Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Talk at Bogazici, Daniel Star (Boston University), “The Reasons of Virtue: A Reductive Epistemic Account”

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Friday, May 23rd, 5-7pm, TB 130 (Anderson Hall)
“The Reasons of Virtue: A Reductive Epistemic Account”
Is it possible to provide informative, non-circular analyses of individual practical virtues in terms of something prima facie distinct from virtue? It has been claimed, by committed consequentialists, that virtues are character states that systematically bring about the realization of good outcomes in the world. It has also been claimed, by neo-Aristotelians, that they are character states that, in particular ways, promote the flourishing of the individuals that possess them (although this is not always intended to be a reductive claim). The aim here is to defend a new, quite different kind of reductive analysis, one that takes off from Daniel Elstein and Thomas Hurka’s attempt to analyze individual virtues in terms of a non-ethical element and a ‘thin’ ethical element, viz. goodness. Partly through the examination of individual virtues, I contend that although Elstein and Hurka are on the right track, a better recipe for analyzing virtue might be provided by focusing primarily on normative reasons, instead of on goodness (this is an option that they appear somewhat amenable to). On what I have elsewhere argued is the correct account of normative reasons (reasons as evidence), it will further follow that the practical virtues are nearly entirely epistemic in nature. Some objections to and ramifications of the resulting view will be considered.
Daniel Star’s webpage

Written by markedwardsteen

May 1, 2014 at 11:22 am

Posted in Uncategorized

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