Hesperus is Bosphorus

A group blog by philosophers in and from Turkey

Talk at Bogazici: Adam Green (University of Innsbruck) “Knowledge as a Team Sport” (08/03/2013)

with one comment

Adam Green (University of Innsbruck) will be giving a talk on March 8th:

“Knowledge as a Team Sport”

Friday, 5-7pm, TB130

ABSTRACT: Virtue epistemology and credit theories of knowledge think about knowledge as a kind of achievement. Knowing is achieving a true belief through cognitive excellence or, at least, through reliable faculties. Virtue epistemology has a lot of strengths to recommend it, especially its account of the normativity and the value of knowledge. Many, however, consider it to be a non-starter because of a growing list of problems some of the most well known of which concern testimony, that is, coming to believe things on the say-so of others. There are at least three problems for virtue/ credit views associated with testimony. First, if anyone deserves the credit for one coming by a true testimonial belief, it would seem to be the testifier not the recipient of testimony. Second, one commonly predicates testimonial knowledge of children despite the fact that they are gullible and thus not skillful recipients of testimony. Third, results from social psychology challenge the idea that we are at all reliable in monitoring others for trustworthiness, deceit, or competence. In this talk, I develop an anti-individualistic virtue epistemology, and I use it to resolve these three supposed shortcomings of virtue epistemologies and credit theories of knowledge.


Written by Lucas Thorpe

March 3, 2013 at 7:51 pm

One Response

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  1. Hello Dr. Adam Green,
    I am excited to see this post. I am working on this issue for my doctoral dissertation. It will be great if I can get a draft of this paper. I have some dilammas regarding virtue epistemology approach to knowledge. The way you began your abstract triggered those in me again. Your first sentence is : “Virtue epistemology and credit theories of knowledge think about knowledge as a kind of achievement”. I am wondering why do you say ‘virtue epistemology and credit theory’. Are there any other strand in virtue epistemology other than credit therory which consider knowledge as achievement?
    I was trying to clasiffy virtue epistemological account of knowledge in to two: 1) Achievement theory and; 2) Credit theory. I attempted to formulate them as follows.
    Achievement theory: Knowledge is an achievement. Knowledge is a true belief where the agent’s intellectual virtues are the most salient explanation for her/him possessing the true beleif.
    Credit theory: knowledge is beleif whose success is ‘creditable’ to the beleiver”. Here knowledge is an achievement of the agent which deserves credit.

    Formulating the views in this way seem to pose difficulties. It seems that the feature of ‘deserving credit’ is built into the notion of ‘achievement’. Hence to say ‘achievements which deserve credit’ is tautologous. So there is only one theory of knowledge here: the view that knowledge is an achievement. For this not to be the case there must be achievements which do not deserve credit; I am not sure whether it can be the case.
    I request you to provide me your response on this.


    August 30, 2013 at 12:51 pm

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