at Marmara: Prof. Dr. Mehmet Elgin on “Multiple Realizations and Two Faces of Laws in Biology” (28.10.2022) Via Zoom
Prof. Dr. Mehmet Elgin (Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University) will give a talk at Marmara on Friday. All are welcome.
Date: Friday October 28, 2022
Time: 18:00 – 20:00 (Istanbul Time)
To attend the event please send an e-mail to marmara.phil.talks@gmail.com
“Multiple Realizations and Two Faces of Laws in Biology”
About the Speaker: Mehmet Elgin is a full professor at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University Department of Philosophy since 2011. He received a BA degree in Philosophy Group Teacher Education (Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and Education) from Çukurova University, Adana, Turkey, (1991), an MA degree in Philosophy from Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, USA (1996) and a PhD degree in Philosophy from The University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, USA (2002).
He was a teaching assistant at The University of Wisconsin Madison Philosophy Department between 1998-2002. He was an assistant professor between 2004-2006 and an associate professor between 2006-2011 at Muğla Sıtkı Koçman University Philosophy Department. He was a visiting fellow at Leibniz Hannover University Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science (Germany) between March-July 2007 and at University of Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science between September 2007 – May 2008. He was an honorary visiting scholar at University of Wisconsin-Madison Philosophy Department between August 2013 – July 2014. He was also a Fulbright scholar at Northeastern University Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies between September 2021-June 2022.
Mehmet Elgin specializes in philosophy of science and in philosophy of biology. He has published papers about biological laws, mathematical models and explanation in evolutionary biology, reductionism in biology, Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis and evolutionary psychology in national and international philosophy journals.
Abstract: The claim that laws of empirical sciences must be empirical may seem a truism to most people and yet this is precisely the thesis I will challenge in this talk. The status of a priori mathematical models in evolutionary biology has been concern for philosophers. It is suggested that such generalizations should not and did not have to be formulated as a priori claims. I will argue that this is a mistake since the scientists who formulated these a priori laws were not at liberty to formulate empirical laws given the nature of the properties they try to model in evolutionary biology. The central thesis of evolutionary theory is The Principle of Natural Selection (PNS) and the central property in this principle is fitness. Fitness is a multiply realized property. For this reason, any generalizations that are designed to apply all living organisms where fitness figures turn out to be a priori. On the other hand, there are purported cases of multiple realizations in biology such as the claim that different genes may realize the same biological function. I will argue that if we look closely to these cases, they are not genuine cases of multiple realizations. For this reason, one can formulate empirical generalizations that contain these properties. The latter implies some biological properties can be reduced to properties in the lower-level sciences. However, the former implies that since fitness in the principle of natural selection cannot be reduced to properties in the lower-level sciences, the law we formulate about it cannot be reduced to lower-level science laws either. This suggests that biology drives its autonomy from evolutionary theory.
Project end talk: Theoretical knowledge and behavioral science
Friday, 21 OCT 2022, 6.00-7.30 PM, John Freely Hall, Room JF 507 (4th floor)
https://mtrboun.wordpress.com/2022/10/13/project-end-talk-theoretical-knowledge-and-behavioral-science/
Theoretical knowledge and behavioral science
Frank Zenker, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey (fzenker@gmail.com)
Abstract: Behavioral science broadly lacks theoretical knowledge today. Some 50 years of experimental/observational research have not resulted in empirically adequate theories that allow us to explain and predict human behavior, and to intervene onto it (e.g., in public policy making). In explaining this “state-of-the-art,” I raise three related issues. First, a strong focus on induction suggests a lack of understanding among behavioral scientists about what theoretical knowledge is, why it is important, and why it requires a deductive approach. Second, the primary aim of “making discoveries” (by testing against chance) leads to applications of the best statistical inference strategies generally, and of a Bayesian hypothesis support threshold particularly, that typically ignore the minimum sample size—leading to underpowered studies the results of which are unlikely to replicate. Third, since observed behavioral responses typically translate into either small effects that are quasi-unobservable or into medium to larger effects the observation of which remains diffuse, the point-effect that an empirically adequate theoretical construct would have to predict is typically unknown, partly explaining why theoretical knowledge cannot easily arise. For each issue, I present possible remedies.
Guests: To enter the campus via the main gate near Bogazici Metro station, please obtain a guest pass in exchange for a passport or ID card
Hesperus is Bosphorus 