Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Daniel Hutto at Bogazici: “Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal” (8/06/2015)

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Hutto talk

Daniel Hutto will give a talk at Bogazici in TB130 entitled “Narrative Self-Shaping: A Modest Proposal”  on Monday June 8th from 5-7pm. Everyone is welcome. Details on how to get to Bogazici by metro can be found here. And here’s a video showing how to find the TB building.

Daniel Hutto is the author of many books, including, Narrative and Folk Psychology (2009, editor), Folk Psychological Narratives: The Sociocultural Basis of Understanding Reasons (2007), Narrative and Understanding Persons (2007, editor), Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy: Neither Theory nor Therapy (2006), Beyond Physicalism (2000).

His latest book, written together with Erik Myin is Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content (2012). Prof. Hutto and Prof. Myin will be presenting a draft of their new manuscript at a conference at Bogazici from June 9-11, 2015. Details of this conference can be found here.

Abstract: This paper distinguishes a modestly construed Narrative Self Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) from Strong Narrativism in an attempt to motivate devoting our intellectual energies to the former.  Here is how the action unfolds. Section one briefly introduces the notions of self-shaping and rehearses reasons for thinking that self-shaping, in a suitably tame form, is, at least to some extent, simply unavoidable for reflective beings. It is against this background that basic commitments of a modest Narrative Self-Shaping Hypothesis (or NSSH) are articulated. Section two identifies a foundational commitment – the central tenet – of all Strong Narrativist proposals, those that posit a necessary link between self-shaping (or self-constitution) and implicit Narrativizing. Section three reminds the reader of Strawson’s (2004a) challenge to Strong Narrativism. It is revealed that Strawson’s objections are most effective if they target Strong Narrativism’s central tenet construed as phenomenological revelation about what is necessary for self-experience and not merely the psychological Narrativity thesis, construed as an empirical hypothesis about typical Narrativizing proclivities. Having set the stage, section four critically examines two different strategies, pursued by Rudd (2012) and Schechtman (2007) respectively, for escaping the horns Strawson’s dilemma poses for Strong Narrativism. In the end both strategies invoke the notion of implicit Narrativizing at a crucial juncture. Section five reveals that a substantive proposal about what implicit Narrativizing might be is lacking, hence we have no reason to believe that it actually occurs. It is concluded that, as things stand, Strong Narrativism has no way of avoiding the horns of Strawson’s dilemma.  The brief concluding remarks of the final section are a reminder why, despite their modesty, softer versions of the NSSH – when coupled with a developmental proposal about the narrative basis of our folk psychological competence – are non-trivial and worthy of further development and investigation.”

More Info: In Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences on Narrativity, Interpretation and Responsibility (other contributors include Daniel C. Dennett and Marya Schechtman). The final publication is available at Springer via DOI: 10.1007/s11097-014-9352-4

Support for this workshop was provided by BAP project 9320, ‘Kant on Character, Virtue and Impossible Ideals’.

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Written by Lucas Thorpe

May 28, 2015 at 11:36 am

Posted in Uncategorized

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