Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Archive for December 2017

III. METU UNDERGRADUATE PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCE, APRIL 14-15 2018/ 3. ODTÜ LİSANS ÖĞRENCİLERİ FELSEFE KONGRESİ, 14-15 NISAN 2018

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III. METU Undergraduate Philosophy Conference 2018 /3. ODTÜ LİSANS ÖĞRENCİLERİ FELSEFE KONGRESİ
April 14-15th, 2018/ 14-15 Nisan 2018
B14, Social Sciences Building, METU

DEADLINE FOR ABSTRACT SUBMISSION/ÖZETLER İÇİN SON TESLİM TARİHİ:
15th February 2018 (800-1000 words)/15 ŞUBAT 2018 (800-1000 keli me)

DATE OF NOTIFICATION/SONUÇLARIN AÇIKLANMA
TARİHI: 1st March 2018/ 1 Mart 2018

LANGUAGE: English or Turkish.

SUBMISSION PAGE:
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=mupc2018

ÖZETLERİN GÖNDERİLECEĞİ ADRES
https://easychair.org/conferences/?conf=mupc2018

LOCATION/ YER:
B14 Amfisi,
Sosyal Bilimler Binası, ODTÜ

For more information/ DETAYLI BİLGİ İÇİN:
lisanskongre.phil.metu.edu.tr

CONTACT/ İLETİŞİM:
Serdal TÜMKAYA
Rasearch Asssistant
Philosophy Department
Social Sciences Building / Z39 / METU
Phone: +90 312 210 59 47
http://metu.academia.edu/serdaltumkaya

Written by Serife Tekin

December 28, 2017 at 6:00 pm

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Talk at Bilkent: Saniye Vatansever

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“Kant’s Response to Hume in the Second Analogy: A Critique of Buchdahl’s and Friedman’s Accounts”

Saniye Vatansever (Yeditepe, Philosophy)

Wednesday 20th December, 2017, 1640-1745, H-232

Kant

Abstract: While commentators mostly agree that in the Second Analogy Kant responds to the “Humean problem,” there is not yet an agreement on exactly which Humean problem he aims to solve. L.W. Beck, Gerd Buchdahl, Graham Bird and Henry Allison, among others, argue that the Second Analogy addresses Hume’s “problem of causation,” which is a problem concerning the justification of the concept of causation and the Causal Principle. In this paper, I focus particularly on Buchdahl’s interpretation of the Second Analogy, to which I refer as the “modest reading” because on his reading the Second Analogy has a modest goal of solving only Hume’s problem of causation. In response to Buchdahl’s modest reading,Michael Friedman, among others, argues for the “strong reading” of the Second Analogy, according to which Kant addresses not only Hume’s problem of causation, but also the problem of induction. The problem of induction is a problem about the validity of inductive inferences and a satisfactory solution to it requires demonstration of the validity of the principle of the uniformity of nature.In contrast with Buchdahl’s and Friedman’s influential readings, which view the Second Analogy as addressing one or the other of the Humean problems, I argue that the Second Analogy achieves more than addressing the problem of causation,and yet falls short of solving the problem of induction. The alternative reading I offer consists of the following three theses (i) contra Buchdahl, the Second Analogy argument proves both the necessity of the Causal Principle and the existence of its particular determinations, i.e., necessary empirical causal laws; (ii) contra Buchdahl and Friedman, empirical laws express two different kinds of necessity that are not reducible to each other; and finally, (iii) contra Friedman,even though the Second Analogy proves the existence of (necessary and strictly universal) empirical laws, it does not establish the uniformity of nature, which in turn means that the Second Analogy argument does not solve Hume’s problem of induction.

Written by Sandrine Berges

December 18, 2017 at 10:35 am

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Şehir Philosophy Talks 35// Nihat Ülner

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psychologTalks35y-1

Written by metindemirsehir

December 14, 2017 at 3:53 pm

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Talk by Baver Demircan at Koç (CANCELLED)

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The following event was announced a few days ago. Unfortunately, due to our speaker’s health situation, it had to be cancelled.

Baver Demircan (Üsküdar University)

“Being and Thought in Hegel”

Friday, December 15, 14:00-16:00, 2017, CSSH SOS 104, Koç University

Organized by the Philosophy Department of Koç University

Abstract:

The Hegelian Logic provides the conceptual – categorical structure of natural and spiritual processes. Nature and Spirit are more advanced determinations of this logical structure. The categories in the Logic do not belong to our intellect, even if their dialectical correlations are described as pure thought-determinations (forms) by and in the mind. It is Being that deduces dialectically the categories from one another in its development; and when the development in the Logic is completed, it becomes manifest that Being is nothing other than the Idea as such (the logical Idea). The idea as such develops and realizes itself as Nature or natural processes, and returns to itself as the sphere of Spirit by mediating itself with Nature. If we consider the Logic as the universal of the development process of the Hegelian substance, that is to say, if we take it as the in-itself (an sich) of this development process, its existence is for us and the subject of reflection. In other words, as the onto-logical structure of the whole system it is exposed by the act of reflection, but it is the development of such an onto-logical structure as natural and spiritual processes that grounds its exposition by and in the mind. The logic constitutes the in-itself of the actuality – of the process of being itself of the Hegelian substance. But it is also the self (selbst) of this development process, since the natural and spiritual processes are conceptually exposed through the categories as the totality of dialectically deduced thought-determinations by the act of reflection. Therefore, two aspects of the Hegelian logic have to be taken in consideration on the basis of the distinction and relation between in-itself (an sich) and self (selbst) of the Hegelian substance. In this speech, we are going to give our own rationale for not treating the Hegelian logic as a transcendental logic.

Written by Erhan Demircioglu

December 12, 2017 at 2:26 pm

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Talk by Michelle Adams at Bilkent, 15 December (NSC/Psychology)

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Michelle Adams (Bilkent, NSC/Psychology)

“Cognitive Aging and its Relationship to Neuronal Structure and Function

Friday, 15th December, 2017, 1240 – 1330, A-130

Organized by the Mind, Brain and Behavior Research Group at Bilkent University.

Michelle_Adams_Poster-01

Abstract: Normal aging is accompanied by a range of biological changes that diminish quality of life. Understanding the changes contributing to memory decline is important for developing strategies to prevent or lessen cognitive problems. What are the specific changes that take place during aging which lead to decrements in neural function? What are the intrinsic biological determinants of those changes? What factors can ameliorate these changes? I will present data from the laboratory examining the neural consequences of aging on behavior and the brain. In addition, I will discuss the effects of an intervention, caloric restriction, which alters the course of neural aging.

About the Speaker: Dr. Adams received her PhD in Neuroscience in 2001 from the New York University – Mount Sinai School of Medicine.  Her PhD work focused on the relationship among brain aging, cognitive decline, estrogen, and glutamate receptors.  Dr. Adams did a postdoctoral fellowship at the HHMI in Brown/MIT examining the functional consequences of altering glutamate receptor levels and then in 2004 she went to the Neurobiology and Anatomy Department at Wake Forest University School of Medicine to study the effects of caloric restriction on synaptic glutamate receptors.  In 2005 Dr. Adams became an assistant professor at Wake Forest University and then in 2009 she moved to Bilkent University where she is currently an associate professor in the Psychology Department and director of the interdisciplinary graduate program in Neuroscience.

Written by Sandrine Berges

December 6, 2017 at 9:47 am

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Talk by Özlem Yilmaz (ITU) at Boğazici: “On Some Concepts of Plant Stress Physiology.” Thursday, 07/12/2017, 5pm.

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ozlem Yilmazozlem Yilmaz

Written by Lucas Thorpe

December 5, 2017 at 8:28 pm

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Sehir Uni Phil Talks 34 // Manuel Knoll

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Written by metindemirsehir

December 4, 2017 at 2:32 pm

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Workshop on “Action, Society and Normativity” at Boğaziçi (Friday, 8/12/2017)

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poster action society normativity (2107)

There will be a workshop at Boğaziçi this Friday (8/12/2017) from 1.30pm to 6pm on “Action, Society and Normativity”. All talks will take place in the John Freely Building (JF 507-8).

1.30- 3.00 Jeremy Koons (Georgetown, Qatar), “Can the Moral Point of View Be Defended Against Rational Egoism?”

3.00-4.30 Bill Wringe (Bilkent), “‘Collectivism, Consequentialism and Community: What Sellars Could and Should Have Said.”

4.30-6.00 Ken Westphal (Boğaziçi ) “Intelligible Possession, Justice and Social Ontology.”

 

ABSTRACT:  (for the talk by Jeremy Koons). Wilfrid Sellars was ambivalent as to the prospects of deriving the “reality…of an ethical community consisting of all rational beings” (SM 7.XX.144/p. 225), and hence vindicating the moral point of view—and particularly ambivalent that the moral point of view could be rationally justified vis-à-vis rational egoism (RE).  Sellars’s ambivalence reflects a common set of assumptions in analytic philosophy: either (a) that the moral point of view stands in opposition to self-interest, or (b) that the moral point of view must be justified by appeal to self-interest.  I think the prospects are rosier than he anticipated, and set out to prove the reality of this community—and hence to vindicate the moral point of view.  I argue that rational egoism (RE) cannot be established just by considering the nature of practical reason.  Nor does RE embody the most plausible theory of the good: an agent cannot consistently hold that her welfare is the only good (for her).  I will argue that central elements of rational agency are constituted by collective attitudes, which essentially depend on the community, its practices, and its attitudes.  Thus, rational agency itself cannot be understood apart from the community.  Nor can the agent’s welfare, autonomy, or other essential goods or capabilities—indeed, various essential elements of her identity.  Thus, there is no meaningful way to argue that an agent’s well-being matters, but the welfare of the community—that (partially) constitutes her agency, her welfare, and so on—does not matter.

 

Support for this workshop is provided by Lucas Thorpe’s TÜBİTAK project “Concepts and Beliefs: From Perception to Action” ( 114K348) and the joint Boğaziçi -Southampton Newton-Katip Çelebi project AF140071 “Agency and Autonomy: Kant and the Normative Foundations of Republican Self-Government” run by Lucas Thorpe (Boğaziçi) and Andrew Stephenson (Southampton) and Lucas Thorpe’s BAP project 9320.

 

Written by Lucas Thorpe

December 4, 2017 at 9:59 am

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Talk by Jeremy Koons at Bilkent 7 December

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“‘Ho hum, I’m being attacked by a bear’: How judgment is tied to concern and motivation”

Jeremy Koons (Georgetown University in Qatar, Philosophy)

Thursday 7th December, 2017, 1540-1715, H-232

walk-shadow-door-light

Abstract: A persistent problem in metaethics is the question of how to reconcile the cognitive and motivational elements of moral judgment. The lynchpin to the ‘moral problem’ is the Humean philosophy of mind, which holds that belief and desire are ‘distinct existences,’ and that both must be present to explain motivation. I attack the Humean theory of motivation from two directions. First, I argue that it presupposes a ‘formalist’ model of reasoning that has come under sustained attack from Brandom, Sellars, Lewis Carroll, and others. Second, I argue that in making moral (and other sorts of practical judgments), we take some feature of the world to be salient (and others not to be so). However, to see certain features as salient is already to make a judgment embodying various concerns, attitudes, and commitments; and hence, it is to make a judgment that is also essentially practical in nature (i.e., tied to intention and action).

Written by Sandrine Berges

December 4, 2017 at 8:59 am

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Applying to graduate programs: meeting for undergraduate students at Bilkent

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A meeting about applying to graduate programs in philosophy will be held
on Monday 4 December, between 12:40 and 13:30 in G160 at Bilkent University. In this meeting, Dr Jack Woods (Leeds) will talk about the nuts and bolts of the
application process and how to increase your chances of getting into a
graduate program in North America or Europe.

 

Written by Sandrine Berges

December 1, 2017 at 7:43 am

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