We will continue with our Kant reading group at Boğaziçi this semester, meeting on Wednesdays from 5.15-7pm in the new Philosophy Department Seminar Room, JF 507. (This is on the top floor of John Freely Hall) .
We will start this Wednesday (15/02/2017) by finishing reading the Doctrine of Method of the Critique of Pure Reason. Starting where we left off last semester (A832/B860). Once we have finished this we will read some secondary literature on the Critique of Pure Reason. Everyone is welcome.
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The reading group is jointly organised by Lucas Thorpe and Ken Westphal. This reading group is part of the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project AF140071 “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government” run by Lucas Thorpe (Boğaziçi) and Sasha Mudd (Southampton) and Lucas Thorpe’s Bogazici University BAP project 9320
We will continue with our cog-sci/philosophy reading group at Boğaziçi this semester, meeting on Tuesdays from 5.15-7pm in the new Philosophy Department Seminar Room, JF 507. (This is on the top floor of John Freely Hall) .
We will start this Tuesday (14/02/2017) by reading:
Mark Steedman, “Plans, Affordances and Combinatory Grammar“, Linguistics and Philosophy, December 2002, Volume 25, Issue 5, pp 723–753.
If you would like to be added to our mailing list, please email Duygu at: firstname.lastname@example.org
Support for this reading group is provided by Lucas Thorpe’s TÜBİTAK project “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” ( 114K348).
Talk at Boğaziçi: Frank Zenker (Lund) on ‘Using conceptual spaces to exhibit conceptual continuity through scientific theory change’(Thursday, 16/02/2017)
Frank Zenker (Lund) will speak on ‘Using conceptual spaces to exhibit conceptual continuity through scientific theory change’. Thursday, 16 Feb. (2107), 5–7pm
in (new!) Boğaziçi University, Philosophy Department Seminar Room JF 507
Talk at Boğaziçi: Cansu Canca (Hong Kong) on “What Should Kant Have Said? A Kantian Argument against the Prohibition of a Kidney Market” (Friday, 10/02/2017)
Cansu Canca (Department of Philosophy – School of Humanities Medical Ethics and Humanities Unit – Faculty of Medicine University of Hong Kong) will speak on ‘What Should Kant Have Said? A Kantian Argument against the Prohibition of a Kidney Market’ Friday, 10 Feb. 5–7pm in room JF 507–508. Everyone welcome.
Philosophy Talk at Istanbul University: Michael N. Forster (Bonn/Chicago): “The Revolution in Philosophy of Language, Hermeneutics, Translation Theory, and Linguistics at the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the Nineteenth”(15/12/2016)
Prof. Dr. Michael N. Forster (Bonn/Chicago) will give a talk at the philosophy department at Istanbul University, starting at 5pm on Thursday 15/12/2016. The talk will be held in Felsefe İhtisas Kitaplığı (203). This is in Edebiyat Fakültesi, Felsefe Bölümü, Laleli (Vezneciler). The building is almost opposite the Vezneciler Metro Station.
Michael Forster (Bonn/Chicago):
“The Revolution in Philosophy of Language, Hermeneutics, Translation Theory, and Linguistics at the End of the Eighteenth Century and the Beginning of the Nineteenth”
NOTE CHANGE OF VENUE: ALL TALKS IN NH203. (North Campus).
The Second Annual Arda Denkel Memorial Conference
All talks held in NH203. Everyone welcome.
12.50-13.00 Introduction: Stephen Voss (Philosophy, Boğaziçi)
13.00-14.10 Bill Wringe (Philosophy, Bilkent)
“Things We Can Get Excited About: Shared Emotions and Other Minds”
14.10-15.20 Terry T. Eskenazi (Psycology, Koc)
“Social Influence and Metacognition.”
15.30-16.40 Michael Schmitz (Philosophy, Vienna)
“Joint Attention and Understanding Others”
16.40-17.50 Gaye Soley (Psychology, Boğaziçi)
“Children’s representations of social groups”
18.00 Dinner: BUMED
13.00-14.10 Lucas Thorpe (Philosophy, Boğaziçi)
“Why should a Kantian care about Social Cognition?”
14.10-15.20 Annette Hohenberger (Cog-Sci, ODTU)
“Effects of joint action on timing and co-representation: Explorations with the social Simon Task
15.30-16.40 Angelica Kaufman. (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen. Lichtenberg- Kolleg/Leibniz Institute for Primate Research)
16.40-17.50 Jedediah Allen (Psychology, Bilkent)
“An action-based approach to social cognition”
18.00 Dinner: Bakar
Support for this event was provided by Lucas Thorpe’s TÜBİTAK project “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” ( 114K348) and by the Boğaziçi University Rector’s Conference support fund.
Vilius Dranseika at Boğaziçi on “Proper names, rigid designation, and empirical studies on transtemporal identity judgments” (06/12/2016)
Vilius Dranseika (Vilnius) will give a talk at Boğaziçi on “Proper names, rigid designation, and empirical studies on transtemporal identity judgments” on Tuesday 06/12/21016 at 5pm in TB130. Everyone welcome.
ABSTRACT: A common tripartite strategy employed in empirical studies on folk concept of personal identity goes as follows: First, describe a hypothetical transformation (e.g. amnesia, brain transplantation, reincarnation, PVS, change of moral character). Second, check whether the study participants judge post-transformation individual to be identical to the pre-transformation individual. This is most often done by checking whether study participants refer to the post-transformation individual by the name that was originally introduced to refer to the pre-transformation individual. Third, use these data to draw conclusions about identity criterion(-ia) employed by the folk. For example, if transformation involves loss of all autobiographical memory, but participants still use the same personal name, conclusion is made that autobiographical memory is not considered by the participants to be necessary for identity preservation.
In this paper I discuss the most common version of the second step of this strategy. Namely, methodological assumption that participants’ use of personal names is indicative of their judgments about numerical identity of individuals. Depending on the study, this assumption is employed as one (sometimes both) of these two inferential strands:
In this paper I claim that neither of these two strands can be used to draw reliable conclusions about folk judgments of numerical identity. I also claim that neither of these two strands can be sufficiently justified by appeal to the Kripkean notion of rigidity (which is a standard move in psychological literature in question).