Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Archive for the ‘Perception’ Category

Talk at Bilkent: Emre Arda Erdenk, “Hume’s Sympathy Mechanism and Perceptual Intuitionism”

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The Department of Philosophy at Bilkent University is pleased to invite you 
to the following talk:
Friday, April 24, 2015, 17:40, at G 160

David Hume’s Sympathy Mechanism and Perceptual Intuitionism

Assist. Prof. Dr. Emre Arda Erdenk

Karamanoglu Mehmetbey University, Department of Philosophy


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CFA: Enriching Embodied Cognition (Boğaziçi) 9-11/06/2015

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Call For Abstracts: Enriching Embodied Cognition
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
June 9th-11th, 2015

Keynote Speakers: Daniel Hutto (Wollongong) and Erik Myin (Antwerp)

This workshop will be centered around material for the manuscript of Hutto and Myin’s latest book, Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework, which is a follow-up to their 2013 book Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content.

Articles and draft material will be circulated to the participants in advance, and in the morning sessions Hutto and Myin will present and discuss core arguments with the participants. In the afternoon participants will present papers. These papers should be on themes discussed in the book, but do not have to be direct responses to Hutto and Myin’s work. If you would be interested in presenting a paper at the workshop, please send a short abstract to istanbulembodied@gmail.com by April 20th. Successful applicants will be informed by April 25th.

Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework will provide an enriched understanding of embodied cognition: showing just how embodied it is and just how it is embodied. This book integrates what is best in the replacement approaches, advancing the sciences of the mind by providing a novel framework for non-representational embodied cognition ­ one that refines and critically synthesizes the main insights of the enactivist and ecological traditions. Hutto and Myin argue that once unified replacement approaches have all that is needed to do the necessary enriching work. In making their case Hutto and Myin highlight a recognized danger ­ call it the Retention Worry ­ that many applications of embodied, enactive cognition, (with headline cases in psychology, psychiatry and sports science) are missing the point. The Retention Worry arises for any account of embodied cognition that retains too much traditional thinking about the role of mental representations in cognition, for such accounts fail to successfully motivate any role for the body or environment, let alone the one identified in the research]. Only by clarifying what, if any, role representations play in cognitive science explanations will we gain a deeper and clearer understanding of the nature of embodied cognition.

This workshop is organized as part of Lucas Thorpe’s Tubitak project: Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action.

The proposed chapter structure of the book can be found below the fold:

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Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 30, 2015 at 12:40 pm

2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science, April 19, Sunday, 2015, ODTU (METU), Ankara.

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Dear colleagues,
ISBCS 2015, the 2nd International Symposium on Brain and Cognitive Science,
is going to be held in April 19, Sunday, 2015, at ODTU (METU), Ankara.

ISBCS wants to be a gathering in Turkey for cogsci researchers worldwide, and for cogsci researchers in Turkey. Read the rest of this entry »

Written by István Aranyosi

January 15, 2015 at 11:14 am

Philosophy/Cog-Sci Reading Group: Concepts and Beliefs, from Perception to Action (Wednesdays, 17.15-19.00, Bogazici University, TB365)

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As part of a three year Tubitak 1001 project on “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” we will be running a weekly reading group, that will meet on Wednesdays from 17.15-18.00 in TB365 at Bogazici University. If you would like to participate and be added to our mailing list (and receive copies of the readings) please contact Merve Tapinc (mrvtpn@gmail.com)

Hopefully we will have a website for the project up and running in a month or so.

The schedule for the first 5 weeks of the reading group will be as follows:

(1) September 24th, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83

(2) October, 1st, 2014
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis, ‘Concepts and Cognitive Science’ in Concepts: Core Readings, Edited by Eric Margolis and Stephen Laurence, MIT Press (1999), pp. 3-83 (continued)

(3) October 8th, 2014
Lawrence and Margolis (cont.)

(4) October 15th, 2014
James Gibson, The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, LEA Publishers, 1979

(5) October 22nd, 2014
Gibson (cont.)



Written by Lucas Thorpe

September 11, 2014 at 2:49 pm

Talk at Yeditepe by Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Sehir) on “Consciousness and Misrepresentation” (21/03/2014)

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“Consciousness and Misrepresentation”

by Assist. Prof. Dr. Sinem Elkatip Hatipoğlu (Şehir University), on March 21, at 16.00, in Law Building Room 332.

Abstract: No one denies that we humans differ significantly from what one might call our cognitive relatives, i.e. complex machines such as robots or other forms of living beings. However what marks the difference is difficult to pin down. Consciousness has been taken to be one of the best candidates to account for this difference but an account of consciousness is just as difficult to give. In this talk I focus on one particular theory of consciousness, viz. the higher-order theory of consciousness and a troubling aspect of this theory. Higher-order theories assert that a mental state is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of that mental state. For instance the perception of a blue chair is conscious when there is a higher-order representation of the perception. But since representations are not infallible, higher-order theorists embrace the possibility of having a conscious perception of a blue chair where there is a perception of a red chair or even where there is no perception. The former is usually called a misrepresentation and the latter radical misrepresentation. Even though higher-order theories have many virtues, I suggest that the possibility of a radical misrepresentation undermines some of those virtues. As such either the possibility of a radical misrepresentation needs to be denied or the phenomenon of a radical misrepresentation needs to be understood in a different way.

Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 19, 2014 at 6:28 pm

Talk at Bogazici: Ivan Soll (Wisconsin-Madison) on “In Praise of Illusion.” 18/07/2013

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Professor Ivan Soll (Wisconsin-Madison) will give a talk at Bogazici University on Thursday 18/07/2013, in TB130 from 5-7pm. Everyone welcome.

“In Praise of Illusion.” 

ABSTRACT: A wide ranging discussion of various attitudes to illusions, both perceptual and intellectual, in Descartes, the Empiricists, Kant, Schopenhauer, 20th century aesthetic theory, and Nietzsche, and including my own views about the matter.


Written by Lucas Thorpe

July 14, 2013 at 8:38 pm

Two-Day Conference on Neurology, Philosophy of Biology, and Artificial Intelligence, organized by Koç University Philosophy Department (Venue: Beyoglu – RCAC)

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  • Speakers include but are not limited to: Bernard Stiegler (Université de Technologie Compiègne), Alva Noë (University of California, Berkeley), Barry Smith (University of London), and Güven Güzeldere (Harvard University)Poster

Conference Program

May 25th  Saturday

9.30 Opening

9.45-11.45 First Session

  Hilmi Demir: “A Recent History of Philosophy of Mind: Convergence Points between Cognitive Sciences and Phenomenology”

 Barış Korkmaz: “Self: Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis”

Aziz Zambak: “Plasticity: The Forgotten Principle in Artificial Intelligence”

11:45-12:00 Coffee Break

12:00-13:00  Second Session

Bernard Stiegler: “From Neuropower to Noopolitics”

13:00-14:30 Lunch Break

14:30:16:30 Third Session

Patrick Roney: “Neuro-aesthetics”

Zeynep Direk: “Neuroethics and the question of alterity”

Stephen Voss: “What do I mean when I say I”

May 26th Sunday

 9:30-10:30 First Session

Alva Noë: “The Fragile Manifest: Presence in Thought and Experience”

10:30-10:45 Coffee Break 

10:45-12:45 Second Session

Barry Smith: “Are Flavours in the Brain? The Phenomenology and Neuroscience of Flavour Perception”

Güven Güzeldere: “Unity of Consciousness in a Divided Brain?” 

 12:45-14:30 Lunch Break

14:30-16:30 Third Session

Fuat Balcı: “Reward Maximization: The Role of Time and its Psychophysics”

Emrah Aktunç: “On Bickle’s ‘Ruthless Reductionism in Cellular/Molecular Neuroscience: What are they Reducing?”

Hakan Gürvit: “Plasticity: Via Regia to the Neuroscientific Subjectivity”

Venue: Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations – Beyoglu

Venue Map

TALK: Siyaves Azeri (Queens, Canada) on “Conceptual Cognitive Organs: Toward a Historical Materialist Theory of Scientific Knowledge”, 17/12/2012

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Siyaves Azeri (Queens, Canada) will give a talk at Bogazici on Monday, December 17th from 5-7pm in TB130.

“Conceptual Cognitive Organs: Toward a Historical Materialist Theory of Scientific Knowledge”

ABSTRACT: The relation between scientific concepts and reality cannot be satisfactorily explained unless the empiricist supposition that dramatically differentiates “appearance” and “reality” is dropped. Concepts are components of sign systems, which function as tools of cognitive activity. Conceptual cognition, qualitatively speaking, is not different than perceptual cognition. Concepts are extensions of human sense organs. They are particular higher cognitive organs the function of which is cognitive activity.
Unlike empiricists that locate perception and cognition in human mind, Vygotsky’s historical approach locates perception and cognition outside the psyche or consciousness. It is the degree of abstraction and generalization that differentiates between perceptual and cognitive activities and between different forms of cognition. Scientific concepts and conceptual systems (theories) appear to be a particular form of higher mental activity. They are cognitive tools that provide the ability of systematic cognition of phenomena, which are not available to the grasp of ordinary sense organs. They are tools of scientific “groping” of phenomena. Scientific concepts free perceptual and cognitive activity from determination of “biological” sense organs by providing a high degree of cognitive abstraction and generalization. Scientific cognition, like perceptual activity, is actualized by consciousness but outside the consciousness.

Keywords: Activity, cognition, concept, consciousness, empiricism, reality, science, theory, Vygotsky

Written by Lucas Thorpe

December 13, 2012 at 7:31 pm

Istanbul Technical University Talk (23.10 at 13:00). Zsolt Bátori (Budapest University of Technology and Economics). Philosophy of Perception Meets photography

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“Philosophy of Perception Meets Photography”
Zsolt Bátori
Budapest University of Technology and Economics

23.10. 2012, Tuesday, 13.00

Istanbul technical University

Faculty of Science and Letters

Department of Humanities and Social Science, Seminar Room

In this paper I consider an important aspect of photographic realism that is strongly connected to the debate over photographic transparency, and to the question of what types of processes are to be considered perception proper. Photographic transparency theory holds that in photographs we see the scene photographed as we see objects through eyeglasses or in mirrors. I discuss some of the major arguments for and against transparency, and then I argue that formulating a position first requires an explication of one’s position about the nature of perception (seeing). In order to show what decisions one must make to arrive at a position about seeing, I consider beings with perceptual systems more or less different from ours. This discussion not only enables us to see how relative our notion of photographic realism is to our specific visual capacities, but it also helps to explicitly formulate a position about what conditions one might or might not consider necessary for seeing.! Although I do not argue for or against any of these specific conditions here, my considerations show through what steps the transparency debate may be resolved. This discussion also sheds some light on how to proceed when arguing for or against the (proper) perceptual status of specific perceptual mechanisms.

Written by Barry Stocker

October 21, 2012 at 10:05 pm

Is “to immediately perceive” a split infinitive?

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Stylists and editors really don’t like split infinitives such as “to boldly go”. I’ve been revising a paper on Reid’s account of colour perception and I sometimes use the expression “to immediately perceive”. So, for example, I will talk about “the capacity to immediately perceive” certain qualities.  The editors have suggested that I don’t use “to immediately perceive” as it is a split infinitive.

I’m not sure, however, that “to immediately perceive” is a split infinitive. Here’s my thinking: We talk about immediate perception and indirect perception. I’m not sure that there is such a thing as indirect perception, but in order to deny the fact that there is such a thing as indirect perception, we have to allow the expression “indirect perception” into our language. So I have no problem with the expression. Anyway my worry is that if we think that “to immediately perceive” is a split infinitive, then we should say “to perceive immediately” and “to perceive indirectly”. This would suggest, however, that “perceiving p immediately” and “perceiving p indirectly” are two ways of doing the same thing. And this doesn’t seem right to me. I think these are two quite distinct types of attitudes towards p. So my thought is that there are really two quite distinct verbs here: “to immediately perceive” and “to indirectly perceive”. “Immediately” here is not really functioning as an adverb. We can distinguish between how and what questions. And I think the “immediately” in “to immediately perceive” is part of the answer to a what question, rather than the full answer to a how question? Q: What is he doing? A: He is immediately perceiving a particular quality. As opposed to: Q: How is she perceiving the quality? A: immediately.

So I’d to keep the expression “to immediately perceive”. Any thoughts here? Have I been living abroad for too long and lost my intuitions about what counts as correct English?

Written by Lucas Thorpe

October 15, 2012 at 12:31 pm