Further details can be found here. Everyone welcome.
WORKSHOP ON THEORIES OF CAUSALITY AND OCCASIONALISM
June, 2nd 2015-Tuesday, İbrahim Bodur Salonu (Boğaziçi University, South Campus)
10.00-10.10 Opening Remarks, Nazif Muhtaroğlu
10.10-10.20 Welcoming Remarks, Chryssi Sidiropoulou
- Session-Occasionalism and Causation in Islamic Philosophy
10.20-11.40 “Natural Causality: Views of Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites,” Muhammad Basil Altaie (Physics Department-Yarmouk University, Jordan)
11.40-12.00 Coffee Break
12.00-13.20 “Efficient Causation and Continued Existence in Kalam, Avicenna and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi,” Ayman Shihadeh (Department of the Near and Middle East-SOAS, University of London, UK)
13.20-14.50 Lunch Break
14.50-16.10 “Occasionalism and The Evolutionary Causal Process,” Alparslan Açıkgenç (Philosophy Department, Yıldız Technical University)
16.10-16.30 Coffee Break
- Session – Occasionalism and Causation among the Scholastics
16.30-17.50 “Suarez on Divine Efficient Causation,” Jeffrey McDonough (Philosophy Department, Harvard University, USA)
June, 4nd 2015-Thursday, İbrahim Bodur Salonu (Boğaziçi University, South Campus)
- Session- Occasionalism and Causation in Early Modern Philosophy
10.00-11.20 “The Causal Theories and Occasionalism among the Continental Rationalists,” Brandon Look (Philosophy Department, University of Kentucky, USA)
11.20-11.40 Coffee Break
11.40-13.00 “Malebranche’s Occasionalism and British Empiricists,” Nazif Muhtaroğlu (Philosophy Department, Boğaziçi University)
13.10-14.30 Lunch Break
- Session- Contemporary Theories of Causality and Occasionalism
14.30-15.50 “Prominent Theories of Causality Today,” Douglas Kutach (Philosophy Department, University of West Indies-Mona, Jamaica)
15.50-16.10 Coffee Break
16.10-17.30 “Current Approaches to Causality and Occasionalism”
Edward Moad (Philosophy Department, Qatar University)
CONFERENCE ON THEORIES OF CAUSALITY AND OCCASIONALISM
June, 6th 2015-Saturday, İbrahim Bodur Salonu (Boğaziçi University, South Campus)
8.40-8.50 Opening Remarks, Nazif Muhtaroğlu
8.50-9.00 Welcoming Remarks, Chryssi Sidiropoulou
- Session-Occasionalism and Causation in Islamic Philosophy
9.00-9.25 “Causality: An Analysis of the Views of the Mu’tazilites and the Ash’arites,” M. Basil Altaie (Yarmouk)
9.30-9.55 “The Emanation Theory, Mere Conservationism and Occasionalism,” Davlat Dadikhuda (McGill)
10.00-10.25 “How Effective is the Comparison between Malebranche’s Occasionalist Causation and Dogen’s Soto Zen Buddhist Practice? (in the light of another pair of comparison: Scholastics’ Concurrentism and Rinzai Zen Practice),” Takaharu Oda (Edinburgh)
10.25-10.35 Coffee Break
10.35-11.25 The Discussion of the First Session
11.25-11.45 Coffee Break
- Session-Occasionalism and Causation in Modern Philosophy
11.45-12.10 “Creatures that Cause? Pre-established Harmony and Occasionalism” Paul Martin (Ohio)
12.15-12.40 “Spinoza’s Pantheism and Malebranche’s Occasionalism” Brandon Look (Kentucky)
12.45-1.10 “Berkeley’s Rejection of Occasionalism” Jeffrey McDonough (Harvard)
1.15-1.40 “Hume, Kant and Al-Ghazali on the Universal Principle of Causality” Nazif Muhtaroğlu (Boğaziçi)
1.40-2.50 Lunch Break
2.50-3.40 The Discussion of the Second Session
3.40-3.50 Coffee Break
- Session-Occasionalism and Causation in Contemporary Philosophy
3.50-4.15 “How A Contemporary Theory of Fundamental Physics Supports Occasionalism” Douglas Kutach (West Indies)
4.20-4.45 “Regularity and Counterfactual Theories of Causation in Relation to Occasionalism” Edward Moad (Qatar)
4.50-5.15 “Knowledge, Minds and Causal Efficacy” Bruce Katz (Independent)
5.25-6.20 The Discussion of the Third Session
June, 7th 2015-Sunday, İbrahim Bodur Salonu (Boğaziçi University, South Campus)
9.00-9.50 “Does Causal Dispositionalism Make Room for Occasionalism?” Anna Marmodoro (Oxford)
- Session-Occasionalism and Quantum Mechanics
10.00-10.25 “Reviving Kalam Occasionalism by ways of Quantum Gravity and Unified Theories” Mehmet Bulgen (Marmara)
10.30-10.55 “Causality in Quantum Mechanics: A New Perspective” M. Basil Altaie (Yarmouk)
11.00-11.25 “How Quantum Mechanics Supports Occasionalism” Douglas Kutach (West Indies)
11.30-11.55 “Quantum Occasionalism” Vasil Dinev Penchev (Bulgarian Academy of Sciences)
11.55-12.10 Coffee Break
12.10-1.00 The Discussion of the Fourth Session
Daniel Hutto will give a talk at Bogazici in TB130 entitled “Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal” on Monday June 8th from 5-7pm. Everyone is welcome. Details on how to get to Bogazici by metro can be found here. And here’s a video showing how to find the TB building.
Daniel Hutto is the author of many books, including, Narrative and Folk Psychology (2009, editor), Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (2007), Narrative and Understanding Persons (2007, editor), Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy (2006), Beyond Physicalism (2000).
His latest book, written together with Erik Myin is Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (2012). Prof. Hutto and Prof. Myin will be presenting a draft of their new manuscript at a conference at Bogazici from June 9-11, 2015. Details of this conference can be found here.
Abstract: This paper distinguishes a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism in an attempt to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former. Here is how the action unfolds. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment – the central tenet – of all Strong Narrativist proposals, those that posit a necessary link between self-shaping (or self-constitution) and implicit Narrativizing. Section three reminds the reader of Strawson’s (2004a) challenge to Strong Narrativism. It is revealed that Strawson’s objections are most effective if they target Strong Narrativism’s central tenet construed as phenomenological revelation about what is necessary for self-experience and not merely the psychological Narrativity thesis, construed as an empirical hypothesis about typical Narrativizing proclivities. Having set the stage, section four critically examines two different strategies, pursued by Rudd (2012) and Schechtman (2007) respectively, for escaping the horns Strawson’s dilemma poses for Strong Narrativism. In the end both strategies invoke the notion of implicit Narrativizing at a crucial juncture. Section five reveals that a substantive proposal about what implicit Narrativizing might be is lacking, hence we have no reason to believe that it actually occurs. It is concluded that, as things stand, Strong Narrativism has no way of avoiding the horns of Strawson’s dilemma. The brief concluding remarks of the final section are a reminder why, despite their modesty, softer versions of the NSSH – when coupled with a developmental proposal about the narrative basis of our folk psychological competence – are non-trivial and worthy of further development and investigation.”
More Info: In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences on Narrativity, Interpretation and Responsibility (other contributors include Daniel C. Dennett and Marya Schechtman). The final publication is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s11097-014-9352-4
Support for this workshop was provided by BAP project 9320, ‘Kant on Character, Virtue and Impossible Ideals’.
Conference at Boğaziçi: Enriching Embodied Cognition, with Dan Hutto (Wollongong) and Erik Myin (Antwerp). 9-11/06/2015
Enriching Embodied Cognition
With Daniel Hutto (Wollongong) and Erik Myin (Antwerp)
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
Demir Demirgil Salonu
June 9th-11th, 2015
A video of how to find the Demir Demirgil Salonu once on campus can be found here.
Directions explaining how to get to Boğaziçi University by metro can be found here.
I have Inserted links to some of the talks into the program below and will add links to new papers if and when I receive them. Everyone welcome!
Tuesday 9th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “REC: Revolution Effected via Clarification”
11:30- 1:00 Erik Myin: “Radicals Assembled: The Case of Perceiving”
2:30-3:30 Anita Leirfall (Bergen, Philosophy) “A Proto-Proprioceptive Affected Causal Power of Thinking?
Kant on the Directions of Mind”
3:30-4:30 Victor Laughlin (Antwerp, Philosophy) “Anticipatory Mechanisms, the Hard Problem of Content
5:00-6:00 Matthew Jernberg (Bogazici, Philosophy) “Reformulating the Coupling-Constitution Fallacy”
Wednesday 10th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “An Overly Enactive Imagination?”
11:30- 1:00 Daniel Hutto & Erik Myin: “Extensive Minds”
2:30-3:30 Bill Wringe (Bilkent, Philosophy) “Some Worries about Embodied Imagination.”
3:30-4:30 Istvan Aranyosi (Bilkent, Philosophy) “Extensive Pain”
5:00-6:00 Annette Hohenberger (METU, Cog-Sci) “When is Cognition Embodied or Disembodied?
Evidence from Behavioral Discontinuities.”
Thursday 11th of June 2015
10:00-11:20 Daniel Hutto: “The Natural Origins of Content”
11:30- 1:00 Erik Myin: “Radically Enactive Computation: Reasoning tis but RECkoning”
2:30-3:30 David Davenport (Bilkent, Computer Engineering) “”Not Content? Think(ing) Computation!”
3:30-4:30 Mathew Harvey (Southern Denmark, Philosophy) “Language without Representations”
5:00-6:00 Jasper Van Den Herik (Rotterdam, Philosophy) “Getting Real About Words”
Support for this conference was provided by BAP project 9320, “Kant n Character, Virtue and Impossible Ideals” and Tubitak Project 114k348 “Concepts and Belief: From Perception to Action”.
Workshop in Istanbul on “Seeing and Disjunctivism” with Sofia Miguens and Charles Travis (22/05/2015)
Koç University Philosophy Department Presents
Seeing & Disjunctivism
with Sofia Miguens and Charles Travis
on Friday May 22nd, 14:30 – 18:00
at Research Center for Anatolian Civilizations, İstiklal Cad. No:181, Beyoğlu
[Please note that the event will take place off campus.]
“Is seeing judging? Conceptions of perceptual experience and motivations for disjunctivism”
Sofia Miguens- University of Porto
Abstract: In order to assess commitments of different uses of the notion of representation in conceiving of perceptual experience I focus on the John McDowell-Tyler Burge controversy over disjunctivism and perceptual psychology (Burge 2005, McDowell 2011, Burge 2011, McDowell 2013 a, McDowell 2013b; also Burge 2003). Going through McDowell’s responses to Burge I analyse motivations for disjunctivism and discuss some claims, both tenable and untenable, that seeing (or experiencing, in general) is judging.
“The Room in a View”
Charles Travis- King’s College London & University of Porto
Abstract: Between 1946 and 1949 Wittgenstein took up the topic of seeing-as for a second time (the first in the Tractatus). This time it is interwoven with discussions of many more parts of mental life. Why the interest? And why the setting? Two motives: 1) to correct the Tractatus’ mistaken view (of seeing-as, and of representation) 2) to explore the work of meeting Frege’s challenge: in an account of mental life, always to respect the essential publicity of thought. Two lessons which emerge: 1) the importance of distinguishing two forms of authority: expert and executive. 2) Motivations for ‘disjunctivism’ (not that Wittgenstein was a disjunctivist). A third: the importance of what Frege saw and young Wittgenstein missed.
Normativity in Action
1st Southampton-Boğaziçi Workshop on Agency and Autonomy
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
Saturday, May 16th, 2015
Ibrahim Bodur Oditoryumu
1pm – 6pm
1.00 – 2.30 Jack Woods (Bilkent) “Footing the Costs (of Normative Subjectivism)”
Respondent: Ville Paukkonen (Helsinki)
Chair: Merve Tapınç (Boğaziçi)
4pm- 4.30 Coffee Break
6.00-7.30 – Drinks at Keçi
Funding for this Workshop was provided by the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project AF140071 “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government” run by Lucas Thorpe (Boğaziçi) and Sasha Mudd (Southampton).
Call For Abstracts: Enriching Embodied Cognition
Boğaziçi University, Istanbul
June 9th-11th, 2015
This workshop will be centered around material for the manuscript of Hutto and Myin’s latest book, Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework, which is a follow-up to their 2013 book Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content.
Articles and draft material will be circulated to the participants in advance, and in the morning sessions Hutto and Myin will present and discuss core arguments with the participants. In the afternoon participants will present papers. These papers should be on themes discussed in the book, but do not have to be direct responses to Hutto and Myin’s work. If you would be interested in presenting a paper at the workshop, please send a short abstract to firstname.lastname@example.org by April 20th. Successful applicants will be informed by April 25th.
Enriching Embodied Cognition: A Unified Enactivist and Ecological Framework will provide an enriched understanding of embodied cognition: showing just how embodied it is and just how it is embodied. This book integrates what is best in the replacement approaches, advancing the sciences of the mind by providing a novel framework for non-representational embodied cognition one that refines and critically synthesizes the main insights of the enactivist and ecological traditions. Hutto and Myin argue that once unified replacement approaches have all that is needed to do the necessary enriching work. In making their case Hutto and Myin highlight a recognized danger call it the Retention Worry that many applications of embodied, enactive cognition, (with headline cases in psychology, psychiatry and sports science) are missing the point. The Retention Worry arises for any account of embodied cognition that retains too much traditional thinking about the role of mental representations in cognition, for such accounts fail to successfully motivate any role for the body or environment, let alone the one identified in the research]. Only by clarifying what, if any, role representations play in cognitive science explanations will we gain a deeper and clearer understanding of the nature of embodied cognition.
This workshop is organized as part of Lucas Thorpe’s Tubitak project: Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action.
The proposed chapter structure of the book can be found below the fold: